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Abstract
This dissertation is concerned with the scientific practice in which a mathematical
construct that was originally developed to study a particular subject matter subsequently
used in other disciplines or sub-disciplines for a different subject matter, a phenomenon
that I call ‘tool migration.’ I argue that tool migration can be ‘epistemically risky.’
Specifically, uprooting a research tool from one disciplinary context and re-situating it
for use in another can change how the tool is applied; whatever has made the tool useful
and reliable in the first place may not have stayed the same in the new context. Using the
migrations of game theory and formal language theory as examples, I identify three kinds
of epistemic risks associated with tool migration: mischaracterization (i.e., characterizing
a new phenomenon with inappropriate assumptions), misinterpretation, (i.e., using illfitted background contexts to interpret the result), and misjudgment (i.e., incorrectly
rejecting or accepting a novel use of a migrating research tool). However, my analyses of
these tool migration stories show that (1) proactive modifications to a tool in migration
are conducive to successfully applying an old tool in a new context, (2) being aware of
the changes to a tool due to migration is crucial to avoid misinterpretation and
misjudgment, and (3) there is a need for a study of tool migration to understand how
scientists manage (or may manage) these risks.
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Chapter 1
1.1

Introduction

Orientation

Research projects and programs involving researchers from multiple disciplines are a
growing trend as part of scientific practice. As a result, inter, cross, or
multidisciplinary research programs have become a significant force in knowledge
generation. One important aspect of this trend in knowledge production is the
development and use of formal models, theories, or methods that are meant for bridging
gaps between scientists who have different training and approaches.
An example of such an emerging research program is cognitive biology, one
strand of experimental psychology that emerges from the development of the theory of
formal languages (or formal language theory ‘FLT’) in linguistics and computer science.1
FLT, including its components such as automata theory and the Chomsky hierarchy, is the
study of mathematically defined languages. Cognitive biology is the study of cognition
as a biological function. One advocate of this new strand of cognitive science, Tecumseh
Fitch (2014, 330), argues that a “triangulation between three disciplines” neuroscience,
the cognitive sciences, and cognitive biology is required to properly understand both the
evolution of and neural substrate for human linguistic capacity. According to Fitch (ibid.,
330), neuroscience provides an understanding of “the firm physical foundations of brain

Throughout the dissertation, I will use ‘the theory of formal languages’ and ‘formal
language theory’ interchangeably.
1
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function,” cognitive biology provides “a comparative viewpoint.” Most germane to my
inquiry, Fitch proposes that the “bridging functions between all” these “domains should
build upon the insights of computer science” and, in particular, on the theories of
computability and FLT (ibid., 330).
Fitch's proposal would be familiar to the philosophers of mind, as it is rooted in
the classical, computational theory of mind, which views the human mind or the human
brain (or, to some philosophers, both) as an information processing system. In the
traditionally anthropocentric research landscape of cognitive science, what is new in
Fitch’s approach to cognition is the stress on the inclusion of nonhuman animal model
organism in the study of human cognition.2 For Fitch, essential to the inclusion is the
crossdisciplinary application of the theory of formal languages. Applying FLT allows
experimental psychologists to design experiments to probe the abilities of subjects—both
human and nonhuman animals—to learn artificial grammars. The experimental results,
in turn, shed light on 1) which kind of information processing system resides in the
subjects and 2) the differences between the species of subjects in terms of the information
processing system that they possess.
In this dissertation, I focus primarily on the journey of the theory of formal
languages. FLT was originated in Chomsky’s study of natural languages (Chomsky
1956; Ginsburg 1980). Between its initial formulation by Chomsky and its recent, novel
applications in cognitive biology (e.g., Fitch and Hauser 2004), FLT received intervening
development in computer science for improving the design of both the programming

Early exceptions include, e.g., Brooks 1991; Bechtel, Graham, and Balota 1998, chap. 8;
Bekoff, Allen, and Burghardt 2002; Allen and Bekoff 1999. Some of the more recent
work includes, e.g., Andrews 2014.
2
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languages and their corresponding recognizers, called ‘automata’ (e.g., Greibach 1981).
Since 2000, the results of artificial grammar learning experiment have been used to infer
about the computational constraints to the subjects' cognitive infrastructures (e.g., Hauser,
Chomsky, and Fitch 2002; Fitch and Hauser 2004; ten Cate and Okanoya 2012). The use,
including the experimental use, of FLT in cognitive biology thus presents a rich source
for understanding knowledge production in the era of inter and crossdisciplinarity —
the subject matter that I set out to explore in this dissertation.

1.2

Motivation

The story of FLT makes a curious case to philosophers of science, particularly those to
whom crossdisciplinarity as scientific practice is of interest. How has a theory
developed in linguistics for studying natural languages become the backbone of
computing technologies and now a promising bridge, as Fitch argues, that links cognitive
biology, neuroscience, and the cognitive sciences?
Nonetheless, outside its native and home disciplines (linguistics and computer
science, respectively), FLT, just like many other theoretical frameworks and models, has
been applied in various kinds of research. In addition to cognitive biology that I am
investigating in this dissertation, the theory has been applied by molecular biologists to
tackle various problems, including the problem of recognizing proteinencoding genes
(e.g., Head 1987; Dong and Searls 1994; Searls 1992, 1993, 1995, 2002), the
implementation of computation in cells or DNA (e.g., Paun et al. 1998/2005), and the
design and verification of synthetic genetic constructs (e.g., Cai et al. 2007; Coll et al.
2016).
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In light of these various areas that the theory participates, I term my approach to
the case of FLT a study of ‘tool migration’  a project that investigates how formal
constructs such as theoretical frameworks or mathematical models ‘migrate’ across
disciplinary contexts to gain new ways of using them. If one views scientific research as
knowledge production of some sort, then mathematical constructs like FLT can be seen as
playing crucial, facilitating roles in the overall generation of knowledge. Moreover, if
one thinks of these facilitating theories or models in science as ‘tools for research,’ which
is a position I will defend in Chapter 2, then the study of the migration of a
wellcirculated research tool becomes a study of the trajectory through which the tool
augments its epistemic capacity. For indeed, after making the transition from one
discipline to another, the research tool in question gains new recognition for its expanded
usages in the enterprise of knowledge production.
All that said, research tools do not simply work magically in multiple disciplinary
contexts; instead, much work has to be done for such a transition to occur and to occur
smoothly. In the case of formal language theory, it can be speculated that the ways in
which the theory is used in aforementioned disciplines differ significantly as the users
adapt the theory to suit different subjectmatters and to meet particular disciplinary needs.
As such, the term ‘tool migration’ aims to capture both the ‘situatedness’ of a research
tool that was established in its native or home discipline and the effort it takes to
‘resituate’ the tool in a foreign discipline. In particular, during the process of uprooting
a research tool, significant contextual details may be stripped away, such as the implicit
expertise or background assumptions that go into formulating a problem or interpreting
the result of a calculation. Similarly, during the resituation, new expertise and
4

background assumptions may be introduced so that members of the importing discipline
may use the tool to formulate a problem and interpret the results of calculation in a new
context. Consequently, whatever might justify a tool’s usefulness in the first place might
not be carried over to the new context in which it is resituated.
In addition to losing what makes the tool useful in the first place, there might be
the risk of error particularly associated with using a research tool that is newly migrated
into the discipline. Such errors include mischaracterization (i.e., characterizing the
phenomenon in question with inappropriate assumptions), misinterpretation, (i.e., using
illfitted background contexts to interpret the result), and misjudgment (i.e., falsely
rejecting or accepting a novel use of a migrating research tool). Among these errors,
mischaracterizing a target phenomenon and misinterpreting a computational result could
lead to further errors of explanation in the new discipline or errors of prediction about the
target phenomenon. Each of these errors, including misjudgment, incurs various costs
(e.g., waste of resources, opportunity costs). It is thus desirable to treat a migrated
research tool with care.
Taken together, by studying the applications of FLT across disciplines, this
dissertation aims to shed light on the features that give rise to its usefulness across
various disciplines and, conversely, the limitations that may have inadvertently escaped
the attention of both scientists and philosophers of science.

1.3

My Approach, Research Questions, and Emphases

This dissertation seeks to contrast the role of the theory of formal languages in
applications in three disciplines: linguistics, computer science, and more recently
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cognitive biology. My approach to this inquiry, however, is not meant to be historical.
Instead, what I aim to deliver is a philosophical reflection on the epistemic issues related
to its recent application in cognitive biology, i.e., drawing upon its ‘reputation’ in
computer science to answer the question concerned with the ‘species difference’ between
humans and other animals in terms of linguistic capacity. On the one hand, because FLT
is at the intersection of multiple disciplines (it is especially regarded as a wellestablished
component in the theory of computation in computer science), it is an attractive candidate
for research applications. On the other hand, for the same reason, it is far from clear what
renders the theory suitable for applications outside the disciplines of its inception and
early development, especially the role it plays in cognitive biology — bridging between
disciplines that are related to or in direct contact with the study of the mind and brain of
both humans and other animals. Specifically, my research questions are:
1. What are the epistemic features that make it attractive to researchers from
different, and not directly related, scientific contexts?
2. What might be the risks involved in producing disciplinary knowledge with the
aid of a migrated tool such as formal language theory?
Each of these two questions concerns, respectively, the positive aspect and the negative
aspect of the crossdisciplinary migrations of formal language theory. However, instead
of treating these questions with equal attention, I put a slight emphasis on the second, i.e.,
the epistemic risks involved in tool migration.
Despite the recent interest to the topic of modeling and model transfer, the
negative aspect of tool migration has not had the due attention they deserve from the
philosophers of science. The discussion of model transfer concerns a relatively small set
6

of mathematical models that are applied in multiple disciplinary contexts. One of the
first philosophers of science to provide an account of model transfer, Paul Humphreys
(2002, 2004, 2018) argues that versatile models are used to study phenomena of different
domains because of the computational tractability they afford. Other philosophers
(Knuuttila and Loettgers 2014, 2016) suggest that some versatile models provide not only
computational tractability but also conceptual frameworks for theorization, which they
label ‘model templates.’ These authors’ analyses offer valuable insights, some of which
converge with my finding (as I report in Chapter 3). At the same time, their unanimous
omission on the risks inherent in this aspect of scientific practice calls for a remedy.
By contrast, in recent work that focuses on the use of evidence across disciplines,
Mary Morgan (2010) presents a cogent analysis of why using evidence that is outside its
site of discovery or construction, which she calls ‘traveling facts,’ needs to proceed with
care. Specifically, facts could be received and treated as evidence in different ways
according to the disciplinary base; once leaving the base where they were first found,
facts might lose their usefulness and reliability. I take Morgan’s discussion on traveling
facts to be a starting point in my investigation. While my concern lies mainly in formal
constructs instead of evidence (and much less about facts), as the chapters that follow
will show, examining the usefulness of a research tool across disciplines prove to yield a
fruitful result.

1.4

Organization

I organize the rest of this dissertation as follows.
In Chapter 2, I make two assumptions about the use of mathematical constructs in
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science. The first assumption is concerned with the instrumental characteristics of
mathematical constructs, which allows me to view them as ‘research tools.’ I use game
theory as an example and lay out three instrumental characteristics. Mathematical
constructs are used to:
(1) formulate a research question into a tractable form,
(2) obtain an analytic result of the formulation, and
(3) interpret the analytic result as a solution or answer to the research question.
The second assumption is concerned with the contextual details of research tools. I
suggest that research tools are ‘specific’ to a subject matter and ‘sensitive’ to the
disciplinary context wherein it was first conceived. From these two assumptions (i.e., the
‘research tool assumption’ and the ‘subjectspecific assumption,’ respectively), I argue
that tool migration can be epistemically risky. Crucial disciplinary contexts can be lost in
the ‘uprooting’ of a research tool or in the ‘resituation’ of the tool, or both. One
potential consequence is that whatever that makes the tool useful and reliable in the
previous context fails to migrate with the tool into the new context.
To pursue this line of thought, I model my investigation of tool migration after
Morgan’s (2010) work on ‘traveling facts.’ Morgan’s primary concern is the use of
evidence outside its initial site of construction or discovery; her analysis of traveling facts
thus reveals many features that the tools in migration also display. These common
features—their role in knowledge production, their locality in origin, and their
autonomy—prompt me to consider whether ‘losing integrity’ during tool migration hurts
the cause of the scientific enterprise as it does in the context of traveling facts. However,
despite rich in many ways, Morgan’s analysis of traveling facts lacks a criterion with
8

which to systematically determine ‘integrity.’ According to Morgan, ‘losing integrity’
refers to a change in the content of a fact due to traveling. In my work, ‘losing integrity’
refers to a change in the content of a research tool due to migration. The difference
between my work and Morgan’s lies in that I develop a clear view of what this ‘content’
would be when it comes to the tools in migration. Specifically, I determine the content of
a research tool by its instrumental characteristics. The content of a research tool includes
(1) the definitions of the theoretical terms that factor into formulating a research question
and (2) the ways in which the analytic results are interpreted as an answer or a solution to
the formulated question. For brevity, I refer to (1) and (2) as a tool’s ‘target profile’ and
‘usage profile,’ respectively.
In Chapter 3, I develop a fourfold typology as an ‘integrity’ check, which itself is
based on two conceptpairs. First, between applications of a tool in migration, I
distinguish an ‘established’ application and a ‘novel’ application. Second, within an
application of a tool, I distinguish the tool’s target profile and its usage profile. Based on
the changes (or the lack of changes) in these profiles between the established and the
novel applications, I lay out four types of tool migration. In particular, tool migration
refers to the practice of applying a research tool to study a subject matter that is ‘new to
the tool’ (i.e., in so far as this tool’s previous applications are concerned). I analyze this
practice into one of the four types as follow. Between the established and the novel
applications:
● a ‘toolapplication’ occurs when both the target profile and the usage profile of
the tool remain similar,
● a ‘tooladaptation’ occurs when the tool’s target profile remains critically similar,
9

whereas its usage profile has changed,
● a ‘tooltransfer’ occurs when the tool’s usage profile remains critically similar,
whereas its target profile has changed, and finally
● a ‘tooltransformation’ occurs when both the target profile and the usage profile
of the tool have changed.
To demonstrate, I examine an argument which suggests that losing integrity in tool
migration is suboptimal. Using the migration stories of game theory as examples, I arrive
at a negative conclusion; losing integrity in tool migration could, in fact, be optimal.
Game theory originated in the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions
between decisionmaking agents (von Neumann 1928). According to my analysis, its
migration from the social sciences to biology and its homecoming from biology back to
the social sciences shows two examples of tooltransformation (c.f. GrüneYanoff 2011a,
2016). Based on the analysis in Chapter 3, I argue that while ‘uprooting’ and
‘resituating’ indeed undermine the tool’s integrity and while an exogenous research tool
should be handled with extra care, losing integrity is not the problem. Losing integrity
can be desirable and productive if it is resulting from proactive modifications to the tool
as the users resituate it into their respective disciplinary context. I conclude this chapter
by discussing three concepts of epistemic risks associated with tool migration. For
instance, modifying the target profile may help to prevent other users from the error of
(1) mischaracterizing their target system with illfitting assumptions and (2)
misinterpreting their analytic results. Most importantly, I pointed out that the inventor
does not always have the best judgment of the limits of the tool that he or she
constructed. I call this kind of error ‘misjudgment,’ i.e., (3) falsely rejecting or accepting
10

a novel use of a migrating research tool.
In Chapter 4, I launch my investigation of the migration of FLT. I begin by
reviewing two applications, one in linguistics another in computer science. Based these
two applications, I argue that one crucial usage of FLT in linguistics is to theorize what
kind of information processing device is best to describe the syntax of human language.
By contrast, in computer science, the theory is not only applied to theorize about
computability but also applied to engineer computers based on design needs. Thus, the
migration from linguistics to computer science has augmented the usage profile of FLT.
However, in contrast to the augmented usage profile, the application of FLT in computer
science shows a target profile that is critically similar to its application in linguistics.
Consequently, according to my typology, this particular migration can be categorized as
tooladaptation.
In Chapter 5, I explore one positive impact brought by applying the theory of
formal languages in cognitive biology. Cognitive biology is the study of cognition as a
biological function, one strand of which aims to understand both the evolution of and
neural substrate for human linguistic capacity (Fitch 2014). It does so by applying FLT
in experiments to test the abilities in nonhuman animals to learn artificial grammars. The
first example of this approach is reported in Fitch and Hauser’s (2004).
Bringing animal model organisms in contact with formal models of languages to
investigate human linguistic capacity presents an intriguing and positive aspect of tool
migration. On the one hand, using animal model organisms for the inquiry of human
psychology has been a trademark of the behaviorist program, whose decline is often
credited to Chomsky (1959a). On the other hand, the return of songbirds and nonhuman
11

primates to the quest of understanding the faculty of human language is based on the
classification scheme — the skeleton of which was singlehandedly constructed by
Chomsky (1956, 1959b). One may ask: How do scientists marry the behaviorist and the
cognitivist approaches by bringing animals as model organisms back to the study of the
linguistic capacity of humans? I argue that the key to this integrating branch of cognitive
biology lies in an innovative insight from the migrating trajectory of FLT. In particular,
the cognitive biologists ‘enable’ the Chomsky hierarchy—specifically, the scheme that
computer scientists use to classify automata—to classify different systems of animal
cognition, humans included. This innovation thus integrates animal model organisms
with formal models of languages into one scientific enterprise. For this reason, I refer to
Fitch and Hauser’s innovative application ‘the experiment of artificial grammar learning
(‘AGL’) powered by the theory of formal languages’ or ‘FLTpoweredAGL.’
Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss two negative reactions to applying the
FLTpoweredAGL experimental protocols within cognitive biology. The first negative
reaction comes from alert neurolinguists (Honing and Zuidema 2014) who disagree with
Fitch over the usefulness and reliability of FLT in neurolinguistic studies. The second
negative reaction is a misunderstanding of the intended use of the protocols. Specifically,
some commentators interpret Fitch and Hauser’s experiment as a test for ‘recursion’ (i.e.,
the capacity of ‘infinite use of finite means’ or ‘openendedness’). In another paper,
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) suggest that recursion is a feature which bears unique
significance to human language. That paper and Fitch and Hauser’s work (2004) together
prompted a surge of experiment searching for recursion in nonhuman animals.
Unfortunately, the FLTpoweredAGL experimental protocols do not test for recursion.
12

This misuse of the tool brought backlashes to Fitch and Hauser’s work and cast a shadow
on their achievement.
In one of their efforts to clear the confusion, Fitch (2010) argues that the lack of
proper understanding of FLT on the users’ part is the source that caused this unfortunate
search of recursion. In contrast, I argue that a misleading passage in the coauthored
paper by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) is also culpable. This unfortunate episode
of tool migration highlights the responsibility of ‘importers.’ Being an importer of a
migrant research tool is of great responsibility. For by introducing a research tool to a
new context, one may be exposing other users under an assortment of epistemic risks.
Mistaking the tool for doing something which it does not is but one example. There may
be more.

13

Chapter 2
Basic Assumptions and Concepts for a Study of Tool Migration

I begin my investigation by developing a conceptual framework with which I analyze the
migration of formal language theory (‘FLT’). Because my analysis will be touching on
multiple disciplinary contexts wherein the theory has been applied, I aim for the
framework to be somewhat general, i.e., not specific to any given disciplinary context, for
a systematic analysis. The goal of this chapter is to start developing this very framework.
In Section 2.1, I discuss two assumptions that I take to be the starting point to my
investigation: First, a research tool is a mathematical construct used in science in a
certain fashion which justifies viewing it as a research tool. Relevant to the idea of a
research tool are three instrumental characteristics: (i) formulating a research question
into a tractable form, (ii) obtaining an analytic result from the formulated form, and (iii)
interpreting the result as a solution or an answer to the initial research question. Second,
I contend that the construction of research tools is both specific to the subjectmatter and
sensitive to the disciplinary context in which the construction takes place. In Section 2.2,
I elaborate on what I mean by ‘tool migration’ and discuss why tool migration can be
epistemically risky. In Section 2.3, I describe Mary Morgan’s (2010) work on the
crossdisciplinary use of evidence, which she calls ‘traveling facts.’ In Section 2.4, I
recount her argument for why one should be cautious when using facts that have traveled
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away from the site of initial discovery or construction. Crucial to her argument is the
idea of the ‘integrity’ of the traveling facts. A traveling fact traveled with integrity when
its content remains “more or less intact during its travel” (Morgan, 2010, 12).
Conversely, ‘losing integrity’ refers to a traveling fact that “changes so much during its
travels that it is not recognisable as the same fact or has lost its credibility as a fact”
(ibid.). Using her cautionary tale as inspiration, I continue in the next chapter to develop
my analysis, essentially a typology with which to detect ‘integrity’ of a tool in migration.

2.1

Two Assumptions

A tool migration study makes at least two assumptions regarding its target of study. First,
I assume that mathematical constructs used in science can be viewed as tools, and as I
focus on the ways in which they are used in scientific research, I call them ‘research
tools.’ Second, I assume that research tools are subjectspecific, which means that each
research tool is constructed for a certain subject matter. Let me elaborate on these two
assumptions in turn. For brevity, I call them the ‘research tool assumption’ and the
‘subjectspecific assumption.’ Throughout this chapter and the next chapter, I will use
game theory—the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions between rational
decision makers—as an example to illustrate these two assumptions. I reserve the
discussion of formal language theory for Chapters 46 when I have sufficiently motivated
the case and framework for studying tool migration. Also, the much more technical
details required to introduce formal language theory prevents it from being an effective
example in the early stage of building, as well as introducing, the framework.
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2.1.1

The Research Tool Assumption

By a ‘research tool,’ I mean any formal construct in science that is to be used (or
operated) in a seemingly systematic manner, and the outcome of whose operation is to be
interpreted to answer a question related to a particular subject matter. Consider game
theory. The operational aspect of a game theoretic analysis consists of three basic steps
as follow.
First, to apply game theory, one needs to formulate a particular strategic
interaction in game theoretic terms, such as ‘players,’ ‘acts’ and their ‘payoffs.’ This
process involves identifying who the players are, what may be their acts, and assigning a
numeric value to each of these acts as payoff before representing the interaction in a
matrix. Second, having assigned the values to the acts, one calculates to obtain an
analytic result of this formulation, such as the Nash equilibrium. Third, and finally, one
interprets this abovementioned result as the solution to the question regarding a
particular strategic interaction. In other words, to apply game theory is to follow these
three basic steps (‘problem formulation,’ ‘calculation,’ and ‘interpretation’).3
Moreover, concerning especially the interpretational aspect of a research tool, a
user obtains a result after going through the steps of problem formulation and calculation.
Note that this result can be properly understood only through the lens of a certain
interpretation. For example, a Nash equilibrium is a set of acts or moves in which every
agent will be better off maintaining his or her decision given other players doing the
same. In a sense, the Nash equilibrium of a gametheoretic analysis is a meaningful

My analysis does not exclude that in actual practice, one may need to go through these
steps multiple times to finetune the result.
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‘solution’ in virtue of the usual understanding of the gametheoretic formulation of a
problem.
To put the analysis above in general terms, I contend that a research tool guides its
users to
i. formulate a problem concerning a subject matter (‘problem formulation’),
ii. obtain an analytic result for the formulated problem using the tool (‘calculation’),
and then
iii. interpret the result as a solution to the problem, which advances users'
understanding of the subject matter (‘interpretation’).
Jointly, problem formulation, calculation, and interpretation give rise to the instrumental
characteristics of formal constructs in science that justify viewing them as ‘research
tools.’ To drive home the point, when applying such a construct, the goal of performing a
sequence of prescribed steps as depicted in (ii) goes beyond merely completing the
calculation to obtain a result. Instead, as described in (iii), this result itself is to be
interpreted in a certain way so that one may solve a problem, answer a research question,
or, eventually, gain knowledge about a subject matter. Indeed, manipulating symbols is a
means to the end that was specified in (i) during the mathematical formulation of the
initial problem. Thus, a formal construct that exhibits these abovementioned
characteristics in scientific practice can be seen as a research tool because it assists its
users to meet an end.
To complete my sketch of a conceptual framework toward a tool migration
analysis, I now turn to the second assumption: the subjectspecific assumption.
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2.1.2

The SubjectSpecific Assumption

Like any product of scientific endeavor, research tools are constructed in a particular
place and time. Some of them are further developed and eventually receive recognition
as a viable tool within a certain scientific context. Assume that a scientific context is to
be characterized by its subject matter, metaphysical commitments, methodological
assumptions, and the accepted hypotheses or research questions. Then the recognition of
a certain construct as a viable research tool is contextspecific. That is, the recognition of
a research tool being useful and reliable is granted given all the characteristics of the
scientific context or tradition in which the tool is constructed or developed. In other
words, a certain construct becomes an established research tool when it is acknowledged
by its users in a particular scientific context. It follows that the very scientific context's
characteristics determine the said tool's research capacities (e.g., to what subjects it may
be justifiably applied or in what ways it could legitimately be used to produce
knowledge).
Among the characteristics of a scientific tradition, the subject matter is arguably
the most salient feature regarding a research tool. For example, the subject matter of
game theory is strategic interaction between rational agents, individuals or groups. For
example, the subject matter of game theory is strategic interaction between rational
agents, individuals or groups. Research tools are subjectspecific in the sense that they
are constructed to carry out a series of actions such that certain questions regarding their
subject matter can be answered.
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2.2

What is Tool Migration and Why it Needs Attention

Having introduced the concepts of ‘research tools’ and the ‘subjectspecific’ assumption,
I now specify what I mean by a case of tool migration:

When a formal construct, which has been recognized as a viable research tool for
a particular subject matter in a particular (sub)disciplinary context in science, is
allegedly used for different subject matter in an another (sub)disciplinary context,
it is a case of tool migration.

Being subjectspecific does not prevent a research tool from being used in investigations
about other subject matters. Indeed, certain advancements in science were made by
discovering novel uses of tools that had been constructed to study something else, such as
the use of Faraday's mechanical model of fluid motion to mathematically characterize the
electromagnetic field (Maxwell 1861). At the same time, the subjectspecific assumption
does entail that when a tool is used in a novel way, some kind of justification is necessary.
Thus, when such a justification is missing or misled, the novel use of an established tool
can raise epistemic concerns. For instance, game theory—developed to model strategic
interaction between rational agents (von Neumann 1928)—has been borrowed to study
biological evolution (e.g., MaynardSmith and Price 1972). Formal theoretical
frameworks, such as game theory, are appealing candidates of tool migration perhaps
because they are abstract and thus thought to be more generally applicable than, say, the
oxygen theory of combustion. However, on closer inspection of specific applications,
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e.g., game theory used in evolutionary biology, one may question whether gametheoretic
notions and analyses are appropriate for generating knowledge about biological
evolution—where assumptions about rational agents and their strategic reasoning may
not apply. These concerns motivate this present dissertation that I term a study of tool
migration. Because without some deeper understanding of what is behind the tool and
what may justify its novel use, the status of the result of using an established research
tool in a novel way is unclear at best.
In other words, the ‘research tool’ assumption and the ‘subjectspecific’
assumption jointly suggest that tool migration can be epistemically risky. When an
established research tool appears in use outside its discipline of origin, whether the tool’s
efficacy gets carried over becomes a question. Thus, cases of tool migration in science
call for attention. In the literature, there have not been explicit discussions concerned
with the epistemic risks associated with tool migration, except for Mary Morgan’s
cautionary tale for the use of traveling facts.

2.3

Be Cautious of ‘Traveling Facts’

In “Traveling Facts” (2010), Morgan reports three features of facts that are germane to
the caution of using the ‘welltraveled’ ones. First, facts are locally discovered or
produced. Second, facts are used to generate further knowledge. Third, and, most
crucial, facts are autonomous — that is, once released to the community, facts gain a life
of their own; users may then find novel ways of using those facts, within or outside their
initial context, with or without a blessing from the original producer or discoverer of the
facts. Based on these observations, resulting as a summary of a fouryearlong research
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project devoted to analyzing the dissemination of facts, Morgan argues that one should be
cautious when using facts that have traveled ‘far’ and ‘wide,’ i.e., having been through
multiple contexts that do not share much in common.
According to Morgan, a fact is a piece of knowledge, locally generated, accepted
by the members of its local community for its usefulness and reliability. A traveling fact
is one that finds new users, new uses, or that morphs into new shapes (e.g., becoming
fiction) within or outside its local community. Before unpacking her argument, I should
note that by ‘facts,’ Morgan does not merely refer to ‘true statements’ of some sort. To
her, facts come in different forms. They “may be expressed in linguistic statements ...;
they may appear in pictures, diagrams, models, maps, documents, biographies or novels;
they may be found as material facts located in artefacts” or “as numerical constructions
about the future of our overheated planet” (Morgan 2010, 8). More relevant to our
present purpose, facts may also be “expressed in the behavioural characteristics of”
organisms in an experimental setting or in “statistical and mathematical models” (ibid.,
pp. 8/27). In addition to being elements of knowledge, this wide range of things that
Morgan calls facts, share the following features: they are usable, generated locally,
accepted by their communities as useful and reliable, and finally autonomous.
Invoking the metaphor of traveling, Morgan (2010) focuses on characterizing the
dissemination of evidence that is produced or discovered in a wide range of areas. To
illustrate, I will use her examples from ethology, climate science, and the medical case
report system. Morgan’s work on traveling facts, which I briefly review as follows,
provides a point of departure for my analysis of tool migration in Chapter 3.
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2.3.1

Facts are usable

In Morgan's (2010, 8) words, “facts are a usable category.” Some facts are used to
produce additional knowledge. For instance, the medical reports of several young men in
New York showing an unusual coalition of symptoms led to the recognition and
4

characterization of a thennew disease, the HIVAIDS syndrome. Some facts are used to
make decisions. For example, medical case reports of wellknown, highly infectious,
diseases such as measles or flu, are used, through statistical methods or simulations, to
predict the spread of the diseases. In light of these predictions, public health authorities
5

choose proper responses to better control the spread. For another example, Niko
Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz reported in the presence of overhead moving silhouettes of
predators, certain species of birds on the ground instinctively take cover. This ethological
discovery has inspired the design of birdsofprey window decals in silhouette style,
6

intended to reduce the number of small birds flying into the glass. Window decals of
this sort have not only been available for purchase but also seen in the display at locations
across continents. However, just because facts travel to be used elsewhere does not mean
that they always travel well.
While Tinbergen and Lorenz's scientific discovery seems to have remained
suitably qualified, those window decals turn out not to work as intended. According to
Morgan’s report, genuinely flying birds do not seem to avoid stationary silhouettes of

4

Ankeny 2010, summarized in Morgan 2010.

5

Mansnerus 2010, summarized in Morgan 2010.

6

Burkhardt 2010, summarized in Morgan 2010.
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their predators. Nonetheless, the National Audubon Society—a nonprofit organization
for the conservation of birds, other wildlife, and healthy ecosystem—advises birdlovers
to use window decals to prevent bird collision. In the instructions, it is emphasized that
7

the decals must be spaced “no more than 24 inches apart.” One can argue that in that
case, what essentially deters wild birds from colliding into the windows is the density of
the decals, which creates a visible barrier to the birds. Thus, the shape of these window
decals is largely irrelevant. In this example, Morgan suggests, we have seen a scientific
discovery travel to inspire and influence decisions in the practical realm (i.e., the
production and the consumption of these decals), only to find itself turned into some kind
of urban legend. Such an ending for a traveling fact is undesirable and yet not
exceptional as it could happen to facts generated in other areas. In some scientific
domains, for instance climate science or epidemiology, successful traveling of facts can
be crucial to the wellbeing of humans, which Morgan takes to be an important
motivation for a proper understanding of traveling facts.
2.3.2

Facts are generated locally

No matter how far and widely facts venture away from their origins, they are typically
“generated in a particular time and place and developed by particular individuals or
groups of scientists” (Morgan 2014, 1013). To Morgan, facts are local in both the
spatialtemporal sense and the sociological sense. Facts, regardless of whether they were
discovered or produced, have their “place of origin” (Morgan 2010, 8). This point is
demonstrated even in the medical case reports that became the early diagnoses of

7

Audubon.org 2014 http://www.audubon.org/news/helpbirdsavoiddeadlycollision
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HIVAIDS. It is true that the recognition of the new disease took several medical reports
from different sources, but the documentation of each of those individual reports occurred
in a particular location at a point in time. In terms of their sociological attribute, behind a
discovery or a production of facts is always a discoverer or a producer who handed the
fact to other members in the community. The sociological locality of a fact, thus, refers
to the immediate community members who would become the first group of people to
accept the discovery or production to be reliable and useful.
An important assumption in Morgan's account about this locality of facts is that
the criterion of ‘facthood’ is communitydependent. That is, she does not rely on, nor
does she attempt to develop, an objective criterion for picking out what may be facts.
Instead, it is the behavior of a community toward a particular piece of discoveries or
intellectual creations that marks facts from nonfacts. On the one hand, according to
Morgan (2010), facts are not to be understood “as an expression of that community's
belief, or opinion, but rather that such a community has good reasons to take those things
as facts, and will be likely to have the confidence to act upon them as facts” (p. 11,
original emphases). A community is said to have come to ‘accept’ things in their
community as facts when they are “sufficient for people to act upon them or use them in
support of their action” (ibid., 11). On the other hand, being recognized as a fact in one
community does not automatically make it so in another. The context that makes facts
useful and reliable in the community does not travel as facts do; it stays in the
community. At the same time, of course, the locality of facts does not constrain them to
stay only within their immediate community. This leads to the autonomy of facts that I
discuss next.
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2.3.3

Facts are autonomous

Facts, Morgan writes, “turn out to be like children: Their parents who found or fashioned
them soon lose control of them, they leave home, their product markings become lost as
they make their way into all sorts of other unknown communities and fulfill all sorts of
unexpected purposes” (2010, 26). This metaphor captures “the tendency of facts to travel
relatively independently” without “much reference to the context in which they were
produced” (ibid., 26).
Facts leave their place of origin and immediate community to be used elsewhere,
but not all of them travel well. We have seen the example in which an ecological
discovery turned into some kind of urban legend. According to Morgan (2010), facts
concerned with climate change provide another example.
We all know about climate change from the scientists, but these facts did not
travel easily to us. We all know now that the world’s climate is getting warmer,
but for a long time, we were not very sure what facts we knew: how certain it
was, how serious it was, how fast the change was happening, how different bits of
evidence fitted together to form a consistent account and how far different
scientists were in agreement about it. And we still don’t know much about how it
will affect different parts of the globe. (Morgan, 2010, 4)
In turn, these facts about climate change did not enter the practical realm soon enough
where they could make the (potentially much) needed impact. Successful travels of facts
can be crucial to the wellbeing of humans. Thus, Morgan asks: What makes facts travel
well so that the dissemination of them brings positive influence instead of
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misinformation? In order to answer that question, she first addresses what it means for
facts to travel well.
2.3.4

Traveling fruitfully and traveling with integrity

Morgan begins her analysis by examining two ideas: A fact travels well when it travels
fruitfully and when it travels with integrity. ‘Traveling fruitfully’ refers to the fecundity
of the journey:
[F]acts may travel far and wide in terms of time and of geographical and
disciplinary space to find new users. More unusually, perhaps, are the ways in
which facts find new uses: They gain new functions, coalesce in new patterns and
make new narratives. (2010, 12 emphasis original)
In other words, the increase of new users, new uses, or new communities, suggests a
welltraveled fact. This idea of ‘traveling fruitfully’ is meant to capture the intuition, as
Morgan contends, that facts that encounter resistance outside their immediate community
cannot be said to have traveled well. For instance, the number of ‘climate change
skeptics’ indicates that facts that are established in climate science are thought to be
fictitious by some communities.
By contrast, ‘traveled with integrity’ refers to the stability in the content of the
traveling fact, namely, whether the content remains “more or less intact during its travel”
(2010, 12). As Morgan puts it, “if a fact changes so much during its travels that it is not
recognisable as the same fact or has lost its credibility as a fact, it would be hard to claim
that the fact has travelled well” (ibid.). Taken these two aspects together, facts that travel
well are those that expand their influence in the dimensions of users, uses, and
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communities, all the while without compromising their content.
2.3.5

Adventurous travel of facts

It turns out that, according to Morgan (2010), if one accepts the community view of facts,
there is a potential tradeoff between traveling fruitfully and traveling with integrity.
Consider the justification based on which each community accepts or denies particular
things as facts. Justifications of this sort are derived from the “integrated clusters of
knowledge elements” previously established within a community (Morgan 2010, 14).
For instance, facts “often have details that we might call qualifications,” which are
“circumstantial or contextual elements that contribute to their usefulness (ibid., 16).
These qualifications that may be wellunderstood but implicit within a given community
are thus an essential component of the ‘facthood’ of a fact within that community.
However, when facts travel, these qualifications, whose relevance to the acceptance and
meaning of the fact, might not be evident to those outside the community.
Moreover, facts may “pick up extra elements on their travels and become covered
with additional elements or even sharpened in certain ways” (ibid., 16). It follows,
Morgan argues, that leaving its community of origin “may subtly change the nature” of
the traveling fact (ibid., 15). Thus, the further the facts travel to meet new users in new
communities, the more challenging it becomes to maintain the integrity of their content.
The situation worsens once we consider seriously the possibility that the
appropriate use of some facts requires expertise that is communityspecific. On the one
hand, Morgan says, “[a]t its most fruitful, the use of travelling facts creates a new pattern,
a new coherence, a new narrative or fulfills a new role” (ibid., 20). On the other hand,
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“[t]hese more adventurous travels of facts, and their ostensible contrasts, have to be
carefully looked out for” because “[t]oo often, what appears to be freely travelling
knowledge is, in fact, dependent on tacit or expert community knowledge to make it
transfer effectively” (ibid., 26). That is, she continues, “such knowledge is not in general
separable from its base in techniques and expertise” (ibid., 26). As a result of the
potential tradeoff between traveling fruitfully and traveling with integrity, one should be
cautious about welltraveled facts.
Nonetheless, despite being local in origin and communitydependent in their
usefulness and reliability, some facts (as she argues) have traveled well, so the question
becomes: What makes facts travel well? Morgan suggests that the success of a fact in a
community does not determine, nor predict, whether a different community will consider
its content useful and reliable. Instead, she argues, what makes facts traveling well is the
“users, in different times, places and disciplines, with different questions and different
purposes, who largely determine the uses of facts at various destinations, and thus how
well they have travelled to fulfill new purposes” (ibid., 25).
Eventually, Morgan concludes that good travel companions are crucial. In order
for traveling facts to be appropriately acted upon, or acted with, in the hands of new users
in new contexts, it takes competent curators to provide correct labeling and proper
packaging of the facts at the point of introduction to a new community. Morgan goes on
to elaborate the labeling and packaging practice using different cases of traveling facts, a
discussion full of insight on its own right, but I will now turn to appraise the concept of
‘traveling with integrity’ in Morgan’s account. For a concept playing a critical role in
judging whether a fact has traveled well, my assessment of it, in particular the concept of
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‘losing integrity,’ shows room for improvement.

2.4

A criterion of integrity for traveling facts? A critical assessment

There are two reasons why a criterion of integrity is important to Morgan’s treatment of
traveling facts. First, the goal of Morgan’s project was to extract information from
successful cases what makes facts travel well, i.e., facts that manage to travel both
fruitfully and with integrity. For this approach to succeed, one needs to be able to
accurately distinguish the facts that have traveled well from those that have not. Second,
according to Morgan, due to the threat of ‘losing integrity,’ one should be cautious when
using facts that have traveled through multiple contexts. Her argument goes roughly as
follows:
1. The components that are used in the production of knowledge within a particular
community are facts to that community in the sense that they are accepted by that
community as being useful and reliable.
2. Such acceptance is based on a cluster of preexisting knowledge, qualifications and
background assumptions, which may or may not apply to the context of other
communities.
3. Traveling facts are facts circulating across communities.
4. However, traveling facts do not travel with the qualifications and background
assumptions that granted their usefulness and reliability in the first place, a
phenomenon that she calls ‘losing the integrity.’
5. As a result of detaching from its base, ‘traveling’ undermines the integrity of the
facts, such that one should be wary of using traveling facts as they may no longer
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be as useful and reliable as they were in their home community.
Putting together, the concept of integrity plays a pivotal role in Morgan’s analysis,
justifying caution whenever traveling facts are in use.
While Morgan is not concerned with what I call research tools, her evaluation of
why one should be careful when using traveling facts is informative to my investigation
of tool migration. It is possible that users of research tools in migration should exercise
care, and it is also possible that what justifies such caution is due to ‘losing integrity.’
Before I proceed to explore these two possibilities in Chapter 3, it is crucial to
take note of how Morgan determine the integrity of traveling facts, a concept I will need
to develop for my inquiry.
To Morgan, it is inevitable that facts change some aspect or another due to travel,
but not all such changes necessarily threaten to undermine their integrity. In her words:
[T]ravelling facts as rubber balls: They have a certain shape; they can be carried,
rolled, squeezed, bounced, kicked and thrown without harm to them; and they can
be used in many different ways and in different situations. (2010, pp. 156)
What would it be like, one asks, for a fact to have changed in ‘shape’ like a rubber ball
without harming the integrity of its content? According to her, despite superficial
changes, the integrity of the content of a traveling fact can be recognized as we see it.
Here is an example Morgan (2010, 16) offers to illustrate the possibility of a fact traveled
far and wide without having undermined its integrity:
A good example is found in the travels of the classical style of architecture from
ancient Greece to nineteenthcentury America. Certain details of the style were
altered in the process of adaptation, such as the nature of the materials, the
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addition of windows and the reversal of light and shade in the exterior. While the
community of American architects and builders seemed to delight in their ability
to adapt the stylistic facts of classical architecture to their own contexts, they also
observed certain boundaries. For despite their additions, alterations and
subtractions, there is no doubt that such buildings retained a recognisable integrity
as examples of “the classical style” in their new domain (Schneider [2011]). This
is what we mean when we suggest that facts that travel well exhibit a strong
degree of integrity, but they also have a degree of squishiness, a squishiness that
may result in them getting their hard edges rubbed off, changing their surface
elements or gaining some additional covering as they travel.
Morgan was not being figurative when speaking of facts changing in shape. The
“additions, alterations and subtractions” effectively changed the implementation details
of an architectural style. However, the style survived, as she suggests, because one can
still recognize it being the same style (Morgan 2010, 16). Essentially, Morgan’s approach
to the integrity of traveling fact is that of ‘we know it (i.e., whether it is the same fact)
when we see it.’
Morgan’s approach to integrity in the context of traveling facts raises more
questions than it answers. For instance, her focus is the discovery, production, and
dissemination of evidence, or what is sometimes thought of as hard facts. These facts
include “modern statistical and mathematical models” (2010, 27) along with medical
records and artifacts. On the one hand, it is understandable that she does not attempt to
describe how one may systematically determine the integrity of these varying types of
facts. On the other hand, without a generally applicable criterion for the integrity of
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facts, it is not clear how her conviction to the possibility of successful travel of facts
applies to facts of types other than the architectural styles. More importantly, when the
way with which to select ‘successful examples of traveling facts’ lacks transparency, the
extracted information of how facts travel well is either limited in applicability at best or
misleading at worst. For instance, consider three different communities, A, B, and C. By
following the method of ‘we know it when we see it,’ a given member in Community C
may not have the competence to discern the integrity of a fact that travels from
Community A to Community B. Morgan’s approach is thus opaque to the outgroup
members who do not have necessary information of, but need to decide on the matter
regardless.
What I take from Morgan’s discussion is an idea for improvement: it is important
for a study of tool migration to establish a criterion of integrity in its analytic framework.
The subjectspecific assumption about research tools, which I subscribe to, has a similar
effect on tool migration as does Morgan’s communityspecific assumption about facts on
traveling facts. Research tools are constructed for different subjectmatters within
different disciplinary contexts. One might charitably assume that the members of a given
discipline have good reasons for gravitating towards a few tools from the pool of all tools
constructed within his or her discipline. In contrast, making the same assumption about
their handling of exogenous tools seems dubious. All that said, one of the goals of my
dissertation is to decide what may be the source of epistemic risks in using a tool that has
migrated. ‘Losing the integrity’ thus makes a reasonable point of departure, which I turn
to in Chapter 3.

32

Chapter 3
Be Cautious of Migrant Tools? Yes, but Losing Integrity is not to Blame

In this chapter, I explore whether losing integrity is indeed suboptimal in the context of
tool migration. By studying the migration of game theory as an example, the answer I
eventually arrive is negative. In Section 3.1, I draw a parallel between traveling facts and
migrating tools in terms of their epistemic features, such as their role in knowledge
production, their locality in origin, and their autonomy to be used beyond their origin. In
Section 3.2, based on these features, I pose an argument for examination. This argument
urges caution about using research tools that have migrated. This argument closely
follows Mary Morgan’s (2010) analysis of losing integrity in traveling facts. It argues
that because there are many features in common between traveling facts and the migrant
research tool, one may speculate that losing integrity undermines successfully applying a
migrant tool as it does to the applications of traveling facts. In Section 3.3, I develop a
criterion of the integrity of research tools with which to analyze the migration of game
theory. Unexpectedly, my analysis, which I discuss in Section 3.4, suggests the opposite
of what I have speculated. In Section 3.5, I conclude my observations of the migration of
game theory. Through studying this example, one learns that proactively modifying a
migrant tool helps the users to avoid epistemic risks such as mischaracterizing the target
phenomenon with an illfitting profile. Because modifying a tool entails altering the
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content of the tool, which in turn entails ‘losing integrity,’ I argue that although one
should remain cautious of using a migrant research tool, losing integrity is not to blame.
I end this chapter by a discussion of two further questions about tool migration, which I
explore in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.1

Common Features between Traveling Facts and Research Tools

Research tools may not be what Morgan thinks of as ‘facts,’ but so long as they exhibit
features sufficient for issuing caution of traveling facts, the use of exogenous tools
deserves attention. In Morgan’s (2010) discussion, these features include ‘being used to
generate further knowledge,’ ‘being locally generated,’ and ‘being autonomous.’
Together, these features give rise to a potential tradeoff between accumulating more
users or uses and maintaining the integrity of the content carried in the traveling fact. I
will talk about each of the three features in the context of tool migration in succession.
3.1.1

Research tools are useable

Research tools are usable in advancing knowledge. Previously in Section 2.1, I
introduced the concept of ‘research tool’ to analyze formal constructs in science that are
used to advance the user’s understanding of a subject matter. I argued that formal
constructs used in such a way may be viewed as research tools because they serve as a
means to an end. Merely completing the calculation to obtain a result is not the end
because the result is to be interpreted in a way so that it becomes an answer to the
question, or a solution to the problem, formulated in the first place. In other words, one
gains knowledge of a subject matter by manipulating symbols as a means to the end that
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was specified during the mathematization of the initial problem. Thus, it is entailed in
my definition that research tools are usable and used in producing further knowledge —
as is the case with facts. Of course, instead of the question ‘whether’ research tools are
used to generate further knowledge, a more pressing question to my inquiry is ‘how’ they
are used to do so.
Recall Section 2.1. I proposed to analyze an application of a formal construct in
science in terms of ‘problem formulation,’ ‘calculation,’ and ‘interpretation.’ These three
steps of using a formal construct jointly give rise the construct an instrumental character.
In that chapter, I used game theory as an example to illustrate. Here, with another
example, I would like to highlight the importance of a background context when applying
a formal construct to advance knowledge. Consider the formula for the population mean:
N

∑ xi

μ=

i 1

N

(3.1)

The symbol ‘μ’ represents the average score of a population on some variable, which can
be obtained by completing the calculation expressed on the righthand side of the
equation. To do so, a user will first identify the score on some variable of each individual
in the population. The user will then take the sum of all scores presented in the
population (i.e., x1, x2, x3, …) and obtain μ through dividing the sum by the total number
of individuals in the population (i.e., N). Note that, the value μ as a result of the above
calculation is informative only in light of some context. For example, the individual
scores may be the SAT scores, and the population may be the newly admitted applicants
at a certain university. However, without being given such a context, even to the user
who completed the calculation, the resulting μ is not more meaningful than, say, any
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value one looks up in the multiplication table. Moreover, without comparison of some
sorts (e.g., with the national average or with the average of the previous year’s record),
the admission statistics of a single college in a given year provides limited understanding.
Thus, the formula in (3.1) is useable to generate knowledge partly because of the analytic
procedure it provides (i.e., by which a user calculates to obtain a value as a result) and
partly because of the connections that the user is making between the resulting value and
a particular background context. Such a context is usually given at the stage of
formulating the problem. Taken all together, it is with the context that users of an
equation, or any formal constructs, may meaningfully interpret the result of his or her
calculation.
3.1.2

Research tools are local in its origin

Research tools are, figuratively speaking, local in origin. The locality of a research tool
concerns both the construction of the tool and the acceptance of it within a scientific
community. Regarding the construction aspect, research tools typically start with a
particular initial setup and question. The initial target system plays a role in the
mathematicalization of the phenomenon of interest, which in turn allows mathematical
proofs to be found. Game theory, for example, is local insofar as it originated in the
mathematical formulations and theorizations of livingroom games, e.g., roulette, chess,
bridge (von Neumann 1928). John von Neumann (1959, 13, translated from 1928 pp.
295320 by Sonya Bargmann) begins his article that is now considered the origin of game
theory by posing the question as follows:
n players S1, S2, …, Sn are playing a given game of strategy, B. How must one of
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the participants, Sm, play in order to achieve a most advantageous result?
He then continues to elaborate on what might be a ‘game of strategy’ (1959, 13, emphasis
mine):
A great many different things come under this heading, anything from roulette to
chess, from baccarat to bridge. And after all, any event — given the external
conditions and the participants in the situation (provided the latter are acting of
their own free will) — may be regarded as a game of strategy of one looks at the
effect it has on the participants.
For instance, in the passage where von Neumann (1959, 14, emphasis mine) derives what
he calls a qualitative description of the game concept, he writes:
We may assume that ... [a] game of strategy consists of a certain series of events
each of which may have a finite number of distinct results. In some cases, the
outcome depends on chance, i.e., the probabilities with which each of the possible
results will occur are known, but nobody can influence them. All other events
depend on the free decision of the player S1, S2, …, Sn. In other words, for each of
these events it is known which player, Sm, determines its outcome and what is his
state of information with respect to the results of other (“earlier”) events at the
time when he makes his decision. Eventually, after the outcome of all events is
known, one can calculate according to a fixed rule what payments the players S1,
S2, …, Sn must make to each other.
By formulating this above discussion of a game of strategy, von Neumann derives five
“rules of the game” (ibid, 14), which give him the bases to prove the minimax theorem
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for twoperson zerosum games (Kjeldsen 2001).8
Additionally, the acceptance of research tools has a local component. Consider
game theory again. Certain assumptions (e.g., regarding the ability of the players to
make choices in the game, the players’ rationality and knowledge about the game and
about other players' rationality and knowledge about the game and so on) are crucial to
the tool’s initial applications in economics (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).
However, disciplines that do not readily accept these assumptions about their human
subjects or subject matter (e.g., cultural anthropology) may not employ game theory in
their chain of knowledge production. Thus, both the constructing of assumptions and the
initial success of a research tool are specific to the disciplinary context, and hence both
are local in origin.
3.1.3

Research tools are autonomous

Despite their locality, research tools are autonomous; upon being released, their inventors
lose control over them. Users from within or outside the native discipline of these tools
(i.e., where they were initially conceived) may freely apply them in research with or
without the inventors’ blessing.
For instance, John MaynardSmith took inspiration from game theory to develop
an account of biological evolution (as GrüneYanoff argues [2011a]). The resulting tool,
including the analysis of evolutionarily stable strategy (‘ESS’), is now known as
evolutionary game theory (‘EGT’). This tool (EGT) has subsequently migrated back to
economics, where game theory was originally established. However, what may not be

8

The history and evolution of different versions this proof is reported in Kjeldsen (2001).
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widely known is MaynardSmith’s blatant disapproval of EGT’s homecoming migration.
In an interview (MaynardSmith 1997), he publicly criticized the use of EGT in the
context of theoretical economics:
I'm now amused to discover that the economists and so on are trying to borrow
evolutionary game theory back and introduce it into economics. I'm very
unconvinced that they're justified in doing this — because evolutionary game
theory hinges on the notion of heredity, i.e. the essential notion being that your
success in the game determines how many children you have, and your children
are like you, and the whole thing hinges upon that essential assumption. And I
can't see that that assumption really holds in economics.
MaynardSmith’s critique of EGT's homecoming requires closer scrutiny. In fact, I will
come back to this episode later in Section 3.4 and suggest that it represents an example of
what I call a ‘misjudgment’ related to tool migration. For now, let me turn to explain
how these above features may result in precarious tool migration.

3.2

Framing the Inquiry

In what follows, I adopt Morgan's analysis of traveling facts to consider research tools in
migration. To begin, let us think of tool migration in terms of ‘uprooting’ and
‘resituating.’ In our present concern, ‘uprooting’ captures the sense in which a formal
construct is taken from its base where it has been established as viable for generating
further knowledge. ‘Resituating,’ in contrast, captures the effort of putting the formal
construct to work in a novel context where it is expected to perform a new task, such as
answering a new research question. Thus, similar to traveling facts, research tools could
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lose a host of qualifications and background assumptions that granted their usefulness
and reliability in the first place. Such an incident could occur either in the process of
uprooting or resituating, or both. For further investigation, I organize these above
observations into three statements as follow:

a) Due to ‘uprooting’ and ‘resituating,’ migrating a research tool from its native
discipline to use in a novel discipline may undermine the tool’s ‘integrity’ (i.e.,
tool migration gives rise to losing the integrity of the tool).
b) Losing integrity compromises the usefulness and reliability of applying a tool that
has migrated (i.e., losing the integrity of an exogenous tool is counterproductive
and, hence, undesirable).
c) Therefore, an exogenous research tool should be handled with extra care.

Statement (a) contends that tool migration may lead to losing the integrity of the tool in
migration. Moreover, Statement (b) suggests that losing integrity in this sense may lead
to unsuccessful applications of the migrating research tool because the tool’s usefulness
and reliability would be compromised. Finally, Statement (c), in the form of a conclusion
from the previous two statements, urges care when using a research tool outside its native
or home discipline.
In the sections that follow, I argue that when both Statement (a) and Statement (c)
are correct (i.e., a research tool may indeed lose its integrity due to migration and one
should handle migrated tools with care), Statement (b) can be false (i.e., losing integrity
is not the source of problem). In particular, I will use the migration of game theory as an
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example and show that while one should cautiously apply a migrated tool in novel
contexts, what licenses wariness is not ‘losing integrity.’ Instead, proactively modifying
the tool, which inevitably undermines the tool’s integrity, is crucial to successfully apply
a migrated tool in novel contexts. My argument relies substantially on a criterion for
determining the integrity of a research tool, which I now turn to in the next section.

3.3

A Typology of Tool Migration as an ‘Integrity Check’

The ‘integrity’ of a migrating research tool, as I use it, refers to the tool’s state of being
whole or unmodified. To detect a potential loss of integrity, one may need to perform an
‘integrity check.’ The stress on an integrity check is the point where my approach
departs from Morgan’s. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Morgan did not attempt to provide a
systematic approach to the integrity of traveling facts. Unlike Morgan, I do not have the
liberty to avoid doing so — my argument hinges on being able to state clearly in what
sense migration undermines the integrity of a research tool, especially because the goal of
the present investigation is to decide whether losing integrity is indeed the reason why
one should be cautious of using a migrated research tool. To this goal, I develop an
‘integrity check’ based on the instrumental characteristics of formal constructs that I
analyzed in Section 3.1. In particular, I single out two major kinds of changes within a
research tool that are significant for the tool’s performance in knowledge production.
The first kind pertains to ‘problem formulation’ and considers all the definitions
of the theoretical terms and the relation between them in the formal construct. For
instance, game theory contains definitions of a ‘game,’ its ‘players,’ ‘an act,’ ‘payoff,’ as
well as how these terms relate to one another. For simplicity, I call the collection of

41

theoretical terms and the relation between them the tool’s ‘target profile.’ Essentially, a
target profile of a tool is the collection of theoretical terms allowing users to ‘profile’ the
phenomenon he or she targets.
The second kind pertains to the ‘interpretation’ aspect of applying a research tool.
For instance, in a gametheoretic analysis, a Nash equilibrium could be understood
differently depending on what the initial problem was and, consequently, what was
needed to solve the problem. Concerning a strategic interaction between competing firms
or individuals, a Nash equilibrium could be interpreted as an explanation or a prediction
regarding the outcome of the interaction. Alternatively, it could be used to optimize the
result of strategic interaction. I call the collection of the ways in the result is interpreted,
e.g., as a description, a prediction, a way for optimization, or an explanation of a given
aspect of a target phenomenon, the tool's ‘usage profile.’ To summarize:
● Target profile: all definitions and relations concerning the theoretical terms of the
formal construct in question
● Usage profile: all the ways in which the calculation result of the tool is interpreted
(i.e., all the ways in which the tool is intended to be used)
Moreover, in order to trace the trajectory of a migrating research tool, I distinguish
between two applications of a tool the ‘established use’ and the ‘novel use’ of the tool:
● Established use: a representative application of a research tool in its home
discipline
● Novel use: a recent application of a research tool in a novel discipline

With these two concept pairs, I classify four different types of tool migration,
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based primarily on the differences or similarities between the established application and
the novel application of the migrating tool in question. For instance, when a tool retains
both its target profile and usage profile in the novel use, that particular use of the tool is
considerably similar to its previous application; I call such a case toolapplication. In
contrast, when both the target profile and usage profile have changed in the novel use, the
migration is transformative to the tool, and therefore I call it a tooltransformation.
Between these two extreme types, there may be cases where the novel use alters only one
of the two profiles but not both. Thus, when a novel application changes a tool’s target
profile but not the usage profile, I call it a tooltransfer, whereas when a novel
application changes the tool’s usage profile but not the target profile, I call it a
tooladaptation. See Table 3.1 for a summary.
Table 3.1: A Typology of Tool Migration
Four potential relations between an established use and a novel use of a research tool
USAGE PROFILE

TARGET
PROFILE

REMAINS

DEVIATES

REMAINS

Toolapplication

Tooladaptation

DEVIATES

Tooltransfer

Tooltransformation

As a proofofconcept, in the sections that follow, I apply the above typology to analyze
the migration of game theory. Relating to the argument that I set out to examine, which
regards losing integrity as suboptimal in the context of tool migration, my analysis will
emphasize two major points. First, the migration of game theory from the social sciences
to biology can be viewed as a case of tool migration. As I argue in Section 3.4.3, this is
because neither the target profile nor the usage profile remains as a result of the
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migration. That is to say, this migration has compromised the theory’s integrity. Second,
I will use the homecoming of evolutionary game theory, which MaynardSmith criticized,
to show in Section 3.4.5 why one should be cautious using a migrated tool. However, I
will do so by arguing that MaynardSmith’s critique was not completely justified. These
two points are meant to address Statement (a) and Statement (c), respectively, as I
introduced in Section 3.2. Finally, my discussion in Section 3.5 will lead to a refutation
of Statement (b). That is, contrary to my speculation, in the context of tool migration,
losing integrity can, indeed, be optimal and thus desirable.

3.4

The Migration of Game Theory

Game theory was initially formulated to mathematically model strategic interactions
between intelligent, rational agents. As defined in game theory, a game is any interaction
between two or more people in which each person's payoff is affected by the decisions
made by others (Section 3.1.2). Moreover, such a game assumes complete knowledge —
each player knows the full set of options (or ‘moves’) for all players, and they all know
the payouts to each player in each possible configuration of moves. What they also all
know is that all players assume that all players are rational and that all players know that
all players assume that all players are rational and so on. That is, there is common
9

knowledge of the game and of the rationality of all players. As such, all players will act
in the way that takes all other players’ potential moves into account in order to maximize
their odds of winning. Game theory thus provides tools to mathematically formulate

Common knowledge is distinguished from mutual knowledge. Mutual knowledge of P
means that all players know that P. Common knowledge of P means that not only all
players know that P, but they also all know that they all know that P.
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strategic interactions and analyze the decisions one can make in those interactions. One
such tool is a payoff matrix. For instance, consider an interaction in which one player’s
gain results in another player's equal loss—called a ‘zerosum game.’ The payoff matrix
is used to sort out both players’ potential moves and the payoffs that follow each of the
moves.
Despite being modeled after livingroom games to be applied mainly in the study
of economic behaviors, game theory has inspired evolutionary biologists to develop an
analysis for studying biological evolution. Intriguingly, their framework, which is now
known as ‘evolutionary game theory’ (‘EGT’), has subsequently been introduced back to
economics and other social sciences for studying aspects of strategic reasoning, including
the prisoner's dilemma, among other things. From strategic interactions between rational
decisionmakers to biological evolution and then back to human interaction, the changes
of subject matter are evident. For instance, in social sciences, an act is a result of a
player's decisionmaking. Such a definition simply does not apply in the study of
biological evolution. Instead, new definition of the acts, the players, and other theoretical
terms were introduced to evolutionary game theory in response to the change of subject
matter. Needless to say, when EGT migrates from biology back to the social sciences,
significant adjustments to the theory are required, as I will show some of the typical
examples in the sections that follow.
3.4.1

The Prisoner's Dilemma
10

According to Poundstone (1992), the prisoner's dilemma is framed as follows: Two

10

The following account is paraphrased from Poundstone (1992, 118).
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members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary
confinement with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors admit that
they lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to get
both sentenced to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors
offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity to either
betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime or to cooperate with the
other by remaining silent. The offer is: If prisoner A testifies against his partner in crime,
he will go free while the partner, prisoner B, will get three years in prison on the main
charge, and vice versa. If both prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced
to two years in jail. Both prisoners are given a short time to consider the offer, but in no
case may either of them learn what the other has decided until he or she has irrevocably
made the decision. Each is informed that the other prisoner is being offered the very
same deal, and each of them is concerned only with his or her own welfare—minimizing
his or her own prison sentence. The payoff matrix in Table 3.2 summarizes the situation.
Table 3.2: The Payoff Matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma
B remains silent, i.e., cooperates

B testifies, i.e., defects

A remains silent, i.e,
cooperates

1 year (for A), 1 year (for B)

3 years (for A), 0 years (for B)

A testifies, i.e.,
defects

0 years (for A), 3 years (for B)

2 years (for A), 2 years (for B)

Prisoner A may reason as follows: Suppose I testify and the other prisoner does not.
Then I walk away free instead of spending a year in jail. Suppose I testify and the other
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prisoner does, too. Then I get two years in jail instead of three. Either way, defect
dominates cooperate. Testifying lessens the sentence regardless of what the other
prisoner does. Because defection results in a better payoff than cooperation regardless,
which is also true from prisoner B's perspective, it is a dominant move.
Moreover, in this game, neither prisoner could do better by unilaterally switching
his or her move from defection. When every player in the game is playing a dominant
move, they are said to be in a Nash equilibrium. In a noncooperative game involving
two or more players in which all players have common knowledge of the game and of the
rationality of all players, a Nash equilibrium occurs when each player has chosen a move
while at the same time no one may benefit by changing his or her moves while other
players keep theirs unchanged. In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a set of moves in
which every agent’s move is optimal. They would choose to maintain their decision
given other players doing the same.
This game of prisoners is a dilemma because even though mutual cooperation
yields a better result than mutual defection (i.e., 1 year for each against 2 years for each!),
from either prisoner's perspective, defecting dominates cooperation. When both prisoners
have chosen to cooperate, in hindsight, either of them would have been better off by
unilaterally changing his move from cooperation to defection — so as to walk away free
instead of serving two years in jail. Thus, mutual cooperation is dominated by mutual
defection.
To generalize from the prisoner's situation, any game that has a payoff matrix as
seen in Table 3.3 (where Temptation > Reward > Punishment > Sucker’s payoff) is a
variation of the prisoner's dilemma. In particular, the payoff relation R > P implies the
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analysis that mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection, whereas the payoff
relations T > R and P > S indicate that defection is the dominant move for both players.
See Table 3.3 for a summary.
With the prisoner's dilemma as an example, it should be clear that, as a branch of
mathematics, game theory's subject matter concerns strategic interactions between
rational agents, and the use of the payoff matrix allows for each player to choose an
optimal move. Moreover, as one can see from the definition of a Nash equilibrium, a
gametheoretic analysis relies on all three assumptions about the players—in other words,
11

complete knowledge, common knowledge, and rationality.

Table 3.3: The General Payoff Matrix of a Prisoner's Dilemma
Player B cooperates

Player B defects

Player A
cooperates

Reward payoff for both (R, R)

Sucker's payoff for A; Temptation
payoff for B (S, T)

Player A defects

Temptation payoff for A;
Sucker's payoff for B (S, T)

Punishment payoff for both (P, P)

With similar assumptions, game theory has been used in economics, as well as in
other social sciences, to describe, predict, optimize, and explain a variety of human
In fact, as a side note, the common knowledge of rationality can be more demanding
than necessary when applied to studies of human interactions. For instance, some games
are complex enough that it is entirely unreasonable to suppose that all players would have
perfect information. Thus, in some branches of game theory, one may study what happens
where there are consequent ‘breakdowns’ of rationality—socalled ‘games with bounded
rationality.’ In a similar vein, there are games with bounded information (i.e., the players
do not necessarily know everything about the structure of the game). Nonetheless, neither
games with bounded rationality nor games with bounded information undermine my
main point. In all these games, the subject matter remains (i.e., how rational
decisionmakers strategize in a manner that requires them to make an assessment about
what other rational decisionmakers will do). It is simply that in some cases, ‘rational’
does not mean ‘fully rational,’ in the sense of ‘always choosing the optimal move.’
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interactions in various of domains, such as the economic behaviors of firms, markets, and
consumers (e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995; Casson 1994) military decisions
(Haywood 1954) and international politics (e.g., Snidal 1985).
3.4.2

The HawkDove Game

Game theory was later used in evolutionary biology, when phenotypes or heritable traits
were viewed as ‘moves,’ and individual organisms as embodiments of these moves. In
1972, John MaynardSmith and George Price borrowed the formalism of a payoff matrix
from game theory to mathematically model the evolution of phenotype frequencies in a
population of organisms. Terminology that comes out of game theory, such as ‘game’ or
‘payoffs,’ can also be seen in this novel use of the theory in biology. Their modeling
method assumed that, as the players in a game are in contest with other players,
phenotypes are in contest with other phenotypes in a population of organisms. In this
sense, a contest is embodied by individual organisms with different phenotypes, and the
payoff of a move is formulated using the concept of Darwinian fitness, i.e., the number of
copies of itself (offspring) it will leave in the next generation. A gametheoretic analysis
in biology typically looks for an ‘evolutionarily stable strategy,’ which refers to a
distribution of phenotypes in a population that is immune to ‘invasion’ by an initially rare
new phenotype. Hence, in other words, the games in biology are no longer strategic
interactions between intelligent, rational decisionmakers. Instead, these games are but
the frequency changes between heritable traits. Similarly, the gametheoretic concept of
‘payoffs’ has gained a new meaning in biology—Darwinian fitness. Let me illustrate
with one of the typical examples: the HawkDove game.
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In any population, in contests over resources, hyperaggressive types of organisms
(the Hawks) defeat animals that are peaceful types (the Doves). Thus, one may ask: Why
don't we see in nature that the Hawk type organisms take over the population? Maynard
Smith and Price (1972) borrowed the payoffmatrix concept from game theory and gave a
mathematical account to this question. First, to model this HawkDove interaction as a
game, payoffs for a typical example are shown in a matrix in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: A Payoff Matrix for a HawkDove Game
Hawk

Dove

Hawk

0, 0

3, 1

Dove

1, 3

2, 2

In this payoff matrix, the payoffs of the moves on the rows are in italics,
whereas the payoffs of the moves on the columns are in boldface.
The payoffs assigned to the matrix reflect interactions as follow. Where one is meeting a
Hawk, it is better to be a Dove (i.e., 1 > 0 in column 1), and where one is meeting a
Dove, it is better to be a Hawk (i.e., 3 > 2 in column 2). Second, a ‘state’ that is resistant
to invasion, i.e., an ESS, refers to a distribution of different phenotypes within a
population. Such an ESS is a state in which, when embodied by a population in a given
environment, none of the individuals in the population may improve their fitness by
unilaterally ‘changing their strategy’ (a certain reinterpretation of this phrase is required,
which I will address in the next section). It is in this sense that the population is resistant
12

to a few mutants.

A population of all Hawks is not stable because no one wins in a

Depending on the game, an ESS as a state may consist of players of different ‘types’
(i.e., players who have adopted different strategies, such that none of them can improve
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HawkHawk contest (as the payoff profile is 0, 0); in such a population, a few Doves, or
the ‘mutants,’ would fare better than the Hawks, or the ‘natives.’ Through biological
reproduction, such a small initial advantage allows for more mutants to enter the
population. In a similar way, a population of all Doves would be vulnerable to invasion
by a few Hawks. To see how this scenario is mathematically formulated, consider the
illustration of an ESS.
13

The concept of an ESS can be specified formally as follows: Let ∆F(s1, s2) be
the change in fitness for an individual following strategy s1 against an opponent following
strategy s2, both of which are phenotypes, and let F(s) denote the average fitness of an
individual following strategy s. Furthermore, suppose that each individual in the
population has an initial fitness of F0. Let σ be an ESS, μ be a ‘mutant’ strategy en route
to invade the population, and p be the proportion of the mutants in the population. Then,
the average fitness of a native, F(σ), is the sum of its initial fitness and the change in
fitness after it interacts with other individuals in the population, including other natives
and the mutants (see [3.2]). In a similar manner, the average fitness of a mutant, F(μ), is
the sum of its initial fitness and the change in fitness after it interacts with the natives and
other mutants like itself (see [3.3]).
F(σ) = F0 + (1−p)ΔF(σ,σ) + pΔF(σ,μ)

(3.2)

F(μ) = F0 + (1−p)ΔF(μ,σ) + pΔF(μ,μ)

(3.3)

by unilaterally changing, which is a notion similar to a Nash equilibrium), and at the
same time, the population cannot be invaded by new individuals with a new strategy
(which is an ESSlike concept).
13

The following account is paraphrased from Alexander (2009).
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For σ to be an ESS, one of two things must be true:
i. The natives fair better when they encounter one another than when the
mutants encounter the natives, which can be written as:
ΔF(σ,σ) > ΔF(μ,σ)

(3.4)

ii. The natives do equally well when they encounter one another and when the
mutants encounter the natives, but the natives fair better when they encounter
the mutants than the mutants do when they encounter one another:
ΔF(σ,σ) = ΔF(μ,σ) and ΔF(σ,μ) > ΔF(μ,μ)

(3.5)

To see how this formula works in the HawkDove game, both the pure hyperaggressive
type of population and the pure peaceful type of population can be invaded by mutants
because, contrary to (3.4), ΔF(Hawk, Hawk) < ΔF(Dove, Hawk) and ΔF(Dove, Dove) <
ΔF(Hawk, Dove). That is, there is no pure ESS in the HawkDove game, which answers
14

the question why the Hawk type of organisms does not monopolize nature.
3.4.3

An example of tooltransformation

Three major differences stand out between the prisoner’s dilemma and the HawkDove
game analyses, which, as I argue, jointly qualify the migration of game theory from the
social sciences to evolutionary biology a transformative one, i.e., an example of
tooltransformation — this conclusion, in turn, supports Statement (a) that I laid out in
Section 3.2.
First, there is a change of subject matter, i.e., from strategic interaction between
decision makers to biological evolution, making the transfer an example of tool

This analysis does not rule out the possibility that there may be a hybrid ESS in the
HawkDove game.
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migration. Second, the target profile of game theory has also changed. Having left the
context of the social sciences and entered the context of evolutionary biology, none of the
assumptions about the game, the players in a game, and how the payoffs are understood
in a game remains the same. Among these, the most important change is the assumption
about the ‘change of strategy.’ Game theory as applied in the social sciences, or classical
game theory (‘CGT’) to be distinguished from EGT, assumes that it is within an
individual player’s power whether to choose one move over another. Thus, a change of
strategy is a result of an individual player’s decisionmaking process.
In contrast, such an assumption (i.e., players being capable of choosing one
strategy over another) does not apply to the subject matter of evolutionary biology. As
discussed in Section 3.4.2, a ‘strategy’ in EGT refers to a phenotype that individual
organisms display. Moreover, the concept of a payoff, in turn, is reformulated to be
Darwinian Fitness (i.e., the number of copies that it will leave to play in the games of a
succeeding generation). Consequently, in EGT, the phrase ‘a change of strategy’ means a
change of the proportion, or frequency, of the phenotypes in a population, which is
captured in the mathematical formulations shown in Section 3.4.2. Furthermore, to
account for this change in the frequency of phenotypes as a result of the differential
fitness, MaynardSmith assumes that an individual organism passes on its phenotype to
its offspring according to the fitness assigned in the payoff matrix. This is known as the
heritability assumption about the individuals in EGT. Thus, the eventual change in the
frequency of phenotypes is a result of differential biological reproduction and has nothing
to do with decisionmaking.
Third, moreover, a change in the target profile has resulted in a further difference
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in the use of the two theories, i.e., a change in the usage profile. For instance, the use of
EGT no longer carries the ‘optimization use’ as does CGT in the prisoner’s dilemma
example. Both CGT and EGT may be used to describe, predict, or even explain certain
interactions between two entities (i.e., between rational decisionmaking agents or
between heritable traits).15 However, in CGT, an analysis of a Nash equilibrium proceeds
as if there is complete information about the structure of the game, common knowledge
16

about rationality, and the possession of rationality in individual players.

Also, CGT

assumes the players as free to making decisions between moves, giving the result of the
analysis a prescriptive connotation. To illustrate, recall the prisoner's dilemma.
According to CGT, mutual defection dominates mutual cooperation, and if the three
assumptions, especially the unbounded rationality assumption, apply, then they should
both defect. The prisoner’s situation is a dilemma precisely because of the conflict
between (1) this prescriptive connotation on the individual player to defect and (2) the
fact that mutual cooperation yields a better result for both players.
In contrast, the concept of an ESS—as MaynardSmith and Price intended—relies

It is one thing say that both CGT and EGT may be used to provide explanations
regarding their subject matter, it is another to say that they provide the same kind of
explanations, which would be a false statement. For instance, the kind of explanations
given by CGT would rely on the assumptions about the players’ mental capacity such as
reasoning based on complete information, common knowledge, etc., whereas the kind of
explanations given by EGT in the context of evolutionary biology would not.
15

Some might argue that in order for the gametheoretic analysis to be explanatory or
predictive, these assumptions do not need to be true of actual individuals. For instance, it
could be that human decisionmakers are 'hardwired' to adopt certain Nash equilibrium
strategies in the face of strategic interaction not because of any explicit deliberation, in
the manner of a gametheorist, but because they are the product of a certain kind of
evolution, or simply because over time they have learned that the strategy works. Even
in this sense, a Nash equilibrium analysis still depends on the possession of rationality in
individual players.
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on the heritability of the traits in question and presumes that natural selection through
differential reproduction governs the dynamics of the system. In other words, a contest
between phenotypes, as seen in a HawkDove game, is not a strategic interaction. Even if
there was an ESS in the game, it is not clear in what way that ESS is prescriptive as a
Nash equilibrium is to a prisoner’s dilemma. To put it differently, because individual
organisms have no control over the strategy they embody, an ESS is simply a state
resistant to mutants as alternative strategies. Thus, unlike a Nashequilibrium analysis,
an ESS analysis may not be used to prescribe courses of action at the level of the
individual organisms. This ‘prescriptive use’ of CGT in the social sciences did not
migrate to evolutionary biology. During uprooting, the assumptions regarding the
players’ ability to make choices between different ‘strategies,’ are left out of EGT.
In general, in the migration of game theory from social sciences to evolutionary
biology, the change of subject matter is evident as it shifted from strategic interactions
between rational decisionmakers to the dynamics of natural selection. What is also
evident is that this change of subject matter is accompanied by a change in the tool’s
target profile, i.e., the definitions of the theoretical terms and the assumptions of the
relations between those terms. Such a change, in turn, affects the tool’s usage profile.
These definitions and assumptions regarding the decisionmaking players and their
deliberate moves in CGT are left behind, during the uprooting of the tool. In contrast,the
heritability assumption regarding phenotypes in EGT introduced as a result of
resituation. The follows that the solution concept in EGT (i.e., the ESS) cannot be used
to prescribe an individual’s action in the same way as a Nashequilibrium does in CGT.
Given these changes, which result in the loss of integrity of the tool, it may be a
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surprising turn of events when EGT is subsequently reintroduced to the social sciences to
deal with subject matters again related to rational decisionmakers, the homecoming that
MaynardSmith condemned.
3.4.4

Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT): The Prisoner's Dilemma

EGT has found its way back to be used in the social sciences for studying various social
phenomena (e.g., Axelrod 1984) or cultural evolution (e.g., Skyrms 2010). As mentioned
in Section 3.1.3, MaynardSmith was doubtful about this homecoming of his work. I
recast his qualms using my terminology as follows. By applying EGT to subject matters
that are social in nature, social scientists have mischaracterized their
phenomenonofinterest because biological heredity falls short of accounting for human
interactions. In this sense, the heritability assumption—one key component of EGT
which permits the formulation of differential payoffs between phenotypes in terms of
Darwinian fitness—makes EGT a bad tool to apply in the social sciences (see also
GrüneYanoff 2011b). Let’s take a look at an example of such homecoming: the revisit to
the prisoner's dilemma using EGT. This is a story of game theory, having been
transformed into EGT in a new scientific context (i.e., biology), returns to its original
context. What would the result be when one analyzes the prisoner's dilemma in terms of
an evolutionary game? The simple and quick answer is that, just as defection is a Nash
equilibrium in the singleshot (i.e., nonevolutionary) game, in an evolutionary version of
the game, a population of all defectors is evolutionarily stable.
Taylor and Jonker (1978) tackle the evolutionary version of the prisoner's
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dilemma as follows: First, assume that the population is large and that individuals
encounter one another on a random basis. Simplifying the population in this way, which
is common in an ESS analysis, allows one to represent the state of the population by
keeping track of the proportions that cooperate and defect, respectively. Let pc and pd
denote these two proportions. Furthermore, let WC and WD denote the average fitness of
cooperators and defectors, and let W denote the average fitness of the entire population.
Similar to the expressions for fitness in (3.2) and (3.3), WC, WD, and W can be expressed
in terms of the population proportions and change in fitness:

W C = F 0 + pc ΔF (C, C ) + pd ΔF (C, D)

(3.6)

W D = F 0 + pc ΔF (D, C ) + pd ΔF (D, D)

(3.7)

W = pc W C + pd W D

(3.8)

Second, assume that the proportions of the population between cooperators and defectors
in the current generation, pc and pd, determine the proportions of the population between
cooperators and defectors in the next generation, p'c and p'd, based on the average fitness
of that proportion over the average fitness of the entire population. This relation can be
expressed as:
p′c =

pc W C
W

and

p′d =

pd W D
W

which can be rewritten into the following forms:
p′c

17

pc =

pc (W C W )
W

and

The following account is paraphrased from Alexander (2009).
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(3.9)

p′d

pd =

pd (W d W )
W

.

(3.10)

Using these equations, known as the replicator dynamics, one may model the population
of cooperators and defectors in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Recall that in any given
prisoner’s dilemma, a cooperator receives a Reward payoff when encountering another
cooperator (i.e., ΔF(C, C) = R) and a Sucker's payoffs when encountering a defector (i.e.,
ΔF(C, D) = S), whereas a defector receives a Temptation payoff when encountering a

cooperator (i.e., ΔF(D, C) = T) but a Punishment payoff when encountering another
defector (i.e., ΔF(D, D) = P). Thus, the respective expected fitness of cooperating and
defecting is as follows:

WC = F0 + pc ΔF(C, C) + pd ΔF(C, D)
= F0 + pc R + pd S
and

WD = F0 + pc ΔF(D, C) + pd ΔF(D, D)
= F0 + pc T + pd P.
Recall also that T > R and P > S. It follows that WD > WC and hence, WD > W > WC,
which entails that
WD W
W

>0

and

WC W
W

< 0.

Finally, consider that the proportions of cooperators and defectors in the next generation
are given by
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p′c = pc

(W C W )
W

< 0 and

p′d = pd

(W D W )
W

> 0,

respectively. Over time, the value of p'c decreases, whereas the value of p'd increases,
which means that, in a population of both cooperators and defectors, the defectors will
eventually take over the entire population. Moreover, this analysis suggests that a
population of all cooperators is not resistant against invasion by a few mutants of
defectors. Thus, cooperation is not an ESS. In contrast, a few mutants of cooperators
may not invade a population of defectors, as the decreasing of the mutants' fitness will
drive them into extinction.
The fact that both a Nash equilibrium analysis and an ESS analysis reach the same
conclusion about the prisoner's dilemma is not surprising. If a move dominates another at
each individual encounter, it will continue to dominate over time. Instead, what makes
the homecoming event surprising, germane to my argument, is the change of what counts
as ‘payoffs’ in the second time(!) that renders EGT applicable to address the subject
matter of CGT.
3.4.5

Misjudgment and mischaracterization

An ESS analysis presupposes that the strategies are inheritable traits (i.e., the heritability
assumption). This assumption, as MaynardSmith points out, makes applying EGT in the
social sciences problematic. MaynardSmith’s criticism turns out not entirely justified.
His concern of mischaracterization has been addressed at least by Taylor and Jonker
(1978) and Skyrms (2010), respectively. The mathematicians Taylor and Jonker contend
that the idea of payoffasfitness needs not to be interpreted as resulting exclusively from
biological reproduction. As they put it (1978, 146),
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[T]he more fit a strategy is at any moment, the more likely it is to be employed in
the future. The mechanism behind this is either that individuals tend to switch to
strategies that are doing well, or that individuals bear offspring who tend to use
the same strategies as their parents, and the fitter the individual, the more
numerous his offspring. (Emphasis mine)
Such an increase in the frequency of a particular strategy, they argue, can be understood
either as a result of heredity, as MaynardSmith did, or as a result of social learning (e.g.,
imitation). Building upon this realization, the ‘replicator dynamics’ (Section 3.4.4) has
been accepted for being an appropriate model both for some biological systems and for
learning; the replication of a strategy no longer relies on its previous context—in this
case, biological reproduction. Consequently, the modeling of biological reproduction and
social imitation with the same mathematical equation (i.e., the replicator dynamics) could
be justified. In other words, Taylor and Jonker’s effort to resituate EGT in the social
sciences—through giving the formalization of biological reproductive dynamics a new
meaning—prevents the users of EGT from mischaracterizing the target phenomenon in
their research. Hence, rejecting the tool’s novel application in the social sciences on the
grounds of the heritability assumption alone would be a misjudgment.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. Owing to Taylor and Jonker’s
reinterpretation of ‘payoffsasfitness,’ the risk of mischaracterization may in principle
be set aside. However, wellinformed of both MaynardSmith’s worry and the
reinterpretation from Taylor and Jonker, Skyrms casts an additional reason for users of
EGT in the social sciences to be cautious. According to him (2010, 55):
The relevant payoffs for cultural evolution may or may not correlate well with
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Darwinian fitness. ... Even if the form of the dynamics is the same for biological
and cultural evolution, the substantive conclusions may be different.
That is, each EGT application in the social sciences needs to provide its own
interpretation of ‘fitness’ based on the empirical details of its target phenomenon. In
other words, resituating a research tool does not provide a ‘one size fits all’ kind of
solution to avoid mischaracterization. Skryms concludes, “[c]are in interpretation is
required,” and it needs to be done empirically based on the context of the application
(ibid.). Mischaracterizing a target phenomenon associated with using EGT in the social
sciences remains a risk very much in practice. Thus, EGT’s homecoming makes an
example for supporting Statement (c), it requires extra care to handle a research tool that
has migrated in order to avoid errors such as mischaracterization or misjudgment.
3.4.6

Appropriate Modifications as ‘Counteractors’

One upshot of the above discussion is that the success of applying a migrated tool may
not require the integrity of the tool. In other words, losing integrity does not necessarily
undermine the usefulness or reliability of a research tool after migration. This
observation entails that Statement (b) is not the case.
A question naturally arises: If not integrity, what may account for the success of a
migrated research tool in the case like game theory? The answer, I argue, lies in the
appropriate modification to the tool as a way to counteract changes occurring to the tool
due to migration. Recall EGT’s homecoming that baffled MaynardSmith. My recount
of Taylor and Jonker’s episode has shown that applying EGT in the social sciences was
not necessarily a ‘plugandplay.’ With their reinterpretation of ‘fitness,’ which
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constitutes a modification to the tool’s target profile, applications of EGT in the social
sciences could be plausibly justified. More importantly, this reinterpretation can be
viewed as intended to counteract the uprooting of the tool from the context of biology so
as to resituate it to the context of the social sciences. Thus, instead of maintaining
integrity, intentionally altering a migrating tool to counteract changes between contexts is
key to promising applications of the tool in a new context.
My finding is consistent with the work of some philosophers of science, such as
Paul Humphreys and Tarja Knuuttila, who have chosen scientific models and modeling to
be the unit of their analysis. Humphreys (2002, 2004) coined the term ‘computational
templates’ for analyzing a relatively small number of mathematical formulas that are used
in science to study a variety of phenomena. According to Humphreys, the generality of
these templates come partly from their construction and partly from corrections made
during each application of them. The former refers to the explicit assumptions that were
formulated as part of the template during construction. The latter, in contrast, refers to a
“set of not always explicitly formulated suggestions for how to improve” its performance
by means of, e.g., idealization, abstraction, approximation (2018, 3). Complementary to
Humphreys’s analysis, Knuuttila stresses the ‘resultdriven’ approach in the practice of
scientific modeling. In such an approach, tweaking an existing template is a necessary
strategy when modeling starts from the output and the effects that the models are
anticipated to produce instead of otherwise. In her own words (Knuuttila 2011, 268):
The template that has proven successful in producing certain features of some
phenomenon will be applied to other phenomena, often studies within a totally
different discipline. [Moreover, i]f a model succeeds in producing the expected
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results or in replicating some features of the phenomenon[,] it provides an
interesting starting point for further model building, whose typical aim of which is
to correct and adjust the template to better suit the domain it is applied to.
What I conclude from the migration stories of game theory converges nicely with these
above observations. For instance, in the homecoming of EGT, seeing the commonality
between the replication of a phenotype in the domain of biology and the replication of a
strategy in the domain of the social sciences is a stretch of a concept or abstraction.
Moreover, such abstraction may be justified by reinterpreting (or, in a sense, tweaking)
the meaning of fitness. Thus, losing integrity does not necessarily hinder successfully
applying a research tool of an external origin. Quite on the contrary, it is the tweaking of
the tool—a process that necessarily undermines the tool’s integrity—to properly resituate
it into a new context that seems to predict a promising application. Let us take a look at
one more example of game theory’s legacy that supports my conclusion.
3.4.7

Evolutionary Game Theory: TIT FOR TAT

The return of EGT to the prisoner's dilemma opens up new possibilities for analysis; in
particular, it opens up the possibility of memorydependent strategies (i.e., ‘memory’ for
the players). Recall the prisoner's dilemma. It is a dilemma because it “embodies the
tension between individual rationality (reflected in the incentive of both sides to be
selfish) and group rationality (reflected in the higher payoff to both sides for mutual
cooperation over mutual defection)” (Axelrod 1980, 4). But as Robert Axelrod (1980)
points out, this analysis rests primarily on either the ‘oneoff’ interaction between the
players (as in CGT) or the ‘random pairing’ between the players (as in EGT). Modifying
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the assumption of how players interact may consequently change the result of the
analysis. After all, Axelrod argues, human strategic interactions are neither isolated nor
random, and thus “making effective choices … requires insight into the structural
implications [i.e., the history of the game thus far] of strategic interaction” (ibid., 4).
That is, players who are capable of identifying their opponent and remembering the
history with this opponent in the previous rounds of the game will make their strategic
move according to that history.
In addition to ‘defect’ and ‘cooperate,’ many other strategies are introduced to the
analysis due to this new assumption. One such strategy is called ‘TIT FOR TAT.’ As a
decision rule for making a move in each round of the game, TIT FOR TAT always starts
out by cooperating, and in all the following matches, it simply echoes what its opponent
did in the immediately previous match.
It turns out that TIT FOR TAT is an ESS that can be applied to the
memorydependent version of the prisoner’s dilemma against the opponent who always
defects (‘ALL D’) (Axelrod 1984). A population of individuals playing TIT FOR TAT
cannot be invaded by a few mutants that play ALL D. Individuals playing ALL D will
always receive punishment payoff, which is lower than the reward payoff that individuals
playing TIT FOR TAT receive. For this reason, a few mutants of ALL D players will
drive themselves into extinction. However, as one may wonder, can the population of
ALL D players be invaded by players who follow TIT FOR TAT? The answer depends
on two factors: the initial size of the mutants and the pairing of mutants with other
players. A population of ALL D players is resistant to mutants of TIT FOR TAT players
when the number of mutants is small and the pairing is random. TIT FOR TAT always
64

starts out by cooperating, and so it can be exploited by ALL D. However, if there are
enough mutants of TIT FOR TAT that tend to be paired together in an ALL D native
population, it is possible that over generations, TIT FOR TAT will take over the entire
population.
Notice that this idea of a ‘memorydependent strategy’ would not make sense in a
purely biological context, because evolution is not an explicitly strategic contest. But
once EGT has made its way back into the social sciences, then there is room for such
memorydependent, strategic thinking. Hence, what we see in an ESS analysis of TIT
FOR TAT is not only a case where a tool ‘left to return home’ but also a case where the
tool was modified when it left (adding the concept of evolution while leaving out
‘strategic thinking’) and then modified again upon its return (introducing
memorydependent strategic thinking). In other words, what prima facie seems to be the
borrowing of one research tool across multiple disciplines turns out to be a natural history
of the tool’s development and evolution, eventually leading to several different target
profiles of the research tool. Such a discovery, again, supports that losing integrity can
contribute to the usefulness of a research tool after migration. It is the modification of
the tool that seems to play a pivotal role.

3.5

Tool Migration Risks

Studying the crossdisciplinary use of formal constructs in science as tool migration has
the potential to reveal the risks related to using a migrated tool and how scientists deal
with these risks. Generalizing from the example of EGT, one notes that a migrated tool
may lose a particular usage (i.e., the prescriptive interpretation of the solutions) due to a
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change of its target profile. Moreover, to counteract a change of the subject matter,
scientists can modify a migrated tool so that it may be used appropriately in a new
context, e.g., free from mischaracterizing a new target phenomenon. Sometimes, the
modification needs to be performed according to the context of each application.
Arguably, such a counteracting modification requires the user to be aware of the need to
modify the migrating tool. One might suggest that a migrated tool could be
‘unintentionally’ modified and working successfully in a new context. While I do not
rule out the possibility of an unintended positive consequence of tool migration, such a
success is out of luck, and when the user is indeed ignorant as to why the migrated tool
works in his or her epistemic pursuit, it is doubtful whether the research indeed results in
genuine knowledge.
Moreover, and importantly, applying a migrated tool without being aware of the
need to counteract puts the user at the risk of error. For instance, recall the migration of
game theory from the social sciences to biology. By taking away the assumption of
‘choice’ from the relation between a player and a move, an ESS may no longer have a
prescriptive interpretation as does a Nash equilibrium. A prescriptive interpretation of an
ESS could thus overstep the bounds of the tool, constituting a misinterpretation of the
result.
Finally, the purpose of pointing out these risks of mischaracterization and
misinterpretation associated with tool migration is not to argue against using research
tools that have migrated. As I commented on MaynardSmith’s concern about EGT’s
homecoming, hast preclusion of using such tools could lead to misjudgment, in the sense
of falsely rejecting a viable research tool. Instead, what I wish to do is to motivate a
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study of tool migration. There remain questions to be asked about tool migration as a
vibrant feature of scientific practice. For instance, what does it look like in a case where
a tool migrates across disciplines while its target profile remains critically similar? Can
the tool’s usage profile change without critically changing its target profile? In the next
two chapters, I will address these questions by going over the case of formal language
theory.
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Chapter 4
Formal Language Theory — From Linguistics to Computer Science

Formal language theory (‘FLT’ henceforth), including its components such as automata
theory and the Chomsky hierarchy, is the study of mathematically defined languages.
Initially formulated by Chomsky in the 1950s to investigate syntactic regularities of
natural languages, FLT remains a branch of mathematics and linguistics (Levelt 2008).
However, much of its subsequent development in the 1960s and 1970s was achieved in
theoretical computer science, making its presence more dominant in computer science
than in linguistics (Greibach 1981). Since 2004, the topic has seen a surge of research, in
which psychologists apply FLT to study nonhuman animals’ abilities to learn artificial
grammars — the objective is to understand both the evolution of, and neural substrate for,
18

the faculty of human language.

I contrast the crossdisciplinary applications of FLT in

the next two chapters. In this chapter, I discuss the use of FLT in linguistics and
computer science, respectively. In Chapter 5, I discuss its more recent applications in the
study of the evolution of the mind.
I begin this chapter with a section of preliminary discussion about the theory of

For instance, as Fitch (2014) reports, Abe et al 2011; Bahlmann et al 2008; de Vries et
al 2008; Fitch and Hauser 2004; Gentner et al 2006; Hochmann et al 2008; Marcus 2006;
Perruchet and Rey 2005; Rey et al 2012; Stobbe et al 2012; Udden et al 2012; van
Heijiningen et al 2009.
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formal languages. In Section 4.1, I briefly review some key components of FLT relevant
to its application in cognitive biology, such as the formal systems of grammars and
abstract machines and a classification scheme called the Chomsky hierarchy. In Section
4.2, I focus on FLT’s initial applications in linguistics as presented by Chomsky. His
application includes using FLT to explain semantic ambiguity, to formalize linguistic
analysis, and to narrow down to a method for modeling the syntax of natural languages.
Moreover, some of the concepts that I introduce in Section 4.2 are crucial to arguments
that I go through in later sections, as well as in the next chapter. I will refer back to these
subsections as needed. In Section 4.3, I describe early applications of FLT in computer
science, such as the design of programs, programming languages, and compilers. In
Section 4.4, based on the framework of tool migration that I developed in Chapter 3, I
analyze these two cases, i.e., the initial, established use of FLT in linguistics and the
thennovel use of FLT in computer science. In particular, I discuss in what sense (1) FLT
can be viewed as a research tool and (2) FLT has migrated from linguistics to computer
science. I then argue that (3) this migration is a case of tooladaptation (i.e., the
migration changes FLT’s usage profile without substantially changing its target profile).

4.1

Theory of Formal Languages

4.1.1

An Overview

The building blocks of FLT include the mathematical definitions of an ‘alphabet,’ a
‘sentence,’ a ‘language,’ a ‘grammar,’ and an ‘automaton,’ all of which except for the
automaton were originated in Chomsky’s (1956, 1959b) study of natural languages (e.g.,
Griebach 1981, Hopcroft 1987, Levelt 2008). In FLT, an alphabet (also called a
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‘vocabulary’) is any finite set of symbols, a sentence is any finite string composed of the
elements from a given alphabet according to the grammar of a language, and a language
is any set of such sentences. Most important, a grammar is a formal system which, like
other formal systems such as propositional logic, transforms “a certain input into a
particular output by means of completely explicit, mechanically applicable rules” (Levelt
2008, 2). In this context, input and output are themselves also strings of symbols from
the alphabet. In other words, a grammar is a formal device that takes as input the
elements of an alphabet and produces as output the sentences of a language.
To put these above descriptions in formal terms, let L be a language, V be an
alphabet or a set of vocabulary, and V* be a set whose members are strings composed by
concatenating zero or more symbols in V. Then L ⊆ V*. Moverover, let ε be the string of
zero elements, let V+ be V* without ε, and P be a set of rules. Then the cartesian product
V+ ྾ V* is a set of all possible ordered pairs of strings over V, and consequently, P ⊂ V+ ྾
V* shows how a string is rewritten as another string by a single application of a rule in P.
Similar to grammars, automata are also formal systems. While a grammar is
constructed to produce a formal language, an automaton is constructed to determine
whether a given string belongs to a particular formal language. An automaton takes as
input a string of symbols and gives a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ verdict regarding the membership of
the string to a particular language. In other words, grammars are the ‘generators’ of
formal languages, whereas automata are the ‘recognizers’ of formal languages. For this
reason, both grammars and automata are legitimate means to describe a language.
There are other ways to describe a formal language. For instance, one may list all
sentences of the language; this method is apparently limited to languages with finite (and
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small enough) number of sentences. In contrast, for languages with an infinite number of
sentences, one may write out sufficient sentences for the pattern of the sentences to be
made clear, then use ‘...’ to indicate that the pattern will continue indefinitely, such as
{ab, aabb, aaabbb, ...}. One may also use settheoretic notation such as {anbn: n ≥ 1} to
refer to this aforementioned set, whose members are made of strings of a’s and b’s where
the number of a’s is equal to the number of b’s.
One remark before I introduce the formal systems of a grammar and automaton:
In an important sense, both grammars and automata are ‘languagespecific.’ The
grammar of a language is assumed to generate all and only sentences of that language
(nothing else!). An automaton of a language recognizes also all and only sentences of a
particular language (nothing else). For this reason, to describe a language, one can either
specify the grammar of that language or supply an automaton for the said language. Both
are acceptable means of describing a formal language. The interchangeability between
grammars and automata has led some psycholinguists to suggest that “the distinction
between generating [a language] and accepting [it]” is primarily conceptual, and “less
fundamental than it may at first appear” (Levelt 2008, 2). That is, rather than using a
formal grammar, one can “very well use an automaton ... as a model for a theory of
natural language”; although this has in fact been done, “the generative grammar remains
the preferred model” (ibid.). According to Levelt, the dichotomy between grammars and
automata “has a natural interpretation with reference to speakerhearer models” (ibid.).19
The study of automata (e.g., Turing 1936) predates Chomsky’s study of formal

As I discuss in Section 4.2.3, Chomsky (1959b) does not endorse such an
interpretation.
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grammars, but soon after the Chomsky hierarchy was introduced (1959b), scholars began
to see the connection between the two. What initially appeared to be two independent
areas of study conjoined under the name of ‘formal language theory.’ In what follows, I
introduce two main elements of FLT related to our present focus: the ‘phrase structure
grammars’ (for specifying formal languages) and the Chomsky hierarchy (for classifying
formal languages based on their expressive power).
4.1.2

Phrase Structure Grammars

Constructed by Chomsky to study natural languages, a phrase structure grammar (‘PSG’)
specifies a formal language by defining an alphabet and a set of rules for rewriting strings
composed by symbols from the alphabet.
The alphabet of PSG, denoted by V, distinguishes between the ‘terminal’
vocabulary, VT, and the ‘nonterminal’ vocabulary, VN. VT, is the set of terminal elements,
i.e., words, with which the sentences of a language may be constructed. Elements of VT
are usually denoted by lower case letters (i.e., a, b, c…). VN consists of nonterminal
elements, which are categorical symbols used either in the beginning of the sentence
production or during the process of the sentences production; they never appear in the
sentences of the language. Elements of VN are typically indicated by upper case Latin
letters (i.e., S, A, B, …). For example, the symbol S is a special, nonterminal symbol; it
is usually called the ‘start’ or the ‘sentence’ symbol. Note that a string can be composed
of zero or more symbols from either VN or VT or both, but VN and VT do not have any
elements in common, i.e., VN ⋂ VT = {}. The rules of PSG for rewriting strings, also
called the ‘rewrite rules’ or ‘productions,’ are in the form of
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→

where both

and

stand for any sequence of (terminal or nonterminal) symbols and

∈ V+ and

∈ V*. ‘

→ ’ is called the production arrow.
With an alphabet and a set of rules, a PSG can be used to specify in a stepwise
manner how any given sentence of language may be derived. For example, let a
grammar G = (VN , VT , P, S), where VN = {S}, VT = {a, b}, P = {S → aSb, S → ab}.20 G
generates the language L(G) = {ab, aabb, aaabbb, ...}, and the two productions shown in
(4.1) are said to be able to derive every sentence in L(G). To illustrate, (4.2) shows a
derivation of the string aaaabbbb.
(4.1)
i.

S → aSb

ii.

S → ab
(4.2)

#⁀S⁀#

Start

#⁀S⁀# ⇒ #⁀aSb⁀#

Applying rule S → aSb

#⁀aSb⁀# ⇒ #⁀a⁀aSb⁀b⁀#

Applying rule S → aSb

#⁀aaSbb⁀# ⇒ #⁀aa⁀aSb⁀bb⁀#

Applying rule S → aSb

#⁀aaaSbbb⁀# ⇒ #⁀aaa⁀ab⁀bbb⁀#

Applying rule S → ab

In (4.2), the column on the left indicates the steps and the strings produced in each of the
steps. The column on the right indicates the rules applied in those corresponding steps.
‘#’ stands for the beginning or the end of a string, and ‘⁀’ stands for concatenation.21 A

Fitch and Hauser (2004) later call this grammar ‘the AnBn grammar’ in their experiment
on artificial grammar learning — an episode which I feature in Chapters 5 and 6.
20

These symbols were introduced in Chomsky (1956a) but omitted by most of the later
authors in their introduction to the theory of formal languages.
73
21

derivation starts with an S, the ‘sentence’ symbol, and when it arrives at a sequence of
nonterminal symbols, it comes to a stop. In particular, one applies the rule in (4.1i) to
replace S with aSb, where ⇒ stands for ‘replace,’ and the symbols shown in boldface in
each step indicate the sequence generated in that step.22 The whole process as seen in
23

(4.2) is conventionally shown in a more concise way: {S ⇒ aSb ⇒ aaSbba ⇒ aaSbbb

⇒ aaaSbbb ⇒ aaaabbbb}, which is called a ‘derivation of aaaabbbb.’
In FLT, a derivation can be represented in a tree diagram. See Fig 4.1 for an
example.24 In a tree diagram, each of the nonterminals is represented as a node that
extends further down until the branch reaches to a terminal (or leaf) node. The resulting
string of a derivation is taken by reading the leaf nodes in lefttoright order. As I discuss
in Chapter 6, this treeshape representation of the derivation of sentences plays a crucial
role in some cognitive biologists’ theorization of mind and brain (e.g., Fitch 2014).

Fig. 4.1 A Derivation Tree

Because the rewriting of S into aSb occurs at the center of the string, in linguistics, this
process is also referred to as ‘centerembedding.’
22

23

C.f. Parkes (2002).

24

C.f. Parkes (2002, 38).
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To summarize, in the theory of formal languages, a PSG G = (VN , VT , P, S) is a
formal system consisting of a nonterminal vocabulary VN, terminal vocabulary VT, a set
of productions P, and a special start symbol S. Productions are rewrite rules which
specify which strings in V+ can be rewritten to strings in V* stepwise. Note that the
productions in a PSG are in the form

→

Thus, for all PSG productions in the form

where

∈ V+ and

∈ V* (Levelt 2008, 4).

∈ (VN ⋃ VT)+ and

→ ,

∈ (VN ⋃ VT)*.

That is, while the empty string ε can be on the righthand side of a production, it cannot
be on the lefthand side of a production. This form of PSG productions will be the basis
of the Chomsky hierarchy that I discuss in the section that follow.
4.1.3

The Chomsky Hierarchy of Formal Grammars and Languages

In its initial form, the Chomsky hierarchy (1959b) is a classification of PSGs and the
formal languages these grammars generate, now called ‘contextsensitive,’ ‘contextfree,’
and ‘regular.’ Although the construct of PSG was first published in 1956, it wasn’t until
1959 that Chomsky (1959b) constructed this hierarchy now bearing his name. It “placed
formal languages in a mathematically attractive light and began to draw theoretically
oriented adherents” (Ginsburg 1980, 4). The way Chomsky classifies different classes of
grammars is based on three increasingly restrictive conditions on the productions, as
follows:25
First limiting condition: For every production

→

in P, | | ≤ | |, i.e., the number of

symbols on the lefthand side of the production is smaller than or equal to the number of

This review is based on Levelt (2008, 10); c.f., Partee, Meulen, and Wall (1990) for a
slightly different review of the Chomsky hierarchy.
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the symbols on the righthand side of the production. That is, the resulting string
always be longer or equal to the length of the string

will

before the rewrite. Thus, applying

the productions of this grammar would not result in a decrease of the string length. Note
that the symbol of empty string ε has length = 1. Hence, S → ε satisfies this condition.
Second limiting condition: For every production
nonterminal symbol, i.e.,

∈ VN and | | = 1, and (2)

Third limiting condition: For every production
has the form

or

→

, where

∈ VT ,

→

in P, (1)
≠ ε, i.e.,

consists of only one
∈ V+.

in P, (1) | | = 1,

∈ VN, and (2)

∈ VN, and | | = | | = 1, e.g., A → a, A → aB.

With these limiting conditions, four types of PSGs may be classified as follows:
Type 0 grammars (also called unrestricted) are grammars to which none of the three
limiting conditions applies. In other words, all of the productions are of the form
where

∈ (VN ⋃ VT)+ and

→

,

∈ (VN ⋃ VT)*. Except for ε, which cannot appear on the

lefthand side, all symbols (terminal or nonterminal) are allowed to be on either side of
the production arrow.26 For instance, aXYpq → aZq conforms to this pattern.
Type 1 grammars (also called the contextsensitive) are grammars to which the first
limiting condition applied. All the productions of Type 0 with the form

→

where | |

≤ | | belong to Type 1. That is, Type 1 grammars constitute a strict subset of the Type 0
grammars. The Type 0 grammar that are not Type 1 are, for example, those with at least

Some additional conditions are required for a Type 0 grammar to be able to actually
generate sentences, such as (1) having to include a rule in which is the start symbol and
(2) at least one symbol in needs to be a nonterminal.
26
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one production where | | > | |.
Type 2 grammars (also called the contextfree) are grammars restricted by the second
limiting condition. All productions of Type 1 grammars with the form
1,

→

where | | =

∈ VN , and | | ≥ 1 belong to Type 2. Note that the second limiting condition entails

the first, i.e., from | | = 1 and | | ≥ 1, it follows that | | ≤ | |. Thus, contextfree
grammars are also contextsensitive grammars. But the inverse is not true; the Type 1
grammars with at least one production where

= ε (e.g., S → ε) would be excluded from

also being Type 2. Thus, the Type 2 grammars constitute a strict subset of the Type 1
grammars.
Type 3 grammars (also called regular grammars) are grammars restricted by the third
limiting condition. The productions of this type are in the form
has the form of either

or

where

∈ VT ,

→

where

∈ VN and

∈ VN, and | | = | | = | | = 1 , e.g., A →

a, A → aB. Note that the third limiting condition entails the second. That is, from | | =
| | = | | = 1 and | | + | | = | |, it follows that | | = 1 and | | ≥ 1. That is, regular
grammars are also contextfree, but the converse is not true. There are contextfree
grammars that are not regular, e.g., those with at least one production where | | > 2 (e.g.,
S → Sab, S → aSb. Note, we will encounter these two production rules later in Chapter
6). Thus, the Type 3 grammars form a strict subset of the Type 2 grammars.
These four types of grammars form a containment hierarchy which applies not
only to the formal grammars but also to the formal languages they generate. First, in
terms of the grammars, the four types of grammars are constructed based solely on the
increasingly strict requirements on the forms of the productions. Thus, any grammar of a
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more restrictive type will satisfy the restrictions of any other types that are less restrictive
but not vice versa. The resulting scheme is a containment hierarchy of formal grammars.
That being said, conventionally, once a grammar (which may contain more than one
production) satisfies the restrictions of Type 3, it is instantly classified as a Type 3
27

grammar.

Only when it does not (i.e., at least one production failing to meet the third

limiting condition), will it be checked as to whether it qualifies as a Type 2 grammar. If it
does, then it is classified as so, and this pattern repeats until possibly reaching Type 0, the
unrestricted grammars. That is, by definition, any phrase structure grammar fulfills the
requirements of being in the class of Type 0 grammars, but by convention, grammars are
classified based on the extra restrictions they also display in the patterns of their
productions. In computer science, such a convention is of practical importance, e.g., to
the design of compilers. In Section 4.3, I discuss the use of the Chomsky hierarchy in
computer science.
Second, in terms of languages, the formal languages generated by each of the four
classes of grammars also form a containment hierarchy. In its standard formulation (as
reviewed in Greibach 1981), the four classes of languages in the Chomsky hierarchy are:
recursively enumerable (i.e., computable), contextsensitive, contextfree, and regular,
respectively. Among these four classes of languages, both contextsensitive and
contextfree were first described by Chomsky (1956, 1959b) as produced by the Type 1
and Type 2 grammars. In contrast, recursively enumerable languages were first described
by Emil Post (1943, 1947) using the method of ‘rewriting systems.’ Post’s rewriting
system became the basis of Chomsky’s PSGs, i.e., the Type 0 grammars, making

27

Parkes 2002, 31.
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recursively enumerable languages the outermost member in the hierarchy (Greibach
1981). Finally, regular languages were defined by Stephen Cole Kleene (1951, 1956)
using the formulation based on McCulloch and Pitts’ (1943) mathematical model of
nervous activity. Chomsky and Miller (1958) showed that the Type 3 grammars can
produce regular languages. See Fig 4.2 for a graphical representation of the containment
hierarchy of four formal languages.

Fig 4.2 The Hierarchy of Formal Languages
4.1.4

Automata and Their Corresponding Formal Languages and Grammars

Although FLT is said to have originated in Chomsky’s work in the 1950s, some of its
components had been circulating before then, such as the automata theory. Automata are
mathematical models of abstract computers that “transform information from one form
into another on the basis of predetermined instructions” (Encyclopaedia Britannica).28
29

The first of such models is commonly taken to be the Turing Machine (Turing 1936).

A Turing machine consists of a ‘head’ and a ‘tape’ divided into cells that extend

https://www.britannica.com/technology/automaton Access Date:
February 19, 2019.
28

29

Other candidates include Church’s lambda calculus (1936).
79

infinitely in both directions. It also has an internal state (one member of some set of
possible states) and a program, i.e., a set of instructions. Each cell contains a single
symbol from some alphabet of symbols. The head can read the symbol, and then,
according to the program, perform any combination (including none) of acts as follow:
Based on the information that is written in the cell and the internal state of the machine, a
Turing machine will (1) write a new symbol on the cell, (2) move one cell left or right on
the tape, or (3) change its internal state. There is a special internal state, the ‘halting
state,’ and once the machine reaches this state (if it ever does), it performs no further
actions. In a sense, a Turing machine can be thought of as a ‘state machine’ with a
working tape of infinite length.
A working tape of an infinite length is of theoretical importance. With the
formulation of an abstract machine that now bears his name, Turing was aiming to
address the question about the limitation of compatibility, i.e., whether there exist
uncomputable mathematical problems, also known as David Hilbert’s
Entscheidungsproblem or the decision problem. An infinite working tape allows Turing
to explore the limitation of computability without being confined by other limitations
such as memory (or time).
Other subsequently constructed automata are also state machines: They differ in
the presence of an explicit storage and the capacity of such a storage. For instance,
finitestate automata are state machines without a working tape of any sort. In contrast,
the pushdown automata and the linearbounded automata are (just like the Turing
machines) essentially a finitestate automata equipped with some explicit storage.
The study of finitestate automata is thought to have originated in McCulloch and
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Pitts’ (1943) mathematical models for neural networks and later developed by Kleene
(1952, 1956) (Levelt 2008). A finitestate automaton is defined by a list of finite states,
including an initial state, and the conditions for transitioning between the states. The
stark contrast between a finitestate automaton and other types of automata is its lack of
explicit storage of information. As Kleene defines (1956, 3):
A nerve net is an arrangement of a finite number of neurons in which each
endbulb of any neuron is adjacent to the soma of not more than one neuron (the
same or another) the separating gap is a synapse. Each endbulb is either
excitatory or inhibitory (not both).
Kleene calls the neurons without endbulbs ‘input neurons,’ and the others, ‘inner
neurons.’ Each neuron is assumed to be either firing or not firing. For an input neuron,
the behavior (firing or not) at any given time is determined by conditions outside the net.
“One can suppose each is impinged on by a sensory receptor organ, which under suitable
conditions in the environment causes the neuron to fire” (Kleene 1956, 34). Following
the McCullochPitts model, Kleene’s automata naturally do not come with explicit
storage for information, i.e., memory. His investigation of the McCullochPitts nerve
nets was “only partly for their own sake as providing a simplified model of nervous
activity, but also as an illustration of the general theory of automata, including robots,
computing machines and the like. Nonetheless, “to prevent misunderstanding,” he writes
“memory can be explained on the basis of reverberating cycles of nerve impulses. This
seems a plausible explanation for shortterm memories” (ibid., 2).
The presence of an explicit storage distinguishes finitestate automata from all
other automata. In pushdown automata, the storage is called a ‘lastinfirstout’ stack. It
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is a highly restricted form of storage: At any given time, the one and only one item in the
storage that can be retrieved is the most recent item that was added to the storage. To
illustrate, consider several cups stacked up sitting on a table. Consider that you have only
one hand available (because your other hand is busy, say, holding heavy books), and you
are allowed to take only one cup at a time. Thus, at any given time, only the cup on top
of the stack is retrievable to you. Similarly, at any given time, to add a new cup to the
stack, you can do so only by placing it on top of the stack. Consequently, the earlier a
cup is added to the stack, the lower its position in the stack (i.e., closer to the table); the
lower its position, the more cups one needs to remove before retrieving it. In the
linearbounded automata, the storage is a working tape that operates just like the one in a
Turing machine except its length is limited (i.e., its length is predetermined by a constant
times the length of the input).
Together, Turing machines, linearbounded automata, pushdown automata,
finitestate automata form a hierarchy of abstract machines based on the increasingly
heavy restrictions on the storage. As said earlier, a Turing machine has an unlimited
length for storage, making it the least restricted type of automata. An linearbounded
automaton is less restricted than a pushdown automaton because, everything else being
equal, on a working tape, any item can be retrieved at any time, but on a stack, only the
last stored item can be retrieved at a given time. Finally, a pushdown automaton is less
restricted than a finitestate automaton because, everything else being equal, the former
has an explicit storage for information, whereas the latter does not.
Each type of automata is found ‘equivalent’ to one of the four classes of formal
grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy. A grammar and an automaton are ‘equivalent’ just
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in case the languages produced by the grammar are the same languages that can be
recognized by the automaton. In what follows, I list the equivalent pairs of grammars
(the languages they produce) and automata. In a sense, the Chomsky hierarchy provided
a scheme for conceptualizing different formal systems (e.g., mathematical models of
computation, neural nets, grammars) that might not initially be perceived to be related to
one another.
Type 0 unrestricted grammars (recursively enumerable languages) and Turing
machines: Post (1947) showed his rewriting systems can produce those languages that
are recognizable by Turing machines, establishing the outermost class of the hierarchy
(Greibach 1981). It has been shown (Davis 1958, Chomsky 1959b, 1963) that Type 0
grammars produce recursively enumerable languages.30 Thus, Turing machines are
equivalent to Type 0 grammars: Type 0 unrestricted grammars are the generator for, and
the Turing machines are the recognizer of, the recursively enumerable languages.
Basically, Type 0 grammars include all formal grammars; they generate all the formal
languages that could be computed at all.
Type 1 contextsensitive grammars (contextsensitive languages) and the
linearbounded automata: Chomsky (1959b) defined Type 1 grammars by placing
restrictions to phrase structure grammars (which was based on Post’s rewrite systems).
The equivalence between a contextsensitive grammar and the linearbounded automata
was proved in the 1960s by Landweber (1963) and Kuroda (1964) (Levelt 2008).

30

A summary of the proofs can be found in Levelt 2008, 100107.
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Type 2 contextfree grammars (contextfree languages) and the pushdown
automata: According to Levelt (2008), the notion of a ‘pushdown store’ was introduced
by Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1959), but it was Oettinger (1961) who first drew the
relation between pushdown automata and formal languages. Chomsky (1963) and Evey
(1963) “more or less independently” formulated the relation between contextfree
grammars and pushdown automata (Levelt 2008, 126).
Type 3 regular grammars (regular languages) and the finitestate automata:
According to Levelt (2008), Chomsky and Miller (1958) showed the equivalence of
finitestate automata and regular grammars.
See Fig. 4.3 for a summary.

Fig. 4.3 The Chomsky Hierarchy of Formal Grammars, Automata, and Languages

4.2

Theory of Formal Languages in Linguistics

In this section, I discuss three examples of how FLT has been used in linguistics. In
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Section 4.2.1, as the first example, I discuss how Chomsky explains semantic ambiguity
using the treelike diagrams to represent sentence derivation. This application of FLT
shows Chomsky’s attempts to justify using PSG to study natural languages. In Section
4.2.2, as the second example, I review Greibach’s (1981) account of PSG as Chomsky’s
attempt to formalize research methods in linguistics called ‘immediate constituent
analysis.’ In Section 4.2.3, I discuss the ‘correspondence hypothesis’ related to the
analysis in linguistics and psycholinguistics. Some linguists thought that their analysis of
the construction or parsing of sentences, to an extent, informs us the speakerhearer’s
psychological processes of utterance production or comprehension. In contrast, Chomsky
did not endorse such an interpretation. In Section 4.2.4, as the third example, I discuss
what Chomsky actually did with the Chomsky hierarchy: he used it to narrow down a
plausible model of the syntax of natural languages. In particular, he argues that English
cannot be modeled using a finitestate grammar, i.e., English is ‘supra regular.’ In
Section 4.2.5, I conclude this section by contrasting Chomsky’s conclusion that the
syntax of natural languages is supra regular and the hypothesis that the faculty of human
language is supra regular, which I call the ‘supra regular hypothesis.’
Chomsky’s goal to model natural languages never delivered, though it is worth
noting that he (1959b) was not fully endorsing the correspondence hypothesis.
Nonetheless, his conclusion that English is supraregular has been interpreted as a
hypothesis concerning both psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics and recently put to test
by cognitive biologists (Fitch and Hauser 2004, Fitch 2014).
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4.2.1

Explaining Semantic Ambiguity

Chomsky shows that PSG and the tree diagrams can explain why some sentences in
English are ambiguous. Consider the sentence ‘they are flying planes.’ One could take
the thirdperson plural pronoun, ‘they,’ as referring to the same objects referred to by the
word ‘planes’ in the same sentence. Alternatively, one could understand ‘they’ as
referring to some pilots who are flying planes. Because linguistic ambiguity like this
exists in English, Chomsky (1956, 118) argues that “the grammar of English will
certainly have to contain such rules” as I show in (4.3).
(4.3)
Sentence → Noun Phrase⁀Verb Phrase
Verb Phrase → Verb⁀Noun Phrase
Verb → are⁀flying
Verb → are
Noun Phrase → they
Noun Phrase → planes
Noun Phrase → flying⁀planes

This set of rules in (4.3), according to Chomsky (ibid), provides two “nonequivalent
derivations of the sentence” in question, as represented in two different tree diagrams.
Below, in (4.4), I replicate the diagrams from the original paper but highlight the parts
that make them distinctive from each other.
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(4.4)
#⁀Sentence⁀#
/
\
NP
VP
|
/
\
they
Verb
NP
|
/ \
are flying planes

#⁀Sentence⁀#
/
\
NP
VP
|
/
\
they
Verb
NP
/ \
|
are flying planes

These two tree diagrams in (4.4) capture two understandings of the sentence: either as
‘they  are  flying planes’ or ‘they  are flying  planes.’
Generative linguistics is often considered as neglecting semantics (e.g., Putnam
1961). While this assessment may be correct about Chomsky’s overall research program
(which is out of the scope of this dissertation to judge), semantics does seem to play a
role in the conception of a phrase structure grammar. For instance, ambiguity and its
resolution can be seen as a testbed of the ‘empirical adequacy’ of a grammar. When a
proposed grammar provides multiple trees for some sentence, it is said to be “a case of
constructional homonymity” (1956, 118, emphasis original). Constructional homonymity
is a formal property, but Chomsky suggests that it can be used “as an explanation for the
semantic ambiguity of the sentence in question” (ibid). Conversely, he says, one may
reject “the adequacy of a grammar ... by determining whether or not the cases of
constructional homonymity are actually cases of semantic ambiguity” (ibid).
4.2.2

Formalizing ‘Immediate Constituent Analysis’

Sheila Greibach (1981, 15) argues that PSG is one attempt to formalize the method “used
by linguists in describing the morphology and syntax of natural languages” called
immediate constituent analysis. Immediate constituent analysis resembles the analysis in
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propositional logic where compound sentences are analyzed into atomic sentences with
logical operators connecting them. In linguistics, the analysis goes all the way to the
31

morphemes, the smallest, meaningful elements of a language.

A sentence is divided

into two or more immediate constituents (‘ICs’), “each IC into ICs, and so on down”
(Greibach 1981, 16). For example, the sentence ‘the king of England opened Parliament’
can be analyzed as follows (Wells 1947, reviewed in Greibach 1981):
(4.5)
the || king ||| of |||| England | open||ed || Parliament
The string in (4.5) indicates that two ICs ‘the king of England’ (the subject) and ‘opened
Parliament’ (the predicate) are analyzed in the first step. The first IC is then analyzed
into ‘the’ and ‘king of England,’ whereas the second IC ‘open’, ‘ed’, ‘Parliament.’ Then
‘king of England’ is further analyzed into ‘king,’ ‘of,’ ‘England.’ This process stops
once it reaches individual morphemes.
According to Greibach (1981), Zellig Harris, Chomsky’s dissertation advisor,
made one of the first attempts to formalize the process of IC analysis. In From
Morpheme to Utterance, Harris (1946) introduced an equation of some sort (e.g., BC =
A) to describe the formation of utterance from the level of the morphemes up. He first
defines classes of morphemes or sequences of morphemes that can appear in the same
context in the language. Then he forms equations to describe the replacement
relationship. BC = A states that “a morpheme of class B followed by a morpheme of
class C can be substituted for a morpheme of class A” (Greibach 1981, 16). As an
utterance would be divided into morphemes that are placed into different morpheme

For example, the word incoming can be analyzed into three morphemes: in, come, and
ing.
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classes (e.g., words, sentences), the equations were meant to be used to make repeated
substitutions until the whole utterance is grouped into a sentence type, i.e., a morpheme
class that corresponds to a whole sentence (Harris 1946, reviewed in Greibach 1981).
Coming back to Chomsky’s PSG, his formal analysis of a sentence was indeed
presented in the context of the IC analysis. In his words (1956, 136),
Customarily, syntactic description is given in terms of what is called “immediate
constituent analysis.” In description of this sort the words of a sentence are
grouped into phrases, these are grouped into smaller constituent phrases and so
on, until the ultimate constituents (generally morphemes32) are reached. These
phrases are then classified as noun phrases (NP), verb phrases (VP), etc. For
example, the sentence [‘the man took the book’] might be analyzed as in the
accompanying diagram [see Fig. 4.4].

Fig. 4.4 A diagram of Phrase Structure Analysis. As shown in Chomsky (1956, 117), this
diagram demonstrates the different categories that may be used to group different
constituents within a sentence based on phrase structure grammar.
Formalizing IC analysis was crucial to the development of two ‘machine
translation’ programs. The first machine translation program, which I will discuss in

The author notes that “By ‘morphemes’ we refer to the smallest grammatically
functioning elements of the language, e.g., “boy”, “run”, “ing” in “running”, “s” in
“books”, etc. (Chomsky 1956, 124)
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Section 4.4, refers to a study of the automatic translation between computer programs and
the machine language. In contrast, the second machine translation program refers to a
study of automatic translation between natural languages, which is the predecessor of
today’s computational linguistics. In 1950s, the objective of machine translation was to
develop an automated mechanism to translate texts in Russian language into English
without human intervention (O’Regan 2013). The task turned out to be considerably
more complex than expected. Later, the focus shifted to develop algorithms and software
for processing natural languages, eventually leading to a subdiscipline now call
‘computational linguistics’ (O’Regan 2013, Poibeau 2017).
4.2.3 The Correspondence Hypothesis: the Models ‘for’ Parsing Linguistic Information
vs. the Models ‘of’ Utterance Production and Comprehension
Computational linguistics is often associated with the study of artificial intelligence
(O’Regan 2013) and psycholinguistics (Schubert 2019). This association is consistent
with the metaphysical commitment or methodological assumption some researchers held:
Namely, that the mental processes of language production and comprehension can be
understood in terms of information processing, which in turn can be understood through
studying syntax (e.g., Lidz 2018, also see Hornstein et al. 2018). However, at the time
when formulating IC analysis was an active research program, not all linguists agree on
what IC analysis described.
On the one hand, the equations emerging from IC analysis were interpreted by
some linguists as merely a means for parsing. In other words, those formal systems were
models for parsing linguistic information. For instance, Wells (1947, 100, quoted in
Greibach 1981) said that “The task of ICanalysis is the task not of describing what
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utterances occur but of describing, after these utterances have been given, what their
constituents are.”
On the other hand, some other linguist(s) (e.g., Harris 1946) understood those
formal systems to be both models for parsing linguistic information and models of the
information processing related to utterance production and comprehension.33 This latter
view is sometimes referred to as the correspondence hypothesis, i.e., there is a
correspondence between the structure (e.g., NP, VP) set up by the linguist and the
structure used by the speaker or hearer in speech production or comprehension. In other
words, linguistic structures are psychologically real (Harris 2010).
Unlike his thesis advisor, Chomsky did not seem to (fully) endorse the
correspondence hypothesis. His stance regarding the hypothesis can be seen in a footnote
in which he defended his terminology. The term ‘generate’ in generative linguistics,
which Chomsky borrowed from Post (1944), has been a focus for criticism of Chomsky’s
study of natural languages. As he wrote (1959b, 1378), such a concept of
“sentencegenerating grammars” has “erroneously been interpreted as” only taking into
consideration “language from the point of view of the speaker rather than the hearer.”
Actually, it does neither; Chomsky continues (ibid., 138):
[S]uch grammars take a completely neutral point of view. ... We can consider a
grammar of L to be a function mapping the integers onto L, [the] order of
enumeration being immaterial (and easily specifiable, in many ways) to this
purely syntactic study, though the question of the particular “inputs” required to

To be fair, Harris did warn that “there are further limitations of selection among the
morphemes, so that not all the sequences provided by the formulae occur” in actual
languageuse (Harris 1946, 178, quoted in Greibach 1981).
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produce a particular sentence may be of great interest for other investigations
which can build on syntactic work of this more restricted kind.
This quotation suggests that generative grammars were not constructed to capture the
processes when utterance production or comprehension is in action (i.e., ‘linguistic
performance’). That is, similar to the stance Wells (1947) had taken, neither the
derivation of a string nor the rules of production was meant to be interpreted as models of
actual information processing of speech production or comprehension, be they
psychological or neurological.
That said, as shown in the second half of the quotation above, where the question
of ‘inputs’ comes in, Chomsky does not rule out the utility of his ‘purely syntactic study’
in the empirical approaches to explain linguistic behavior. As a matter of fact,
psychologists including George Miller have attempted to investigate the ‘psychological
reality’ of linguistic transformations (reported in Harris 2010, Miller 1967, Baars 1986,
Gardner 1985). The inquiry in psycholinguistics in the 1960s and the 1970s, which was
based largely on the conjecture “that the more transformations differentiated two
sentences, the longer it would take for people to relate them,” did not pan out (Harris,
246, also see Gardner 1985).34 Nonetheless, one product of this research program is an
experimental protocol for probing the subject’s ability to learn artificial grammars. It is
this experimental protocol, now referred to as ‘artificial grammar learning’ (AGL), that
cognitive biologists apply to test the supraregular hypothesis, which I discuss in Chapter
5. In the section that follows, I discuss Chomsky’s argument for the ‘supraregular

According to the linguist Stanley Dubinsky at University of South Carolina (in
personal conversation), a similar assumption remains in today’s empirical linguistics.
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thesis,’ which is the basis of the supraregular hypothesis.
4.2.4 Modeling The Syntax Of Natural Languages: Chomsky’s Argument for the
Supraregular Thesis
Chomsky (1956) argues that the grammars of the most restricted class in the Chomsky
hierarchy are too limited to be considered an adequate model for the syntax of natural
languages. His argument can be viewed as intended to guide researchers to a plausible
method for modeling the syntax of natural languages. I reconstruct his argument (as in
Chomsky 1956) and highlight the central role of the hierarchy in P1 of the argument
shown in (4.6).
(4.6)
P1: If there exists a robust syntactic feature in at least one natural language that is
indescribable by a given class of formal grammars in the Chomsky hierarchy, then it
requires formal grammars beyond that particular class in the hierarchy to model the
syntax of natural languages. (‘The Classificatory Conditional’)
P2: There exists a robust syntactic feature in English indescribable by finitestate
grammars (i.e., the most restricted class in the hierarchy) called the ‘long distance
dependency’.35 (‘The case of the long distance dependency in English’)
C: It requires a formal grammar beyond the most restricted class in the Chomsky
hierarchy to model the syntax of all natural languages. (‘The supraregular thesis’)
The argument in (4.6) has the form of Modus Ponens in which the Chomsky hierarchy is
featured in the consequent of P1 and, consequently, in C. In particular, P1—‘the

According to Larson (2017), Harris (1945) described a similar feature but termed it
‘discontinuous morphemes’.
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classificatory conditional’—can be viewed as a methodological statement, declaring the
criterion of when to ‘move up’ the hierarchy in search for the right class of formal
grammars to model natural languages.
Insofar as the argument in (4.6) is sound, the crux of it lies in P2, the syntactic
feature of the long distance dependency in English. To illustrate, consider the three
sentence patterns in (4.7).
(4.7)
(i)

If S1, then S2.

(ii)

Either S3, or S4.

(iii)

The man who said that S5, is arriving today.

According to Chomsky (1956, 115) “these sentences have dependencies between
‘if’‘then,’ ‘either’‘or,’ ‘man’‘is.’ ” For instance, replacing ‘if’ in (4.7i) by ‘either’
requires a corresponding replacement of ‘then’ by ‘or,’ or else, the resulting string would
not be a sentence of English. Similarly, replacing ‘man’ in (4.7iii) by ‘men’ also requires
a corresponding replacement of ‘is’ by ‘are.’36 In other words, the feature of long
distance dependency is concerned with the dependent constituents—within a single
sentence with regard to a language—that are not adjacent to each other. Note that such
dependent constituents, if they occur in a sentence, occur in pairs. Thus, let m represent
the degree of long distance dependency within any given sentence, S, in English. Then,
m of S can be determined by counting the number of paired dependent constituents within
S. For example, assume m = 0 for S1 through S5 in (4.7). Then for the sentence patterns

36

The pair ‘men’‘are’ was not mentioned in Chomsky (1956).
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from (4.7i) through (4.7iii), m = 1.
Moreover, Chomsky continues (1956, 115), in English, “there are infinite sets of
sentences ... with more than any fixed number of” such dependent pairs of constituents.
Consider the sentence patterns in (4.8) for instance.
(4.8)
(i)

If if S1, then S2, then S2.

(ii)

Either either S3, or S4, or S4.

(iii)

The man who said that the man who said that S5, is arriving today is

arriving today.
In (4.8), each of the italicized sequences indicates the replacement of S1 in (4.7i) by (4.7i)
itself, S3 by (4.7ii) itself, and S5 by (4.7iii) itself. After these replacements, the degree of
long distance dependency increases from m = 1 in (4.7iiii) to m = 2 in (4.8iiii). If one
were to repeat this selfreplacement indefinitely, each replacement will result in a string
that remains grammatical in English with an increased m.
Furthermore, Chomsky (1956) argues that a finitestate grammar cannot describe
a language wherein the sentences do not have a fixed m. “Specifically,” he says (ibid.,
114, emphasis original):
we define a finitestate grammar G as a system with a finite number of states S0,
.., Sq, a set A = { aijk | 0 ≤ i, j ≤ q; 1 ≤ k ≤ Nij for each i, j } of transition symbols,
and a set C = { (Si, Sj) } of certain pairs of states of G that are said to be
connected. As the system moves from state Si to Sj, it produces a symbol aijk ∈ A.
See Fig. 4.5 for an illustration in Chomsky (1956).
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Fig. 4.5 A Diagram of a ThreeState FiniteState Grammar
Shown in Fig. 4.5 is a “threestate process with (S0, S1), (S1, S1), (S1, S0), (S0, S2), (S2, S2),
(S2, S0) as its only connected states, and with a, b, a, c, b, c as the respective transition
symbols” (Chomsky 1956, 116). Thus, “this process can produce the sentences” such as
“a⁀a, a⁀b⁀b⁀a, a⁀b⁀b⁀b⁀a, …, c⁀c, c⁀b⁀c, c⁀b⁀b⁀a, etc” (ibid.). According to Chomsky
(ibid., 116), the language thus generated “has sentences with dependencies of any finite
length.”37
Also according to him, (ibid., 115), if a sentence in a language L has m pairs of
nonadjacent, dependent constituents, then “at least 2m states are necessary in the
finitestate grammar, G, that generates the language L.” Note that, a finite number of
states S0, .., Sq is part of the definition of a given finitestate grammar G. In other words,
any given G has a definite number for q, e.g., when q = 3 with regard to G, G has 3
internal states, S0, .., S2, as illustrated in Fig. 4.5. Consequently, the degree of long
distance dependency, m, in the sentences generated by a finitestate grammar defined by
Chomsky is ‘fixed’ — for m in this case is determined by q, the number of possible finite
states. It follows that—the conclusion—no finitestate grammars can describe the
sentences in English where the degree of long distance dependency, m, is indefinite.
Finally, that conclusion entails P2, i.e., there exists a robust syntactic feature in

37

There does not seem to further explanation for this statement in Chomsky (1956).
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English indescribable by finitestate grammars. Because P2 is the antecedent of P1, by
Modus Ponens, it follows that C: to model the syntax of English, it requires a less
restrictive class of grammars than the finitestate grammars. Recall that finitestate
grammars are also called ‘regular grammars.’ Any classes of grammars beyond the class
of regular grammars are ‘supra regular.’ To distinguish this conclusion in C from a
hypothesis about the infrastructure of human mind, I refer to C as the ‘supraregular
thesis.’38
4.2.5

The Supraregular Hypothesis

Chomsky’s supraregular thesis was about the syntax of natural languages, but it has been
interpreted as a hypothesis about human cognition (e.g., Fitch 2014). One dominant
theme in the study of information in the 1950s was that the brain is a hardware that
processes information, whereas the mind is the program that runs on the brain (e.g.,
Miller 1967, Gardner 1985). Moreover, according to the Chomsky hierarchy, finitestate
grammars are equivalent to finitestate automata.39 Thus, Chomsky’s supraregular thesis
is taken to license the inference as follows (e.g., Fitch and Friederici 2012, Fitch 2014):
The Supraregular Hypothesis — In order to process natural languages that are

Pullum (2011, 277) has argued that “it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound
mathematical argument for” the claim that “English is beyond the power of finite state
description”. Indeed, Chomsky’s (1956) original presentation of the argument is neither a
mathematical proof nor a neatly organized argument. My reconstruction of that argument
in this section is meant to be a charitable reading of the text instead of a challenge to
Pullum’s assessment.
38

For any language L1 that can be generated by a finitestate grammar G, one can
construct a finitestate automaton A such that L1 can be recognized by A, and vice versa,
i.e., for any language L2 that can be recognized by A, one can construct a finitestate
grammar to generate L2; it can be proved that L1 = L2, and thus, G and A are equivalent.
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supraregular, the human mind must be the sort of program that is less restricted
than the regular grammar. For the same reason, human brains must be less
restricted than the finitestate automata to run the program that is supraregular.
In other words, the supraregular hypothesis is a product of both Chomsky’s study of
natural languages and the overall theoretical commitment to view the mind and the brain
as a program that processes information and its physical implementation, and to approach
them accordingly.
Of course, the brain is but one of such physical implementations. In the next
section, I turn to discuss FLT in computer science, a discipline that studies information
processing by building both the programs and their physical implementations, i.e., the
software and the hardware, respectively.

4.3

Theory of Formal Languages in Computer Science

In computer science, what a formal grammar does is also to describe a formal language;
however, the purpose for doing so is different between linguistics and computer science.
In generative linguistics, the initial goal was to reveal ‘the one grammar’ that describes
presumably all natural languages (Chomsky 1956). That is, a grammar with the rewriting
rules that can be used to generate the set of all and only sentences in each and every
natural language. Moreover, regardless of whether such a grammar can be found, the
derivations of sentences based these rewrite rules have provided a means for scholars to
theorize the psychology of information processing (e.g., Lewis and Phillips 2015). In
computer science, however, the purpose of describing a language (i.e., a programming
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language) is not so much about revealing ‘the real grammar’ nor is it about theorizing
how information might be processed in the computer. Instead, as I argue in 4.3.1 and
4.3.2, the purpose is to engineer the flow of information processes in the computer and to
standardize such engineering practices that we call programming (Ledley 1962). In
4.3.3, I illustrate my point by the development of the programming language ALGOL as
an example. In 4.3.4, I discuss the use the Chomsky hierarchy as a classification scheme
in computer science, using the discovery that ALGOL is contextfree as an example.
Finally, in 4.3.5, I argue that although both linguistics and computer science use the
Chomsky hierarchy to classify languages, there is a crucial difference between the two
classificatory uses.
4.3.1

Engineering the Flow of Information Processing

In computer science, the flow of information within a hardware computer is a result of
engineering. For instance, Ledley (1962, 6, emphasis original) introduces computers as
“numericaltransformation” machines, where “numbers are the inputs to it, and the
computer transforms these numbers into new numbers, which appear as the outputs.” See
Fig. 4.6.

Fig. 4.6. Data Flow to Computer.
This diagram in Fig. 4.6 is a duplicate of Ledley’s (1962, 7) diagram captioned “Data
flow to computer.” Note that the input to a computer (to the left of the box) consists of
two different types, the input numbers and a list of instructions, both also in the form of
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numbers.
To illustrate, the input numbers may be the initial conditions of a differential
equation or the raw experimental data, and the output numbers will be, respective to the
input, a table of the functional solutions or the parameters determined by the experiment,
and so forth (Ledley 1962). Moreover, in order for the computer to deliver expected
output with respect to an input, it needs a different type of input numbers: an instruction
list. Such a list is prepared and provided by the software engineers to automate the
rewriting of numbers within the computer. In Ledley’s words (1962, 7, emphasis
original):
[T]he computer must be directed to perform the required computations, and
hence, in addition to the input numerical data, there must be also input
instructions, which are coded in the form of numbers. Such a coded list of
instructions is called a program, or code; the preparation of this program or code
is the responsibility of the computer programmer.
In other words, by providing the instruction list as input numbers, what a computer
programmer does is to engineer the transformation process between the data as input and
the expected numbers as output, i.e., the flow of information processing within the
computer. This engineering use of FLT distinguishes the applications of FLT in computer
science from Chomsky’s application of FLT in linguistics, a point I will revisit in Section
4.4
4.3.2

Standardizing the Practice of Programming

Early instruction code was written in machine language, with sequences of 0’s and 1’s.
The computer performs certain arithmetic operations by following the machine code to
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flip the switches inside the computer on or off. The 1950s saw the development of
higherlevel programming languages, which allowed programmers to specify instructions
using mnemonic codes (abbreviations of operations, e.g., ‘inc’ means ‘increase by one’)
and with constructs such as loops, arrays, and procedures. Before a hardware computer
could perform the expected operations, these languages need to be converted (i.e.,
compiled) into executable machine language through an assembler.
Before the 1960s, programming languages were not ‘portable.’ Not all
programming languages were compatible with all of the available hardware computers.
For example, the code written in the programming language FORTRAN, which was
developed by IBM in the late 1950s and the only mainstream programming language at
that time, could only be compiled and run on IBM’s machines (Savage 1998).
Consequently, changing between different hardware or upgrading the hardware meant
rewriting programs. To improve portability of the programs, it became important to
establish “a universally acceptable international automatic language, analogous to the
universal written language of music” (Ledley 1962, 203). In 1960, after a series of
conferences and meetings among representatives of multiple European countries and the
United States, the first of such universal automatic languages, it came the Algorithmic
Language ‘ALGOL’ (Backus et al. 1960). The metalanguage developed to specify the
syntax of ALGOL became known as BackusNaur Form (BNF) and was used to
standardize the syntax of other programming languages (Hyman 2010).
4.3.3

BackusNaur Form and ALGOL

In addition to being the first language established for standardizing the programming
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practice, ALGOL is also the first programming language to be constructed in the manner
that resembles PSG as Chomsky constructed in linguistics (Ledley 1962). That is, PSG
to a formal language in linguistics is as BNF to ALGOL in computer science. Indeed, it
is recognized that while “BNF was developed independently by Backus, it is really one of
Chomsky’s grammars with a different notation” (Sammet 1972, 607; also see Moll,
Arbib, and Kfoury 1988, 2). To illustrate, in what follows, I use BNF to describe a few
examples of the syntax of ALGOL. This illustration is to show the components of
ALGOL using BNF, the relation between these components, and how they resemble the
way Chomsky describes formal languages using PSG. In the illustration of syntax,
however, I will also point out ‘recursion’ rules as I go; the topic of recursion will be of
focus in Section 6.4.
ALGOL is composed of ‘characters,’ ‘expressions,’ and ‘statements,’ which are
roughly analogous to ‘symbols,’ ‘ strings,’ and ‘sentences,’ respectively. However,
because the purpose of ALGOL is to describe processes of numerical transformations,
ALGOL has a more elaborated set of characters than the alphabet of PSG. For example,
consider the characters in (4.9).
(4.9)
<letter> ::= a|b|c|d|e|f|g|h|i|j|k|l|m|n|o|p|q|r|s|t|u|v|w|x|y|z
|A|B|C|D|E|F|G|H|I|J|K|L|M|N|O|P|Q|R|S|T|U|V|W|X|Y|Z
<digit> ::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
<logical value> ::= T | F
<arithmetic operator> ::= ＋|﹣| × | ∕ | ↑ |
<relational operator> ::= < | ≤ |＝| ≥ | > | ≠
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<logical operator> ::= ⊃ | ∨ | ∧ | ¬ | =
<delimiter> ::= ( | ) | [ | ] | : | . | ; | , | :=
In (4.9), ‘<______>’ indicates categorical rules that define ‘the structure ______ of the
language’. The characters of ALGOL consist of seven different type of symbols, as
indicated between the angle brackets. ‘::=’ represent ‘is defined as’. The symbols on the
right hand side of ‘::=’ are not in brackets because they are in the language of ALGOL,
whereas those on the left part are in BNF. Moreover, most of the operator symbols
assume their common interpretations. The arithmetic operator ‘↑’ means ‘raise to the
power,’ e.g., A2 would be written ‘A↑2’. The delimiter ‘:=’ roughly means ‘replaces,’
i.e., the left part is to be replaced by the name (or address) of the value of the right hand
side, e.g., ‘A := 3’ is a statement that directs the computer to assign the value of 3 to A.
(Ledley 1962, 218).
To see some syntactic rules of ALGOL and how they work, consider the
definitions in (4.10) and (4.11) for producing the expression types of ‘numbers’ and
‘simple variable,’ respectively.
(4.10)
i.

<unsigned integer> ::= <digit> | <unsigned integer> <digit>

where the juxtaposition of two angle brackets ‘<...> <...>’ means ‘followed by’.
ii.

<decimal fraction> ::= .<unsigned integer>

iii.

<decimal number> ::= <unsigned integer> | <decimal fraction>
| <unsigned integer> <decimal fraction>

iv.

<number> ::= <decimal number> | ＋<decimal number>
|﹣<decimal number>
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(4.10i) states that ‘an unsigned integer’ can be either a digit or an unsigned integer
followed by a digit. Note that this syntactic definition is called ‘recursive’ because
syntactically, ‘<unsigned integer>’ appears on both sides of the definition sign. In
general, a definition is recursive when at least one of the terms it defines is used in the
definition. (4.10ii) states that a delimiter ‘.’ followed by an unsigned integer is a decimal
fraction. In (4.10iii), it states that a decimal number can be expressed in one of the three
forms: an unsigned integer (as defined in i), a decimal fraction (as defined in ii), or an
unsigned integer followed by a decimal fraction (as defined in iii). Finally, in (4.10iv), it
states that a number can be expressed in also one of the three forms, namely, a decimal
number, a plus sign followed a decimal number, or a minus sign followed by a decimal
number.
(4.11)
<simple variable> ::= <letter> | <simple variable> <letter>
| <simple variable> <digit>
(4.11) states that a simple variable is a letter, a simple variable followed by a letter, or a
simple variable followed by a digit. Note that this definition is also recursive, and based
on recursive reasoning, the leftmost character of a simple variable is always a letter.
4.3.4

ALGOL is Classified as a ContextFree Language

Both theoretical and practical, the significance of the Chomsky hierarchy to computer
science started to show after Ginsburg and Rice (1962) proved that ALGOL was
equivalent to a contextfree, or Type 2, language (Hyman 2010).40 Theoretically,

According to the Chomsky hierarchy, a grammar that includes at least one recursive
definition is supra regular; this is a direct consequence of how the restrictions are placed
at the Type 3 class of grammars.
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Ginsburg and Rice’s discovery demonstrates that “BNF could express the grammar of all
contextfree languages and was equivalent to one form of Chomsky’s phrase structure
rules” (Hyman 2010, 270). As Hyman (2010) recounts, subsequent developments
include the algebraic formulations for these formal languages (Shützenberger 1961;
Chomsky and Shützenberger 1963) and eventually the proof that each of the languages on
the Chomsky hierarchy corresponds to a particular type of automata (Kuroda 1964).
Within fifteen years of Chomsky’s 1956 essay, “no serious study of computer science
would be complete without a knowledge of the techniques and results from language and
automata theory (Hopcroft and Ullman 1969, v). Finally, the result of these
developments was the new field of study, aptly named ‘formal language theory,’ that
emerged from both the study of languages and the study of automata (Ginsburg 1980).
Practically, Ginsburg and Rice’s (1962) discovery led to ‘syntaxdirected’
compiler design (Hopcroft and Ullman 1969). To illustrate, in software engineering,
programmers write code using particular formal languages, such as Python, or C++.
Before the hardware of a computer executes the code, there are two preliminary tasks: it
needs to check whether that particular code belongs to the programming language in
question, and then, if the answer is ‘yes,’ it needs to translate the code from that
programming language to the machine language of the CPU. A compiler is itself a
program that carries out these two tasks. To ensure performance, the writer of a compiler
will need to make sure that the compiler he or she writes will always reject code that
violates the rules of the programming language (i.e., the syntactically incorrect
programs), as well as always accepting the syntactically correct ones — this part of a
compiler is also called a ‘decision program’  i.e., an automaton.
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4.3.5

The Classificatory Use of the Chomsky Hierarchy

The Chomsky hierarchy helps compiler writers in designing compiler programs; it helps
programmers to first classify the code that their decision program will be dealing with
and then resort to the right template accordingly to engineer the program. Specifically,
the fact that a programming language, P, belongs to a particular class of languages on the
Chomsky hierarchy, L, entails that all the sentences in P (i.e., any code written in P) are
describable by the class of grammars G that corresponds to L. That is, for instance, all
the code written in ALGOL is describable by contextfree grammars. Note that each G
has an equivalent class of automata, A, e.g., the corresponding automata for contextfree
grammars are pushdown automata. Thus, (1) any code written in P is describable by G
and (2) A is equivalent to G; together, (1) and (2) entail that P is recognizable by A, in
principle. That is to say, knowing that ALGOL is contextfree allows a designer to
simplify their approach to engineer the compiler. The Chomsky hierarchy gives the
designer a ‘template’ to work with, i.e., by incorporating a pushdown stack in the
decision program to process ALGOL code.
Note that in computer science, compiler design is not the only area of study
benefited from the Chomsky hierarchy. In general, any programmer whose task includes
parsing input could take advantage from knowing how to properly identify the language
and classify it accordingly. Consider the HTML code as input. Suppose that the set of all
HTML code is supraregular. Suppose also that ‘regular expressions’ are, as the name
suggests, regular. Then it follows that the attempt to parse a HTML code using regular
expressions in the decision program would be futile. However, there are exceptions.
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Suppose that the set composed of all the telephone numbers in the U.S. is regular. Then,
if all one needs from the HTML code is all and only the U.S. phone numbers, nothing
else, then regular expressions would suffice. In other words, while parsing all possible
HTML code is a ‘supraregular’ problem, parsing only a particular kind of information in
the HTML code may not be a supraregular problem. Overall, having the Chomsky
hierarchy as a classification scheme is useful to computer programming engineers — if
the programming task at hand is not supraregular, it does not require a supraregular
solution.

4.4

A Toolmigration Analysis

My discussion of FLT thus far allows for me to answer the two questions that I purported
at the end of Chapter 3: What does it look like when the target profile of a tool in
migration remains the same? Can a tool’s usage profile change without the change of its
target profile? In other words, what does tooladaptation look like? I argue that the
crossdisciplinary uses of the Chomsky hierarchy between linguistics and computer
science discussed thus far presents such an example.
First, FLT including the Chomsky hierarchy can be analyzed as a research tool.
As I characterized it in Chapter 2, a research tool is a piece of mathematical construct that
guides its users to (1) formulate a problem, (2) obtain an analytic result based on the
formulated problem, and (3) interpret the result as a solution to the initial problem. I
recast my discussion in Section 4.2.4 in terms of ‘problem,’ ‘analytic result,’ and
‘solution’ as follows.
In Chomsky’s initial application of FLT:
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● the ‘problem’ is concerned with which type of models should be used to describe
the syntax of natural languages,
● the ‘analytic result’ is the argument (and an alleged proof) that the feature of
longdistance dependency in English is undescribable by finitestate grammars,
and
● the ‘solution’ is stated in the supraregular thesis, which is an interpretation of the
analytic result, i.e., modeling the syntax of natural languages requires a
supraregular grammar.
In a sense, should there be an explicit rule in computer science — ‘if a problem is supra
regular, then go for a supra regular solution’ — Chomsky should be given credit for its
origin.
Second, the crossdisciplinary use of FLT between linguistics and computer
science is a case of tool migration. In Chapter 2, I suggest that when a research tool is
used to study a new subject matter (i.e., one that is different from its previous
applications), then we have a case of tool migration. In Section 4.2, I have shown that
FLT has been used to theorize information processing with regard to language. By doing
so, it was hoped to explain linguistic phenomena, such as ambiguity, and to reveal the
syntax of natural languages. What exactly is this ‘syntax of natural languages’?
Chomsky (1965, 3) later elaborates it as “the speakerhearer’s knowledge of his
language.” Thus, one can say the subject matter of applying FLT in linguistics is the
knowledge of a natural language, whatever it may mean. By contrast, as I have discussed
using ALGOL as an example, the subject matter of applying FLT in computer science is
to study the ways to develop, and to improve the engineering of, the flow of information
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processes within the computer. Thus, this contrast in the two subject matters licenses us
to view the case of FLT between linguistics and computer science as tool migration.
Third, the next step is to determine which of the four types of tool migration
better characterize the case at hand. To do so, there are two question that need
answering: one is concerned with, in these two applications of FLT, the definitions of the
entities in the formal system and the relations between these entities, namely, the tool’s
target profile; the other is concerned with the ways in which FLT is applied to operate in
the two applications, i.e., the tool’s usage profile.
In terms of the target profile, are there any changes in the assumptions or
definitions regarding the ‘alphabet,’ ‘phrases,’ ‘sentences,’ ‘rules,’ ‘derivations,’ etc.,
when considering FLT in Chomsky’s study of natural languages and the development of
ALGOL? The answer to this question, I argue, is negative. In both linguistics and
computer science, these theoretical terms in FLT are about the units of information and
the relation between these units. In linguistics, symbols in an alphabet are the smallest
units that form phrases, and phrases, in turn, are units that form sentences. In the design
of ALGOL, characters are the smallest units that which form expressions, and
expressions, in turn, are units that which form statements. In both disciplines, the
grammatical rules determine the derivation of these units. These crucial similarities
suggest that the target profile of FLT has survived through the migration.
In terms of the usage profile, are there any changes in the way in which FLT is
used between the two applications I looked at thus far? The answer to this question, I
argue, is positive. In linguistics, FLT has been used to (1) explain ambiguity, (2)
formalize a means of analysis, and (3) model the syntax of natural languages through
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means of classification. In computer science, FLT maintains these usages while adding a
fourth one. In computer science, (1’) the derivations trees of FLT are used to detect
ambiguity (Parkes 2002)41, (2’) the metalanguage BNF is formalized to analyze
programming languages, and finally (3’) the Chomsky hierarchy is applied to ‘model’ the
data as input (e.g., code to be parsed by a compiler or by any program) through means of
classification. Recall Fig. 4.6 for an illustration of the relation between ‘data as input,’
‘instruction as input’ and the ‘output’ of the computation. However, despite these
similarities, the ‘engineering use’ of FLT in computer science is a salient, new way of
applying FLT. In particular, in computer science, programmers prepare the list of
instructions in order for the computer to produce intended output. The engineering aspect
of using the Chomsky hierarchy, thus, stands out from the theorizing aspect of using the
same tool in linguistics: the major distinction is that engineering is ‘output oriented.’ To
illustrate, recall the task of parsing phone numbers in HTML code. In that task, the
relevant data as input are the HTML code, which is supraregular, whereas the intended
output, i.e., the U.S. phone numbers in the code, are not. In a sense, the way
programmers model the input in such a task is directed by the intended output, not
necessarily the nature of the input. This outputoriented, engineering use of FLT differs
from the theoretical use of FLT in linguistics that I discussed in Sections 4.24.3. This
engineering use does not appear in the application of FLT when it migrates to
experimental psychology, a story that I resume in the next chapter.
In sum, FLT provides a framework to think about engineering problems and

In my discussion, I did not touch on the point in (1’), for the details in which computer
scientists use the derivation trees to detect or explain ambiguity does not affect my
argument.
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solutions to tackle these problems. These problems are analyzed in terms of varying
units of information and the relation between these units; the solutions are approached in
terms of the processes that generate them and the processes that parse them. The main
observation emerged from the discussion of this chapter is thus: In linguistics, FLT is
used to theorize and account for linguistic phenomena, whereas in computer science, it is
utilized to improve the implementation of information processes. This additional,
engineering use of FLT in computer science augments and, consequently, changes the
usage profile of the tool. Taken together, because the target profile survives the migration
but not the usage profile, the case of FLT migrating from linguistics to computer science
is, I conclude, an example of tooladaptation.
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Chapter 5
Formal Language Theory in the Sciences of Mind, Brain, and Information
Processing

In this chapter, I switch to explore one positive impact brought by migrating the research
tool of formal language theory (‘FLT’) to the sciences of mind and brain. Using
nonhuman animals as model organisms for understanding human linguistic abilities was
one signature of the behaviorist approach, once dominant in experimental psychology —
ironically, Chomsky was widely regarded as the key figure for its decline (Orgood 1975,
Gardner 1985). And yet, in this new wave of experimental psychology, songbirds and
nonhuman primates reappear in the quest for knowledge concerning human verbal
behavior, all under the framework of FLT due to Chomsky. One may ask: How do
scientists reconcile the differences between the behaviorist and the cognitivist
approaches? In particular, how do they combine using animals as model organism and
formal models of natural languages together to form a burgeoning research program?
This chapter is an attempt to start to address this latter question from the perspective of
tool migration. I assume that the answer to the latter question will inform an attempt to
answer the former, even though a proper attempt is outside the scope of this dissertation.
I will argue that the key that introduced this new, hybrid, strand of empirical psychology
was a ‘conceptual crossover’ due to a similar target profile with an augmented usage
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profile. In this chapter, a case of tooladaptation is shown to integrate animal model
organisms and formal models of languages into one scientific framework, called
cognitive biology (Fitch 2014).
To begin, in Section 5.1, I review an experiment in the 1960s in which George
Miller introduced artificial grammars to experimental psychology. This experiment
became a prototype of what is now known as the experiment of artificial grammar
learning (‘AGL’). In Section 5.2, I discuss the first reported experiment that incorporates
the protocols of AGL with the Chomsky hierarchy. Fitch and Hauser (2004) design an
experiment of AGL by using two grammars, a Type 3 grammar and a Type 2 grammar,
respectively, in the Chomsky hierarchy. Unlike their predecessor, Fitch and Hauser
interpret their experimental results based on the Chomsky hierarchy, in particular, the
concept of supra regularity. By doing so, the duo is able to relate animal model
organisms with formal models of languages in the study of the evolution of language. In
Section 5.3, I argue that their achievement can be accounted for in terms a particular type
of tooladaptation: an augmented usage profile with a similar target profile.

5.1 Project Grammarama: A Prototype of The Artificial Grammar
Learning Experiment Protocols
Known for his classic paper “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two,” Miller’s
other classic contribution to psychology is the prototype of the AGL experiment. The
original idea was a guessing game involving an artificial language instead of natural
languages like English. The idea gradually evolved into a research program, and the
initial idea was implemented in various forms, but the goal has been the same—to
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understand rule learning. Miller (1967, 129 emphasis original) depicts his guessing game
as follows:
Suppose that someone is shown arbitrary strings of signals and allowed to ask
which are grammatical and which are not. Suppose moreover that the rules of our
game do not resemble English grammar, and that the signals are not familiar
English words and phrases. In this ... form there is no limit to the variety of
artificial grammars we could invent. Imagine, in short, a completely novel,
completely abstract grammar and meaningless vocabulary. With nothing more
than that—with no meanings, no sensible use of the strings, with nothing but
formal criteria as a guide—can a person discover the grammatical rules
underlying the language? And if so, what is the best way for him to get at it?
In the 1950s, Miller conceived of this game, which he named ‘Grammarama.’ Soon after
computers were introduced to psychology laboratories, it became one of the first
computerized experiments in the 1960s.
The initial Grammarama experiment is comprised of a learning phase and a test
phase. The participant – Miller calls the participant ‘the learner’ – enters a small,
soundproofed room equipped with a chair and a teletypewriter on the table. The
experimenter communicates the instructions with the learner by printing them out on the
teletypewriter. The learner then responds by using the keyboard. The typescript, thus,
shows a record of all the exchanges during an experimental session.
A session starts with a description of the procedure: The learner is told to discover
the rules for generating admissible strings of letters. He or she may type any strings
composed from a specified alphabet. Upon completing a string, the experimenter prints
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out RIGHT to indicate a grammatical string, or WRONG to signal otherwise. The
process will continue until the learner feels certain that he or she has learned the rules.
By typing FINISH, the learner will enter the testing phase and be given in total 10 strings.
For each string, the learner will type ‘C’ to indicate ‘correct’ (i.e., it’s a grammatical
string) or ‘I’ to indicate otherwise. A score will then be printed to show the learner how
he or she has performed, and the session ends.
Instead of the overall correctness of the test result, i.e., the end product of
learning, the goal of Project Grammarama was to understand “how people learn the
grammatical rules underlying artificial languages” (1967, 126). Unlike the ‘engineering
use’ of FLT in computer science, the goal of the experiment shows a ‘theoretical use’ of
FLT similar to that in linguistics. As Miller (1967, 164, emphasis mine) stresses:
Interesting psychological processes occurred during the interaction; it is these
processes that we hope to understand, not their end product. The question is,
what cognitive functions do the protocols reveal?
At the time, 98 subjects were tested with regular grammar and contextfree grammar, in
each case with three sizes of the alphabet (two, three or six symbols). From the
typescript of these 98 learners, a variety of learning strategies was identified as used by
the subjects. It includes “anagrams, cycles, mirroring, counting, progressing, permuting,
algorithmic, random, unique” (ibid., 165). For instance, “if x is admissible, then xx is
also, and xxx, and, in general, xn. This is what” Miller and colleague “called a cyclic
strategy” (Miller 1967, 164). See (5.1) for illustration.
(5.1)
(2)

D(RD)4

DRDRDRDRD
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(3)

RRDRRDRRD

(RRD)3

(4)

RRRDDRRRDDDRRRDDRRRDD

(RRRDD)4

(5)

DDDDDDDDDDR

(D)10R

In (5.1), listed in the left column in are the second through the fifth responses from one
particular subject. Listed in the right column are notes made by the experimenter to
indicate the pattern in each of the responses. Despite the goal was to understanding the
process instead of the learning result, Miller noted that 54 out of their 98 subjects “typed
the word FINISH and took the test before they were ready to pass it” (ibid., 167).
Details of these learning strategies are interesting in their own right but largely
irrelevant to our present purpose. The primary reason to discuss this guessing game is to
contrast it with Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) version of the AGL experiment. In Project
Grammarama, the role of FLT and the Chomsky hierarchy is nearly inconsequential.
Miller applied formal grammars to design artificial languages, but neither the grammars
nor the Chomsky hierarchy was incorporated into his interpretation of the experimental
results. Using the Chomsky hierarchy to design tasks that are either ‘regular’ or ‘supra
regular’ would have to wait until a more recent wave of nonhuman animal AGL
experiments.

5.2

Formal Language Theory in Cognitive Biology

5.2.1 First Experiment in Comparative Psychology where Formal Language Theory
and Artificial Grammar Learning Join Force
The comparative psychologists Tecumseh Fitch and Marc Hauser (2004, 380) report
experimenting with cottontop tamarin monkeys (Saguinus Oedipus) using a regular
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grammars, (AB)n, and a supra regular (contextfree) grammar AnBn. In this now
widelycited experiment, Fitch and Hauser implement these two grammars by
audiorecorded consonantvowel syllables, spoken by a female and a male to create two
sets of distinct acoustic elements, A and B. These two sets are differentiated in voice
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pitch (>1 octave difference), phonetic identity, average formant frequencies, etc.

For

instance, Set A consists of syllables {ba, di, yo, tu, la, mi, no, wu} spoken by female,
whereas Set B consists of syllables {pa, li, mo, nu, ka, bi, do, gu} spoken by male. Thus,
strings such as ‘no li ba pa’ and ‘la pa wu mo no li’ conform to the (AB)n grammar as
they are instances of (AB)2 and (AB)3, respectively. In contrast, strings such as ‘yo la pa
do’ and ‘ba la tu li pa ka’ satisfy the AnBn grammar since the first string is an instance of
A2B2, whereas the second string an instance of A3B3.
Fitch and Hauser divided twenty adult cottontop tamarins into two groups, one
per grammar, each group with a mixture of sexes and ages. Their experimental procedure
includes a training phase, a refamiliarization phrase, and a test phase at the end. The
training phase took place in the animals’ home cages in one evening. During this phase,
all subjects were simultaneously exposed to 20 minutes of repeated playback, which
plays 60 different grammatical strings in random order.
The refamiliarization and the test phases took place in the next morning. When
an individual subject wandered into a sound chamber, the experimenter played strings
randomly chosen from those 60 training strings for two minutes while the animal was fed
with treats. After this refamiliarization phase, the experimenter then closed the door of

Examples of the sound files used in the experiment are provided by Fitch and Hauser
and can be found online:
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2004/01/15/303.5656.377.DC1.
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the sound chamber and started videotaping the subject. During the test phase, no food
was delivered. When the subject was both looking down and away from the loudspeaker,
the experimenter initiated playback of the test stimuli.
Based on the digitized video, multiple observers scored the latency and duration
of looking (i.e., orientation towards the loudspeaker). The observers’ scores agreed with
one another >90% of the time. Between the groups, the testing stimuli are the same eight
strings, four strings consistent with (AB)n and the other four consistent with AnBn. None
of the eight strings were included in the training stimuli to either group of animals.
The reactions to the test stimuli between the two groups of monkeys were
systematically different. In the group trained with the (AB)n grammar (‘Group (AB)n’
henceforth), 9 out of the 10 tamarins looked more to the loudspeaker when violations
were played. That is, they seemed to pay more attention to the strings generated by the
AnBn grammar than those generated by their training grammar. Overall, in this group, the
mean of looking to violations across animals is 72%, whereas the mean of looking to
grammatically consistent novel stimuli is 34%. To Fitch and Hauser, this contrast
between looking and notlooking behavior of the Group (AB)n suggests two things. First,
the monkeys could distinguish between the two syllableclasses, Set A and Set B.
Second, and more important, they are sensitive to their training grammar (AB)n, in the
sense that they might have learned the grammar.
This second point is a standard inference from the socalled
‘familiarizationnovelty’ experiment protocols. It is common to infer whether a subject
recognizes a pattern in the training stimuli based on the subject’s reaction towards novel
stimuli that lack such a pattern. The assumption is that subjects show more interest in
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novelty when they are sufficiently familiarized with the pattern in the training material.
In Fitch and Hauser’s experiment, all eight test strings are novel to the monkeys, but four
of the strings share the same pattern as the training stimuli. The monkeys were trained
with the (AB)n grammar. Thus, the expectation was that if they have learned the (AB)n
grammar, they would look less to the loudspeaker when it played the strings consistent
with the (AB)n grammar than they would when it played violations, i.e., strings of the
AnBn grammar. In the authors’ words, “the ability to learn the rule governing the
construction of an acoustic sequence, without any explicit training, indicates that the
tamarins are sensitive to regularities in an acoustic stream and can recognize novel strings
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as consistent with past inputs (2004, 379).

In contrast, the group of subjects trained with the AnBn grammar (‘Group AnBn’
henceforth) showed no statistically significant difference in their looking behavior
between the grammatical strings and the violations. Among the 10 monkeys, none
looked at more than two of the four violations. Overall, the mean of looking to violations
was 29% and the mean of looking to the consistent stimuli was 31%. Fitch and Hauser
interpret tamarins’ lack of ‘special interest’ in the (AB)n test strings as indicating that
they failed to master the grammar AnBn, i.e., their training grammar.
5.2.2

Implications to the Evolution of Language

The purpose of Fitch and Hauser’s AGL experiment is to probe the ability of tamarins to
process acoustic sequences, but ultimately, what they are concerned with is the evolution
of human linguistic capacity, especially the capacity to handle hierarchical structures. By

However, this interpretation has been challenged by other psychologists, e.g.,
(Perruchet and Rey 2005).
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‘hierarchical structures,’ the authors mean the structures such as ‘sentences,’ ‘phrases,’
‘words,’ and ‘symbols.’ These structures are hierarchical because ‘sentences’ are
composed of smaller units such as ‘phrases,’ ‘phrases’ are composed of even smaller
units such as ‘words,’ and ‘words’ are composed of the smallest units such as
‘morphemes’ or ‘phonemes.’ In other words, the authors were intended to probe the
ability of tamarins to recognize strings that could be generated by PSGs.
Their quest combines the interests from the disciplines of generative linguistics
and evolutionary biology. As they put it, “linguistic syntax involves the rearrangement
and permutation of ... abstract hierarchical structures” such as phrases or sentences in
human languages that are above the word level (ibid., 377). On the one hand, the
capacity in humans to perceive and produce these hierarchical syntactic structures “goes
far beyond the simple concatenation procedures ... in animal communication” (ibid.). On
the other hand:
[T]he evolution of language faculty presumably involved the incorporation of
some ancestral primate cognitive capacities. Thus, a critical question is whether
hierarchical processing was one of these preexisting abilities. (ibid.)
In other words, for Fitch and Hauser (2004), despite lacking hierarchical structures in
their communication systems (which may or may not be the case), some nonhuman
primates may nonetheless possess the ability to process hierarchical structures. If indeed
such an ability can be detected in other primates, which is the purpose of Fitch and
Hauser’s AGL experiment, the finding will help shed light on how this ability have
evolved within primate species. Even if the experiment result turns out to be negative, it
may still inform neuroscientific investigation of linguistic abilities in humans.
120

That being said, it is crucial for Fitch and Hauser to experimentally demonstrate
that humans indeed possess the said abilities, which they did. In the same paper (2004),
Fitch and Hauser report their preliminary AGL experiment with adult human subjects
using the same training stimuli previously mentioned in the tamarin experiment.
According to the authors, all twenty adult human participants “showed rapid learning of
either grammar (with under 3 min of exposure), and were easily able to discriminate
grammatical from nongrammatical stimuli for both grammars” (2004, 379). From this
stark contrast, especially the failure of the tamarins to recognize the strings generated by
the AnBn (supra regular) grammar, they suggest that the acquisition of the hierarchical
processing abilities “may have represented a critical juncture in the evolution of the
human language faculty” (ibid., 380).
To narrow down among alternative explanations, the authors argue that the cause
to tamarins’ failure in learning the AnBn grammar must be internal to the subjects.
According to them, all extraneous factors in the experiment were consistent between the
two grammars. For example, the stimuli are of the same length and loudness. Subjects
are able to perceive the A and Bclasses, as shown in their recognition of the (AB)n
grammar. All of the duration of exposure, testing, or evaluation procedures were the
same. Moreover, the authors argue, earlier work with this species using the same
paradigm has demonstrated that these animals are capable of storing and recalling up to
three separate stimuli and comparing them with subsequent strings. Therefore, they
(ibid., 379) contend that the tamarins’ inability to learn the supraregular grammar, “does
not result from some lower level limitation on memory, attention, or number
discrimination.” They acknowledge that it is possible that, with different experimental
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methods “(e.g., training and reinforcement), different grammars, and other species (e.g.,
apes),” other researchers might come to a different conclusion (379). Nonetheless, the
authors conclude (380), “tamarins suffer from a specific and fundamental computational
limitation on their ability to spontaneously recognize or remember hierarchically
organized acoustic structures.”
5.2.3 Relating Animal Model Organisms With the Study of Language Through the
Chomsky Hierarchy
Fitch and Hauser (2004) appeal to FLT, especially Chomsky’s supraregular thesis, to
interpret the experimental results. According to them, the stringset produced by the AnBn
grammar requires a supraregular grammar that “can embed strings within other strings,
thus creating complex hierarchical structures (‘phrase structures’), and longdistance
dependencies” (378). Indeed, a discussion of this stringset can be found in Chomsky’s
(1956, Section 2) initial paper where he argues that finitestate grammars cannot describe
longdistance dependencies in English. (See Section 4.2.4 for my reconstruction of
Chomsky’s argument for the supraregular thesis). In that article, Chomsky gave three
examples of formal languages that are also undescribable by finitestate grammars. One
of the three, which I quote in (5.2), is likely to be the origin of this AnBn grammar in Fitch
and Hauser’s work.
(5.2)
L1 contains a⁀b, a⁀a⁀b⁀b, a⁀a⁀a⁀b⁀b⁀b, ...,and in general, all sentences
consisting of n occurrences of a followed by exactly n occurrences of b, and only
these. (Chomsky 1956, 115)
Note that earlier in Section 4.1.2, I have already featured L1 shown here in (5.2). In fact,
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it is a stock example of a supraregular language. The grammar that generates it contains
a set of two productions: {S → aSb and S → ab}. Recall the three limiting conditions
from the Chomsky hierarchy (Section 4.1.3). This grammar complies to all but the most
restrictive condition, which I reiterate in (5.3):
(5.3)
Third limiting condition: For every production
VN, and (2) and

has the form

or

, where

→
∈ VT ,

in P, (1) | | = 1 and

∈

∈ VN, and | | = | | = 1 ,

e.g., A → a, A → aB.
Specifically, this limiting condition in (5.3) does not allow for rewriting rules to have
more than two symbols on the righthand side. Since S → aSb in the set violates this
condition, the whole grammar is classified as beyond Type 3, hence supraregular.44
Fitch and Hauser (2004) also appeal to the tree diagram to represent the
supraregularity of the AnBn. To illustrate, consider the derivation of the string aaabbb:
{S ⇒ aSb ⇒ aaSbba ⇒ aaSbbb ⇒ aaabbb} (Section 4.1.2). This derivation is said to be
represented in a tree diagram shown in Fig 5.1a. In Fig 5.1, I juxtaposition that tree
diagram with Fig 5.1c, which Fitch and Hauser use to illustrate the hierarchical nature of
the stringset generated by AnBn (2004, 378). In Fitch’s later work (2014; Fitch and
Federici 2012), he switches to talk of the ‘treelike hierarchical structures’ as another way
of referring to supraregularity. That is, for instance, if a device can parse the stringset
containing aaabbb, it must be able to process its derivation tree as shown in Fig 5.1a, and
hence the device must be supraregular. By contrast, according to Fitch and Hauser

44

The grammar is a Type 2 contextfree grammar.
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(2004), the strings produced by the (AB)n grammar are sequentially organized. Such
strings can be generated by a finitestate grammar (‘FSG’), which makes it a regular
language.

Fig. 5.1 Three Derivation Trees
In Fig. 5.1, on the left, it shows a derivation tree of the string aaabbb; on the right, it
shows two diagrams in Fitch and Hauser (2004) to illustrate (bottom) the strings
generated by a phrase structure contextfree grammar AnBn as hierarchically organized
and (top) the strings generated by a finitestate grammar (AB)n as sequentially organized.
With regard to the experimental design, the authors argue that the two stringsets
generated by (AB)n and AnBn, respectively, make a useful pair of tools for investigating
computational constraint. This is because the strings in both stringsets are formed from
the same alphabet, i.e., the two syllableclasses, Set A and Set B. Thus, they argue, the
only difference between these two stringsets is in the grammars that generate them.
Consequently, if the tamarins can recognize the ‘regular’ stringset (AB)n but not the
supraregular stringset AnBn, then, as Fitch and Hauser reason, the ability of tamarins to
recognize strings is limited at the regular level. Specifically, they say that (2004, 378):
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We chose the AnBn grammar because it is the simplest PSG that cannot, in
principle, be approximated with an FSG but that can easily be brought into
correspondence with a simple FSG in all nongrammatical respects, as required for
our experiment.
Furthermore, they argue, the difference between FSG and PSG is more than of a matter of
analysis. Their difference is ‘real’ both computationally and psychologically. In Fitch
and Hauser’s words (2004, 378):
Like any PSG, the AnBn grammar requires additional computational machinery
beyond a finitestate automaton. In computer science terminology, this addition
would minimally be a pushdown stack. In psychological terms, it requires some
way to recognize a correspondence between either the groups formed by the As
and Bs (e.g., counting) or between specific As and corresponding Bs (e.g.,
longdistance dependencies).
They highlight the experimental use of the grammar by concluding as follows (ibid.):
This PSG thus provides the ideal grammar for the empirical issue addressed by
this study by allowing us to focus on the generative power of the system without
introducing extraneous performance variables (e.g., memory capacity or
referentiality).
5.2.4

An Interdisciplinary Research Program was Born

Since its publication, Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) experiment has brought a vital discussion
to the scientific community concerning the biology and evolution of language. For
instance, Donnell, Hauser, and Fitch. (2005, 286) argue that what FLT offers scientists
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(such as comparative, experimental psychologists) is a “more formal mathematical
approaches to language.” Fitch (2010, 109) suggests that FLT is helpful for “formulating
computational questions about how the human brain implements language, and for
comparing human capabilities with those of other species.” Bowling (2014) also
advocates that to understand the neural basis of human cognitive capacity, biologists need
to first isolate those neural bases of cognitive capacities that are shared between human
and nonhuman animals — the AGL experimental protocols powered by FLT provides
just the right tool for this task. Fitch and Friederici (2012, 1940) argue that this renewed
version of AGL shows “how FLT can be used, practically, by biologists, psychologists
and neuroscientists, to design and execute experiments and analyse the resulting data.”
Emerging from these discussions is a proposal of an interdisciplinary research
program, which features theory of computation as the hub to situate diverse domains of
research such that their research results may inform one another. As Fitch argues (2014),
for the science of cognition to mature, it needs to combine both the comparative and the
computational approaches. In terms of the comparative approach, he urges cognitive
scientists to expand their target interest from human cognition to include cognitive
systems of nonhuman animals. In terms of the computational approach, he recommends
the theory of computation for the role of bridging neuroscience, the cognitive sciences,
and cognitive biology. As Fitch puts it (ibid., 330), neuroscience supplies “the firm
physical foundations of brain function,” whereas cognitive biology provides “a
comparative viewpoint.” Moreover, the link between disciplines “including cognitive
and mathematical psychology, linguistics and musicology” should be built “upon the
insights of computer science” (ibid., 330). Fitch concludes that the theory of computation
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and its “wellestablished branch called formal language theory” provides “an appropriate
framework for ... considering highlevel pattern perception of the sort typifying human ...
language” (ibid., 347). By ‘highlevel pattern perception,’ Fitch refers to
supraregularity, which, as he has argued, can be detected by the AGL experimental
protocols that he and Hauser devised (2004).
5.2.5

The IFGasStack Model

Over the course of ten years, the subject matter of the AGL research in cognitive biology
grows from understanding the evolution of human language faculty (Fitch and Hauser
2004) to looking for the neural substrate of the pushdown stack. Based on these two
general principles and the confirmation that human mind is supra regular, Fitch (2014)
suggests that this neural substrate, once found, will explain how the human brain
processes information that is ‘hierarchically organized,’ as illustrated by the derivation
trees (Section 5.3.2). Fitch speculates that a likely location for the stack could be at the
“inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, comprising Broca’s area and its neighbors), with sensory and
association regions in the temporal and parietal lobes” (ibid., 355). IFG is the structure in
the brain that “serves as a kind of ‘abstract scratchpad’ ” for offloading “partial results
computed during serial processing of hierarchical structures” that are ensconced in the
occipital and temporal cortices (ibid., 355). Calling this the “IFGasstack” model, Fitch
(ibid., 355) establishes the link between neurolinguistics and computer science. In his
words (ibid., 27):
[R]everberations in the frontosensory feedback loop would play the role of the
stack in the pushdown automaton implementing a contextfree grammar. ... [T]he
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IFG would thus have an additional storage mechanism into which intermediate
results (and in particular unfinished structural computations) could be placed for
later retrieval.
Although Fitch admits that this IFGasstack model is highly speculative, he appeals to
FLT as applied in other disciplines to support his approach. In his words (2014, 349),
A founding insight of both cognitive science and modern linguistics is that all
human languages require supraregular computational resources (resources above
the finitestate level) ([Chomsky 1956, 1957]). This means that although a
finitestate automaton can solve many useful problems (e.g., learn a lexicon,
recognize word strings, etc.) there is a substantial class of problems that it cannot
solve. These include all aspects of language in which flexible, extendable trees
are needed as data structures, or where treeidentification and processing are core
computational problems. For systems which rely strongly upon flexible, nested
hierarchical structure, as do language and music, such treebased processing is
indispensable.

Thus far, my discussion of Fitch and Hauser’s AGL experiment shows an novel
application of FLT (i.e., to detect supraregularity) with similar theoretical commitments
from their predecessors. I have also discussed (1) the perceived advantage of applying a
formal tool (i.e. FLT) in the study of the evolution of language and (2) the origin of a
rising interdisciplinary research program in cognitive biology based on a new version of
the AGL experimental protocols. In the next section, I argue that Fitch and Hauser’s
application of FLT can be viewed as tooladaptation.
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5.3

A Tooladaptation

5.3.1

An Augmented Usage Profile

The novelty of Fitch and Hauser’s application of FLT is evident. Indeed, I argue that the
duo’s ‘experimental use’ of the Chomsky hierarchy together with the AGL experimental
protocols has expanded the usage profile of FLT. Specially, while formal grammars were
present in Millier’s Project Grammarama, Fitch and Hauser were the first to incorporate
the idea of ‘supraregularity’ from Chomsky’s work to the design of their experiment.
For this reason, I refer to Fitch and Hauser’s version of the experimental protocols as the
AGL powered by FLT or ‘FLTpoweredAGL.’ Moreover, with this new experimental
use of FLT, I recast the instrumental character in four terms as opposed to three. That is,
in addition to ‘problem,’ ‘analytic result,’ and ‘solution,’ there is a new step, which I call
the ‘experimental result’. To illustrate, in Fitch and Hauser’s application of FLT:
● the ‘problem’ is concerned with the evolution of the ability to process hierarchical
structures, such as ‘sentences,’ ‘phrases,’ ‘words,’ and so on.
● the ‘analytic result’ is that the stringsets generated by AnBn and (AB)n,
respectively, provide a good pair of tool for detecting supraregularity.
● the ‘experimental result’ from the FLTpoweredAGT shows that tamarins failed
to spontaneously recognize the AnBn grammar.
● the ‘solution’ is an interpretation of the experimental result coupled with the
analytic result, i.e., the tamarins does not have supraregularity, which means they
do not possess the ability to process hierarchical structures.
This addition step in my illustration shows that FLT has given a new use in Fitch and
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Hauser’s (2004) application.
Another novelty resulting from the protocols of the FLTpoweredAGL is what I
call a ‘conceptual crossover.’ For those who are familiar with the history of psychology,
especially Chomsky’s (1959a) criticism against the behaviorist Skinner’s methodology,
this novelty is the joining forces of formal models from generative linguistics and
nonhuman animals as model organisms from the behaviorist tradition to the study of the
evolution of human language. In the next section, I will argue that what seems to license
such a conceptual crossover is a similar target profile in Fitch and Hauser’s application of
FLT.
5.3.2

A Similar Target Profile: ‘It’s All About Information Processing’

Like their predecessors, Fitch and Hauser hold that information processing is both
computational and physical in nature. The brain, be it biological or silicon, is an
informationprocessing device, and the mind is the program that runs on the device.
Moreover, informationprocessing systems can be meaningfully classified into a
containment hierarchy—meaningful because the classification is based on the correlation
between the generative power of the grammar and the capacity of the recognizer as
shown in the Chomsky hierarchy. Furthermore, there is a direct, informationprocessing
impact on the recognition of patterns in acoustic sequences, such as parsing. (See Section
4.2.3 for my discussion on the ‘correspondence hypothesis.’) Fitch and Hauser’s
interpretation of the experimental results entails that to them, such an impact, while
direct, manifests as the abilities of the tamarin monkey’s ‘internal program.’ To illustrate,
consider the two diagrams in Fig. 5.2.
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Fig. 5.2 Two Diagrams of Data Flow
In Fig. 5.2, I compare two different approaches to study information processing, one in
computer science, another in the strain of cognitive biology discussed thus far. The
diagram on the top is a replication of Ledley’s (1962, 7) diagram captioned “Data flow to
computer” (Section 4.3.1). The diagram at the bottom is my representation of Fitch and
Hauser’s version of the AGL experimental protocols. In particular, subjects are
represented as the ‘computer,’ the training stringset as the ‘input numbers,’ and subjects’
reaction toward violations as the ‘output numbers.’
One thing to notice from this comparison is the internalization of the ‘instruction
list.’ In computer science (the diagram on top), the instruction list is considered as input,
whereas in cognitive biology (the diagram at the bottom), this list is ‘internalized’ in the
subjects. In Fitch and Hauser’s interpretation, it is this ‘internal factor’ that explains the
output behavior observed in the experiment.
Moreover, to illustrate in what sense the AGL experiment protocols reveal the
‘internal constraint’ to supraregularity, consider the diagrams in Fig. 5.3.
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Fig. 5.3 A Comparison between Group (AB)n and Group AnBn
In Fig. 5.3, the diagram on top indicates that monkeys trained with a regular language
(i.e., Group (AB)n) are attentive to violations. In contrast, the diagram at the bottom
shows that monkeys trained with a supraregular language (i.e., Group AnBn) failed to
show interest to violations. This contrast in monkeys ‘output’ behavior is interpreted as a
limitation of their internal program. That is, their internal program could not recognize
the supra regular training language. As the authors argue, the only difference between
these two ‘inputs’ is the grammar that generates them, one being regular another
supraregular. Thus, to Fitch and Hauser, the diverging behaviors as output have but one
explanation — tamarin monkeys’ internal program is not supraregular. In other words,
to explicate their reasoning, if a system can solve a regular task but fail at a supra regular
one, despite the ingredients of these two tasks are otherwise identical, then the said
system cannot be supraregular.
While this ‘supraregular’ reasoning seems to be a weaker form of the
correspondence hypothesis, it certainly shows a trace of influence from computer science
as opposed from psycholinguistics. As Fitch and Hauser (2004, 378) put explicitly, “the
AnBn grammar requires additional computational machinery beyond a finitestate
automaton. In computer science terminology, this addition would minimally be a
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pushdown stack.” In other words, the computation constraints from which the tamarin
monkeys suffer is, according to Fitch and Hauser, such a stack is absent both in their
internal program and in their brain. Note that according to their pilot study, human
subject have no difficulty of recognizing the violations. By this contrast, humans have
the liberty of enjoying the pushdown stack internally programmed and implemented in
the brain for our disposal (Fitch 2014).45
To summarize, Fitch and Hauser’s AGL experiment has created a new,
experimental use of FLT, but their application has not changed the definitions of the
components in FLT. The tool and its components remains to be units of information and
rules of how smaller units compose bigger units. These components allow users to think
about information processes, be it psychological, neurological, or implemented by
silicon. Thus, Fitch and Hauser’s application of FLT results in an augmented, and hence,
a different usage profile, while the target profile stays largely the same. For this reason, it
is suitable to view the case of FLT in cognitive biology as another example of
tooladaptation.

There are other reasons why humans may not have a linearbounded storage
implemented in the brain.
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Chapter 6
Epistemic Risks: Resistance and Backlashes from the Intended Users
In the previous chapter, I focused on one positive impact of tool migration. My analysis
suggests that the combination of a similar target profile and an augmented usage profile
enables the ‘conceptual crossover’ that brought to life an interdisciplinary research
program — where animal model organisms meet formal models from generative
linguistics in the study of the evolution of language. In this chapter, I discuss two
negative repercussions: resistance and backlashes from the intended users.
Thus far, unlike Morgan’s approach to traveling facts, my analysis has not
explicitly addressed the aspect of users in tool migration, but the concern has been there:
Both the inventors and the subsequent users are key figures to understand the tools in
migration. Specifically, it is their respective applications of a given tool that give what I
identify as the tool’s target profile and usage profile. As I commented in Section 3.5,
what appears to be a given tool borrowed and applied across disciplines turns out to be a
wonderfully convoluted natural history, including the development and evolution of the
tool, with possibly everchanging profiles from one application to another. The story of
game theory was one example. My investigation of formal language theory (‘FLT’)
reveals the same trend, up until this point.
In this chapter, I discuss two reactions of Fitch and Hauser’s work from their
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intended users: the neurolinguists and the experimental comparative psychologists. In
Section 6.1, to begin, I briefly discuss what Fitch thought to be the appeal of applying
FLT in the study of the evolution of language. In Section 6.2, as an example of resistance
from intended users, I discuss a criticism of the stack model from alert neurolinguists. In
Section 6.3, drawing form the migration story of FLT, I reflect on the relation between the
autonomy and the limits of a research tool more generally. In Section 6.4, I come back to
continue the story by reviewing the unfortunate search for ‘recursion.’ In particular, I
argue that this search for ‘recursion’ (i.e., the capacity described as the ‘infinite use of
finite means’ or ‘openendedness’) constitutes a misuse of the experimental protocols of
artificial grammar learning (‘AGL’) reported in Fitch and Hauser (2004). The misuse
brought backlashes to Fitch and Hauser’s work and cast a shadow on their achievement.
Also in this section, I discuss Fitch’s assessment of the source that has caused this
misuse: a conflation of the concepts between ‘recursion’ and ‘supra regularity.’ While
Fitch contends that this conflation is due to the mixed origins of FLT (including
mathematical logic, linguistics, and computer science), I argue that this conflation shows
up also in a paper he coauthored (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002). Finally, in Section
6.5, I summarize the migration story of FLT. Drawing from these repercussions of FLT
within cognitive biology that I reviewed in this chapter, I highlight the responsibility of
users who are in charge of importing research tools. Being an importer of a research tool
in migration is of a great responsibility. By doing so, one exposes his or her intended
users to an assortment of epistemic risks, such as misusing the FLTpowered AGL
experiment protocols to test for ‘recursion.’
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6.1

‘Widely Accepted and Wellunderstood,’ by Whom?

Fitch argues that FLT is “widely accepted, and wellunderstood” for classifying
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“computational systems ... including, presumably, actual brains ...” (Fitch 2010, 109).

He contends (ibid, 110) that the Chomsky hierarchy “provides a sensible starting point
for classifying the computational power of different species in a way relevant to human
language.” In other words, to use my terminology, FLT has the appropriate target profile
to begin with, and the AGL protocols add the ‘experimental use’ to its usage profile, both
of which are indispensable to resituate the tool in the study of the evolution of language.
Indeed, as I discussed in Section 5.3.2, FLT comes from the scientific tradition
that approaches the mind as information processing, and the brain is generally assumed to
be one type of physical devices that compute information. Thus, FLT can be said to have
the right target profile — for the ‘brainasacomputingdevice’ has been a theoretical
commitment shared between the cognitive sciences and computer science. Similarly, the
AGL protocols for testing supraregularity can be said to have given FLT the right usage
profile — for the Chomsky hierarchy has been a classification scheme used in both
linguistics and computer science. The hierarchy has indeed been used to rank different
such devices based on their generative powers. In other words, Fitch does have good
reasons to think that FLT, especially the Chomsky hierarchy, is the right tool for the task,
from the perspective of the users in linguistics and computer science, i.e., the disciplines
where the tool was established. However, as I shown in Sections 6.23, FLT turns out to

In (2010, 109), he argues that “the utility of [the] Chomsky hierarchy is that it provides
a formally defined, widely accepted, and wellunderstood classification for computational
systems less powerful than Turing machines (including, presumably, actual brains).”
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be not so “widely accepted, and wellunderstood” by Fitch’s intended users. This result
should not be surprising. In an interdisciplinary research program such as cognitive
biology, a tool that might be wellunderstood, wellaccepted by one group of users could
very well be poorlyunderstood or even entirely rejected by another group of users. Let
me begin by the story of the ‘IFGasstack model.’

6.2

Potential Limitations of FLT to Inform Neurolinguistics

6.2.1

Discrete Computation for the Brain?

The ‘IFGasstack model’ is explicitly formulated in Fitch (2014) but the idea appears
earlier in Fitch and Friederici (2012). In both articles, Fitch justifies the model with the
unique capacity in humans to process hierarchically ordered linguistic structure. Such a
process is diagrammatically represented as the ‘derivation trees’ in both linguistics and
computer science. Thus, the search for the implementation of the pushdown stack in the
human brain suggests that the ‘derivation trees’ also have migrated with FLT to cognitive
biology. However, in linguistics and computer science, derivation trees are used as
means of analysis (e.g., explaining semantic ambiguity). To Fitch and fellow cognitive
biologists, these derivation trees are real, not just psychologically and computationally,
but also physiologically.
From this metaphysical commitment, a problem arises: the treelike processes is a
result of discrete modeling in generative linguistic, whereas the brain a continuous
device. For this reason, some scholars worry that the Chomsky hierarchy might not be
the right tool for studying the brain. For instance, consider Honing and Zuidema’s (2014,
376) critical response to Fitch:
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We do not share ... Fitch’s faith in ... the branch of computing theory that takes
trees (and the Chomsky Hierarchy) as central notions. ... [A]s we zoom in on the
neural basis of this [tree] structure, important questions arise about the cognitive
reality of the building blocks of treebased descriptions: the symbolic nodes, the
ordering of the branches, and the implied hierarchical levels.
The problem lies in the attempt to model the brain, a continuous system, with a discrete
model that did not take into account the kind of ‘stuff’ that the brain is made of. Honing
and Zuidema continue (ibid., 376):
[U]ltimately, computing in the brain is based on electrical and chemical substrates
that vary on continuous scales. How discrete and treelike structures may emerge
from such a continuous basis is an important research question for cognitive
science … With exact answers to that question still lacking, ... it is important to
realize that a continuous system may approximate the behavior of a discrete
idealization to an arbitrary degree and still remains at heart a continuous system.
They (ibid., 376) conclude that the derivation trees:
might thus provide a good description for some aspects of the behavior of a
system, but fail for other aspects, and completely disappear when zooming in,
because the primitive operations of the system are very unlike trees.
In other words, before taking the IFGasstack model seriously, one might wish to furnish
it with an account of how the discrete structures emerge from the continuous processes in
the brain.
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6.2.2

A Stack Model for Linguistic Memory in the Brain?

Trying to locate the pushdown stack in the brain assumes that the human brain
implements linguistic memory with a mechanism like the lastinfirstout stack (see
Section 4.1.4). Essentially a product of engineering, a pushdown stack is an abstract data
type, invented for automatic processing of coded data, and the computing machine for
47

performing the method.

Similar to the working tape of a Turing machine, a pushdown

stack is a linear storage that behaves in a particular way: By design, it pushes items down
the stack and pops the latest one out before an earlier item may be retrieved.
As the psychologist Jonathon Crystal (in personal conversation) points out, for a stack to
be a plausible model of human linguistic memory, one would expect the lastinfirstout
fashion of memory recall in humans. That is, humans would perform better recalling
items of later part of a sequence than recalling items of the beginning of the sequence.
However, a phenomenon called the serialposition effect studied by psychologists
counters such an expectation.
Serialposition effect refers to an observation about memory recall. It has been
shown that when people hear a reasonably long list of unrelated words and are asked
immediately to recall them in any order, they tend to perform similarly well recalling the
words at the end and at the beginning of the list. The middle of the list is “far less likely
to be recalled” (Hardy and Heyes 1999, 63). Thus, it remains questionable whether the
concept of a stack alone is appropriate for understanding the neural storage of linguistic

In 1957, Friedrich Ludwig Bauer and Klaus Samelson filed for a patent of the “Method
for the automatic processing of coded data, and computing machine for performing the
method.” https://patents.google.com/patent/DE1094019B/en
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information with regard to production and comprehension.
6.2.3

The Place of Infinite Processing Time in Cognitive Neuroscience

Infinity is a crucial modeling choice to the theoretical development of FLT. When Alan
Turing (1936) models computation with the concept of a machine, both its memory and
the time available for the machine to complete the computation are assumed to be infinite
(Section 4.1.4). The working tape of a Turing machine is infinite in length. And the
computability of a function is defined based on whether “there exists a set of instructions
that will result in a Turing machine computing the function regardless of the amount of
time it takes” (BarkerPlummer 2012). Chomsky (1956, 115) has also explicitly stated
that “[i]n general, the assumption that languages are infinite is made for the purpose of
simplifying the description” i.e., the grammar. For the “grammar must reflect and
explain the ability of a speaker to produce and understand new sentences which may be
much longer than any he has previously heard,” he says in an endnote (Chomsky 1956,
124). However, while restricting memory becomes the key to classifying different
classes of automata, the Chomsky hierarchy does not concern the factor of computing
time. Indeed, in computer science, the Chomsky hierarchy is entirely concerned with
‘computability,’ whereas ‘computational complexity,’ which deals with the aspect of
processing time (among other things), is considered in a separate context.
On the other hand, regardless of species, biological brains compute with limited
time. It thus poses a question whether FLT indeed provides the right tool for zooming in
to the neural activities in addition to merely classifying them based on their performance.
As Honing and Zuidema suggest (Section 5.2.1), how the brain computes and stores
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information remains itself a research question. Relying on the ‘IFGasstack’ model or
FLT to inform research in neurolinguistics could be placing the cart before the horse.

6.3

The Undetermined Autonomy and Limits of the Tools: A Discussion

6.3.1

Modeling Choices Carried Over to Become Theoretical Commitments

Discussed in Section 6.2, those theoretical commitments concerning discrete computation
and infinite computing time were modeling choices made by inventors of the tool in the
disciplines where FLT was initially established and further developed. In a sense,
mathematical logic can be viewed as FLT’s ‘native’ discipline whereas linguistics and
computer science its ‘home’ disciplines.
Having migrated to cognitive biology, those modeling choices became theoretical
commitments. Together with the AGL experimental results, it gives rise to the
IFGasstack model for exploring how the brain implements a stack, which in turn
motivates the search for a biological explanation for human linguistic capacity. My study
of FLT confirms one thing: Research tools develop and evolve over the course of being
used, within or outside their native disciplines. Such a discovery strengthens the main
point I argued in Chapter 3: Keeping the integrity of a migrating tool is not necessarily
desirable. Focusing on the changes to a tool (especially changes to either the target
profile or the usage profile, or both) enriches our understanding of tooluse in science.
6.3.2

Limits of a Tool

That said, I should note that no users (not even the inventors) have the total authority
over what a tool could or could not be used to do. For instance, MaynardSmith’s
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criticism about economists using evolutionary game theory (‘EGT’) is an example of
misjudgment — it was an inventor underestimating the potential of his creation, as I
argued in Section 3.4.5. Unbeknownst to him, certain modification to EGT’s target
profile (allowing, for example, for fitness without biological heredity) has made
justifying its applications in social sciences possible. However, there may be cases in
which the accumulated modifications thus far still would not justify using a tool in a
certain way. If true, it follows that there may be a limit to each tool’s functionality (i.e.,
to what it could or could not do), with or without modifications. To illustrate, consider a
simple example. An adjustable wrench is a versatile tool. It can spin bolts of varying
sizes. In addition, it could function as a clamp. With its weight, it could be used as a
hammer, and with its length, it could function as a unit of measurement if necessary, and
so on. However, this list of its possible uses is likely to end somewhere. For instance,
without an overhaul, a wrench could not be used as a roller because it does not have the
shape for such a use. And there are some things that it simply could not be, such as a
Mars spaceprobe. Of course, finding the limit of a tool is not straightforward (which is
why I did it arbitrarily in the example of a wrench). Indeed, when modifications to a
given tool are allowed, it is not clear whether there will be a fixed limit of the tool’s
functionality. Thus, between the inventor’s intended use(s) and the tool’s limit that may
or may not be fixed, there is plenty of room for the users’ creativity.
6.3.3

A Misuse of a Tool Due to a Carriedover Conflation of Concepts

Still, some misuses of a tool are relatively obvious to pick out. In the next section, I
discuss an example in which the users misjudge the capacity of the tool. This example
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also shows that after all, FLT is not wellunderstood for classifying computing systems
without qualification. It may be true that FLT is wellunderstood among theoretical
computer scientists for classifying formal languages and their recognizers. However, in
an interdisciplinary research program, it is dangerous to assume that such a tool will be
similarly wellunderstood by another group of users who are new to it. The AGL
experimental protocols powered by FLT are such a tool. After 2004, some researchers
started using it mistakenly to show that ‘recursion’ — a computational feature that Fitch,
Chomsky and Hauser hypothesize (2002) to be unique to humans and unique to language
— exists in some nonhuman animals, when in fact, the tool does not have the capacity to
detect recursion. I tell a story of this episode of toolmisuse in the sections that follow.
To get slightly ahead of myself, Fitch (2012) argues that the unfortunate search
for recursion with the FLTpowered AGL experiment is misled by a pervasive conflation
of key concepts in FLT, such as the Chomsky hierarchy and recursion. Fitch (2010, 84)
suggests that this conflation appears in “the merger of mathematics and linguistics called
formal language theory” (which I discuss in Section 6.4.5).
Without contradicting Fitch’s statement, I argue that there was another source of
confusion. Those researchers, who misapplied the experimental protocols for detecting
recursion, were misled by a paper coauthored by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) (as
I argue in Section 6.4.6). In other words, this conflation of concepts has been carried
over to cognitive biology, which then starts the unfortunate confusion. The story begins
with why, after 2004, there was suddenly a surge of testing recursion in nonhuman
48

animals.
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E.g., Abe et al 2011; Bahlmann et al 2008; de Vries et al 2008; Gentner et al 2006;
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6.4

The Unfortunate Search for ‘Recursion’

6.4.1

The Faculty of Language

It all started with the question: “The Faculty Of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, And
How Did It Evolve?” (title of Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002). The term ‘faculty of
language’ refers to a set of abilities that enable humans to acquire and use natural
languages. Humans are thought to be endowed with these abilities based on our
neurobiological and genetic composition. Traditionally, the faculty of language was
conceived to be uniquely human. It is sometimes compared with ‘animal instinct’ (e.g.,
Pinker 1994). That is, using language is uniquely human in the same way that spinning
webs is uniquely spider.
In contrast, Hauser, Fitch, and Chomsky (2002) propose a threesystem concept of
the language faculty. They argue that some or all of these systems may have an
independent evolutionary history, recruited to bringing about linguistic abilities only in
humans. Thus, studying animal model organisms may shed light on the evolution(s) of
the faculty of human language. They begin with laying out the components of this
faculty, all of which are meant to account for what language really is.
6.4.2 Sensorymotor System, Conceptualintentional System, And Abstract Linguistic
Computational System
The first component is the ‘sensorymotor’ system, responsible for hearing (or viewing)
and speaking (or gesturing). The second is the ‘conceptualintentional’ system, in charge

Hochmann et al 2008; Marcus 2006; Perruchet and Rey 2005; Rey et al 2012; Stobbe et
al 2012; Udden et al 2012; van Heijiningen et al 2009.
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of meaning. The last is the “abstract linguistic computational system,” for creating
internal representations of discrete expressions (ibid., 1571). Each of the three systems is
responsible for one aspect of language, which according to the authors is “fundamentally,
a system of soundmeaning connections” with “a finite set of elements” and “a
potentially infinite array of discrete expressions” (ibid). In particular (ibid),
Each of these discrete expressions is ... passed to the sensorymotor and
conceptualintentional systems, which process and elaborate this information in
the use of language. Each expression is, in this sense, a pairing of sound and
meaning.
One important step in their analysis of the faculty of language is the introduction
of ‘recursion.’ “At the minimum,” the abstract linguistic computational system “includes
the capacity of recursion” for creating “an openended and limitless system of
communication” (ibid., 1571/1578). They call this system ‘the faculty of language in the
narrow sense’ or the ‘FLN.’ Thus, recursion is the main characteristic of the FLN. In
contrast, the whole threepart system (i.e., FLN together with the sensorymotor system
and the conceptualintentional system) is called ‘the faculty of language in the broad
sense’ or the ‘FLB.’
6.4.3

The Evolution of the Faculty of Language and the ‘Recursiononly’ Hypothesis

Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) argue that this FLB/FLN distinction helps to break
down questions in the literature that concern the comparative and evolutionary aspects of
the faculty of language. According to them, these questions were:
1. whether the faculty of language is uniquely human or shared with other species,
145

2. whether the evolution of such a faculty is gradual or saltational, and
3. whether it evolved as a unique adaptation for communication or for some other
computational problems.
They suggest, for instance, that researchers may now investigate details of each of the
three subsystems along the comparative aspect of the subject matter (as shown in
Question 1). Those details may inform the study of the evolutionary aspects of the topic
(as in Questions 23). That way, scholars may piece together a fuller understanding of
the evolution of language.
With those traditional research questions renewed, the authors then offer
hypotheses for further research. I restate two of their proposed hypotheses as follows:
Either FLB as a whole is a “uniquely human adaptation for language” (ibid., 1572), or
“[o]nly FLN is uniquely human” (ibid., 1573), surely not both. The word ‘only’ in the
latter makes the two hypotheses mutually exclusive. This latter hypothesis was
interpreted as the ‘recursiononly’ hypothesis. As the authors put in the abstract (ibid.,
1596): “We hypothesize [both] that FLN only includes recursion and [that FLN] is the
only uniquely human component of the faculty of language.”
6.4.4

Empirical Methods for Detecting Recursion in Nonhuman Animals

Verifying the recursiononly hypothesis is not straightforward. FLN supposedly contains
only recursion, and recursion is supposedly responsible for an openended and limitless
system of communication. To illustrate, scientists assume that humans have recursion. A
typical argument goes as follows. For any given sentence, e.g., ‘the Earth is round’, one
may create indefinitely many sentences by repeatedly adding a clause in front of it, such
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as ‘Mary believes that…,’ ‘John knows that…,’ ‘it is possible that…,’ and so on. It
appears that a test for recursion in a subject requires a communication system between
the experimenter and the subject. Thus, not speaking any animal languages, and indeed
not knowing whether any exist, scientists wishing to detect recursion in nonhuman
animals need to resort to other signs of recursion.
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) suggest two possible directions: number
representation and rule learning. Because both abilities “can be investigated
independently of communication,” experiments of these two abilities can “provide hints
as to the nature of the constraints on FLN” (2002, 1577). This statement is one of the
first places where confusion starts to loom.
Openendedness in Number Representation
According to the authors, the best evidence for number representation in nonhuman
animals at the time was from work done by Boysen and Matsuzawa on chimpanzees.
(They cite Boysen and Bernston 1989, Kawai and Matsuzawa 2000, Matsuzawa 1985).
However, unlike human children, Chimpanzees do not show the openendedness in their
number representation. The authors continue (1577),
A human child who has acquired the number 1, 2, and 3 (and sometimes 4) goes
on to acquire all the others; he or she grasps the idea that the integer list is
constructed on the basis of the successor function. For the chimpanzees, in
contrast, each number on the integer list required the same amount of time to
learn. In essence, although the chimpanzees’ understanding of Arabic numerals is
impressive, it parallels their understanding of other symbols and their referential
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properties: The system apparently never takes on the openended generative
property of human language.

What might be the cause of such a fundamental difference? The authors consider
two possibilities. The first possibility concerns the difference in learning experience due
to external factors, a view that they attribute to Carey (2001). For instance, children
“typically learn an arbitrar[il]y ordered list of symbols (‘1, 2, 3, 4 …’), and only later do
they learn the “precise meaning of such words” (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002,
1577.). In contrast, “apes and parrots were taught” by the experimenters “the meanings
one by one without learning the list (ibid., 1577). Thus, this difference from the training
regime of animals might have resulted in their fundamentally different experience.
The second possibility concerns the difference in the computational constraints of
the nonhuman animals, i.e., “the kind of statistical inference that animals can compute”
(ibid., 1577). Importantly, this is where the Chomsky hierarchy, rule learning, and the
thesis of supraregularity (Sections 4.2.4 and 5.2.3) enter the discussion, all (wrongly) in
connection with recursion. After introducing these concepts (which I quote below), the
authors state in a caption that “in parallel with the faculty of language, our capacity for
number relies on a recursive computation” (ibid., 1576). The passage that may have
conflated the concepts of supra regularity (or ‘hierarchical processing’ in their
terminology) and recursion reads as follows (1577, emphasis mine):
Early work in computational linguistics (Chomsky 1975, 1956, Chomsky and
Miller 1958) suggested that we can profitably think about language as a system of
rules placed within a hierarchy of increasing complexity. At the lowest level of
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the hierarchy are rule systems that are limited to local dependencies, a
subcategory of socalled “finitestate grammars.” Despite their attractive
simplicity, such rules systems are inadequate to capture any human language.
Natural languages go beyond purely local structure by including a capacity for
recursive embedding of phrases within phrases, which can lead to statistical
regularities that are separated by an arbitrary number of words or phrases. Such
longdistance, hierarchical relationships are found in all natural languages for
which, at a minimum, a “phrasestructure grammar” is necessary. It is a
foundational observation of modern generative linguistics that, to capture a
natural language, a grammar must include such capacities (authors pointing to a
figure which I replicate in Fig. 6.1).
This passage is misleading for two reasons. First, it seems to suggest that supra
regularity, which the finitestate grammars lack, distinguishes between formal systems
that have openendedness and formal systems that lack openendedness.49 This
suggestion is incorrect because both finitestate grammar and phrasestructure grammar
are openended; in fact, all four classes of formal grammars in the Chomsky hierarchy
are. After all, as Fitch states later (2014, 347): FLT is “the study of infinite sets generated
by finite means.” Thus, these two classes in the Chomsky hierarchy cannot inform
scholars about recursion in terms of openendedness. Second, it invokes the term
‘recursive’ referring to recursively “embedding ... phrases within phrases,” whereas by
‘recursion’ they conflated the notions by thinking of openendedness as due to recursion

According to the three authors (2002), recursion is supposedly about the capacity of
handling an openended system, which could be integers, numbers in general, or natural
languages.
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(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002, 1577, emphasis mine). Let me elaborate on this in
the next section.

Fig. 6.1 Recursion as Openendedness. This illustration is captured from the Fig. 5 in
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002, 1576).

6.4.5

Recursion: Openendedness and Selfembedding

Within their paper (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002), recursion has at least two
readings: recursion as the capacity for using an openended system and recursion as
selfembedding. The latter reading implies the former, but not vice versa. In linguistics,
‘recursion’ refers to the property of a rewriting rule being ‘selfembedding,’ which is
indeed a supra regular feature (Section 5.2.3). However, ‘selfembedding’ could describe
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both stringsets AnBn and (AB)n in Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) AGL learning experiment.
In particular, a rewriting rule is ‘selfembedded’ if the same phrase type, S, appears on
both sides of a production in the form

→

. As such, the stringset generated by (AB)n

can be described by a recursive rule. To illustrate, consider the three productions shown
in (5.1).
(5.1)
i.

S→ASB

ii.

S → AB

iii.

S → SAB

In both (5.1i) and (5.1iii), the phrase S appears on both sides of the production arrow,
making the two of them selfembedded rules, whereas (5.1ii) lacks such a pattern.
Note that a grammar consisting of rules (5.1i) and (5.1ii) can generate the
stringset of AnBn, whereas a grammar containing both (5.1ii) and (5.1iii) can generate the
stringset (AB)n. As such, both stringsets are said to be generated by a selfembedded
rule. Recursion in terms of selfembedding does not tell apart the stringsets in Fitch and
Hauser’s AGL experiment.50 Thus, while the FLTpoweredAGL experimental protocols
developed by Fitch and Hauser may have the right profiles for detecting supraregularity,
the tool certainly does not detect recursion in terms of openendedness (because all four
classes of grammars in the Chomsky hierarchy are openended), nor does it detect
selfembedding (Fitch 2010). Crucially, while supraregularity is irrelevant with regard
to ‘recursion as openendedness,’ it does concern ‘recursionasselfembedding.’ A

What they should have said is ‘centerembedding’ instead of ‘selfembedding’.
However, recursion in linguistics is not limited to ‘centerembedding’. Thus, either way,
confusion persists.
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grammar consisting at least one selfembedding rule disqualifies as Type 3. Thus, at the
end of discussing number representation, ‘recursion’ gains an additional reading of being
about selfembedding, a reading that is used in linguistics for describing rewriting rules.
6.4.6

Misinterpretation of the Experimental Results

Recall my analysis of FLTpoweredAGL experimental protocols (Section 5.3.1). The
experimental result would reveal whether the subjects spontaneously recognize their
training grammar. When the subjects do not recognize a supraregular grammar,
everything else being equal, this result is interpreted as that the subjects do not possess
the addition computational resource to be supra regular Due to the discussion in Hauser,
Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) that potentially conflated supraregularity and ‘recursion as
openendedness,’ commentators took Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) work to be confirming
the recursiononly hypothesis (Section 6.4.3). Fitch reports several such cases (2010,
87):
The first place I saw this misinterpretation was ... written by David Premack,
appearing in the same issue of Science: “In ... this issue, Fitch and Hauser ...
report that tamarin monkeys are not capable of recursion. Although the monkeys
learned a nonrecursive grammar, they failed to learn a grammar that is recursive.
Humans readily learn both” (Premack 2004, 318). ... [A] latter paper by Perruchet
and Rey (2005) apparently assumed that we shared Premack’s assessment of our
experiment, disputing our “claim” about AnBn “generating centerembedded
sentences.” Most recently, Gentner et al. (2006) concluded that starlings are able,
with training, to master the AnBn grammar, and titled their paper “Recursive
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syntactic pattern learning by songbirds.” The abstract states that AnBn is a
recursive, selfembedding, contextfree grammar’ ” The accompanying
commentary by Gary Marcus continues the error, asserting that “The AnBn
language … is generally assumed to be recursive ….”
To Fitch, the thought that AnBn requires recursion not only is incorrect, but also “appears
to reflect an inadequate grasp of computer science and formal language” (2010, 87).
Most importantly, he says, “our paper [2004] did not mention recursion, because AnBn is
not a test for recursion” (ibid.). He continues, “the question of recursive implementation
is orthogonal to the analysis of grammatical power embodied in the Chomsky hierarchy”
(ibid.). What AnBn grammar does in the AGL experiment is to test “the additional
memory mechanism(s) to keep track of ‘n’ ”, and “it is an error to see success at
recognizing strings from AnBn (as for starlings) as indicating recursion, or to see failure at
the same task (as for tamarins) as necessarily implying a lack of recursion” (ibid., 8788).
While being polemic in his response, Fitch does “regret certain editorial
decisions,” not in the (2004) but in the earlier paper (Hauser, Fitch, and Chomsky 2002)
that made their “argument more opaque than desirable” (2010, 75). In the next section, I
discuss the key passages (in Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002) where their misleading
message lies. He is correct to regret — it was him and his coauthors who exposed their
scientific community to the risk of making the mistake. (And let’s not forget that one of
his coauthors is the inventor of the initial hierarchy!)
6.4.7

Conflation of Concepts Carried Over by the Importers

The most likely source that started misapplying AnBn grammar to be a test for recursion, I
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argue, appears in Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch (2002). Fitch is correct; Hauser and Fitch
(2004) did not mention recursion. However, that paper was not the time the scientific
community first heard of their novel AGL experiment. In 2002, Hauser, Chomsky, and
Fitch disclosed the experiment and discussed their conclusion (then in preparation). At
the end of the relevant passage (which I quote below in its entirety), they added two lines
that are unmistakably misleading (ibid., 1578, omitting descriptions of the experimental
procedure, emphasis mine):
Fitch and Hauser [then in preparation] recently completed a study comparing
finitestate and phrasestructure grammar acquisition in human adults and
tamarins. ... The phrasestructure rule tested was AnBn. ... Results showed that
human adults rapidly learned this rule implicitly, distinguishing consistent and
inconsistent strings. Tamarins, in contrast, failed in three separate experiments
testing their ability to acquire this grammar, but they readily mastered a
51

finitestate variant (ABn) implemented with the same stimuli and testing
conditions. This suggests that tamarins have a limited capacity to learn the type
of longdistance hierarchical dependencies necessary to achieve the class of
phrasestructure grammars. If true, this limitation would place severe restrictions
on their capacity to learn any natural human language. It is currently unclear
whether this limitation generalizes to other animals, and whether it is similarly
imposed on humans at different stages of development. Nonetheless, such
experiments provide an empirical approach to exploring key differences between
humans and animals relevant to FLN.
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Typo in the original; it should have been (AB)n.
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If FLN contains only recursion, and if the AGL experiments “provide an empirical
approach to explore” important species differences “relevant to FLN,” then it seems
natural to conclude that the AGL experiment was the goto tool for testing recursion.

6.5

Summary of the Migration of the Theory of Formal Language

The tool of FLTpoweredAGL experimental protocols successfully promoted the
comparative approach and interdisciplinary research in the study of language evolution.
The tool even allows nonhuman animal model organisms to reenter the study of human
language, and vice versa. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch state that (2002, 1578):
Our review has stressed the usefulness of animal data for theories about humans,
but this exchange need not be oneway. As the research program we have
sketched progresses, more general principles about cognitive evolution may
emerge.
Interdisciplinary collaboration is the key to making progress in this endeavor. They urge
scholars including “[l]inguistics and biologists, along with researchers in the relevant
branches of psychology and anthropology” to “move beyond unproductive theoretical
debate to a more collaborative, empirically focused and comparative research program”
for the goal of “uncovering both shared ... and unique components of the faculty of
language” (2000, 1578). Unfortunately, in articulating such a research program, the
authors inadvertently introduced a conflation of concepts between supra regularity and
recursion — a conflation which Fitch believes to have existed before their work —
leading to yet another unproductive debate.
After much effort devoted to clarification (including an ERCsponsored workshop
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and a number of publications), the rush to find recursion seems to have subsided.
Looking back, Fitch (2014, 30) notes: Although my colleagues and I have previously
discussed the generation of new [hierarchical] levels in terms of “recursion” [his citation
to Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch 2002], I now regret this.”
Recursion is leaving the spotlight, taken over by the stack model of the brain.
The AGL experiments and FLT remain at the center of cognitive biology (e.g., Jiang et al.
2018, Fitch 2018). One lesson learned: unlike Fitch once thought (2010, 109), FLT was
not necessarily “wellunderstood” for doing what he proposes to do. Indeed, within an
interdisciplinary research program, whether a tool’s is ‘wellunderstood’ cannot be
estimated disregarding the users who are invited to use it.
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Chapter 7

Conclusion

Tool Migration is Epistemically Risky — Having A Similar Target Profile
Does Not Seem to Help

7.1

Summary

This dissertation focused on the scientific practice in which a mathematical construct that
was originally developed to study a particular subject matter but subsequently used in
other disciplines or subdisciplines for a different subject matter, a phenomenon that I call
‘tool migration.’ The main motivation behind this research was the concern that tool
migration can be ‘epistemically risky.’ More specifically, that uprooting a research tool
from one disciplinary context and resituating it for use in another can change how the
tool is applied; whatever has made the tool useful and reliable in the first place may not
have stayed the same in the new context. The two migration stories illustrated in this
dissertation legitimize this concern. The epistemic risks associated with tool migration
are real. However, my analyses of these tool migration stories reveal that changes in the
tools due to uprooting or resituation are not necessarily the problem; instead, appropriate
and proactive modifications to a tool in migration are conducive to successfully applying
an old tool in a new context. By contrast, having a similar set of definitions concerning
the theoretical terms in the formal construct (i.e., the tool’s target profile) does not make
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tool migration less precarious.
The epistemic risks associated with tool migration have not been explicitly
addressed by philosophers of science. The lack of attention to this topic is surprising in
light of the recent and growing interest in topics such as scientific model transfer. For
instance, the discussion of ‘model transfer’ concerns a relatively small set of
mathematical models that are applied in multiple disciplinary contexts. Humphreys
(2004, 2018) argues that models which are transferred to study phenomena of different
domains owe their versatility to the computational tractability they afford. In contrast,
Knuuttila and Loettger (2014, 2016) suggest that in addition to tractability, versatile
models also offer conceptual frameworks for theorization, which they label ‘model
templates.’ However, while ‘model transfer’ is similar to what I call tool migration, prior
analyses have not dealt with the risks inherent in this aspect of scientific practice.
In a slightly different context, Morgan (2010) proposed a similar warning about
the use of evidence outside its site of construction or discovery, or what she calls
‘traveling facts.’ Her argument that ‘losing integrity’ poses a threat to the usefulness and
reliability of traveling facts coincides with my preconception about tools in migration.
Her warning is based on a collection of case studies (Howlett and Morgan 2010) devoted
to understanding the different ways in which facts are received and treated as evidence
according to different disciplinary bases. It was clear to me that my reservation about the
use of the tools in migration resembles Morgan’s concern about the use of the traveling
facts. I thus modeled my investigation to examine whether ‘losing integrity’ also poses a
threat to the usefulness and reliability of the tools in migration.52

52

What was not clear to me is how my concern of the ‘importers’ in tool migration turns
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The main contributions of the current project are 1) the analytic framework that I
developed and 2) the findings I discovered by applying the framework to my case studies.
On the analytic framework, first I characterized an application of a research tool in three
types of tasks: problem formulation, calculation (or computation), and interpretation.
Specifically, in an application mathematical constructs are used to:
(i) formulate a research question into a tractable form,
(ii) obtain an analytic result of the formulation, and
(iii) interpret the analytic result as a solution or answer to the research question.
Second, within an application of a tool, I distinguished the tool’s:
● Target profile: the set of theoretical terms (especially their definitions and the
relations between these terms) that factor into formulating the problem, and
● Usage profile: the set of ways in which the results of calculation are interpreted.
Between applications, I distinguished:
● Established application, and
● Novel application.
Third, with these two conceptpairs, I build a fourfold typology to check for the
‘integrity’ of a tool in migration. Specifically, I compared the similarities or differences
in either profiles between applications.
● When a novel application retains both the target profile and usage profile of a tool
from the tool’s established application(s), I classify it as toolapplication,
● when the novel application retains a critically similar target profile of the tool but

out nicely corresponding with Morgan’s concern of the ‘curator’ and ‘labeling practice’
in traveling facts. See footnote 8 for discussion.
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has changed the tool’s usage profile has changed, I call it tooladaptation,
● when the novel application retains a critically similar usage profile of the tool wut
has changed the tool’s target profile, it is a tooltransfer, and
● when the novel application has changed both the target profile and usage profile
of the tool, it is a tooltransformation.
I then applied this framework to argue that the migration stories of game theory and
formal language theory are examples of tooltransformation and tooladaptation,
respectively.
7.1.1

Case Study 1: Game Theory

Game theory was constructed for studying strategic interaction between agents capable of
making decisions (von Neumann 1928); yet game theory has since been used in
evolutionary biology to study the change of phenotypes in a population of organisms that
may or may not be capable of making decisions (MaynardSmith and Price 1972).
From the migration stories of game theory, I found substantial changes, especially
the changes in the definitions about the ‘players’ and the ‘payoffs.’ To use my
terminology, between these applications, there is a collection of diverging target profiles.
For instance, once game theory left the context of the social sciences and entered the
context of evolutionary biology, the ‘players’ are no longer defined to be
decisionmaking individuals, nor is the ‘change of strategy’ a result of individual player’s
decisionmaking process. Such a definition (i.e., players being capable of choosing one
strategy over another) simply does not apply to subject matter of evolutionary biology.
Moreover, a ‘strategy’ in evolutionary game theory refers to a phenotype that individual
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organisms display, and the concept of a ‘payoff,’ in turn, is redefined as Darwinian fitness
(i.e., the number of copies that it will leave to play in the games of a succeeding
generation). Consequently, in evolutionary biology, the phrase ‘a change of strategy’
means a change of the proportion of the phenotypes in a population. Furthermore, in
order to account for this change in the proportion of phenotypes, it is assumed that
(MaynardSmith and Price 1972) an individual organism passes on its phenotype to its
offspring according to the fitness (i.e., payoff) assigned in the payoff matrix. This
became known as the heritability assumption about the individuals in evolutionary game
theory. As a result, the change in the proportion of phenotypes is understood as a result
of differential biological reproduction instead of decisionmaking. For this reason, when
the social scientists started applying evolutionary game theory to theoretical economics,
MaynardSmith (1997) criticized their applications for being ignored of the heritability
assumption.
My analysis showed that MaynardSmith’s criticism was a misjudgment because
there has been a change in how ‘payoff’ is defined. Such a change in the definition of
‘payoff’ can be viewed as ‘counteractors’ to offset other changes (e.g., the subject matter
changes from being about decisionmaking individuals to being about
phenotypedisplaying organisms). Had it not been this counteracting modification in the
definition of ‘payoff,’ MaynardSmith’s (1997) criticism would have been justified.
Specifically, according to MaynardSmith (1997), evolutionary game theory “hinges on
the notion of heredity, i.e. the essential notion being that your success in the game
determines how many children you have, and your children are like you, and the whole
thing [i.e., the propagation of a particular strategy] hinges upon that essential
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assumption.” In other words, if the social scientists used the tool to study human affairs
in merely a ‘plugandplay’ manner, they have mischaracterized their human subjects.
However, unbeknownst to MaynardSmith, Taylor and Jonker (1978) in their application
contested the idea that the propagation of a strategy can be understood only as a result of
heredity, as MaynardSmith did. According to them, it can be understood also as a result
of social learning (e.g., imitation). Thus, this change of assumption, which changes the
target profile of the tool, in turn properly resituates the tool from evolutionary biology
back to the social sciences.
In general, counteracting modifications to a tool in migration, despite causing the
tool to ‘lose integrity,’ are helpful to prevent errors that are particularly associated with
tool migration. In other words, counteractors are crucial (and perhaps indispensable!) to
properly resituate a tool in a new context. As mentioned in Chapter 3, my finding of
‘counteracting modification’ in tool migration is consistent with the existing literature on
the improvement of ‘theoretical templates’ (Humphreys 2018) and the construction of
model templates (Knuuttila and Loettger 2014, 2016).
7.1.2

Case Study 2: Formal Language Theory

From the migration stories of formal language theory (‘FLT’), I found a similar set of
definitions concerning the theoretical terms: ‘alphabet,’ ‘words,’ ‘phrases,’ ‘sentences,’
‘rules,’ ‘derivations,’ etc. Between linguistics and computer science, these theoretical
terms are units of information that are hierarchically organized. Specifically, in
linguistics, an alphabet is a set of symbols, which are the smallest units that form words,
which are units that form phrases, and phrases, in turn, are units that form sentences. In
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computer science, as I illustrated with the programming language ALGOL, characters are
the smallest units that which form expressions, and expressions, in turn, are units that
which form statements. In both disciplines, grammatical rules are descriptions of the
allowable forms, and derivations are the processes that generate these forms. These
similarities suggest that the target profile of FLT has survived through the migration from
linguistics to computer science. A similar set of assumptions can be found in Fitch and
Hauser’s (2004) design of their experiment. They created two classes of syllables, which
are then used to generate strings as experimental stimuli based on rules that they call
‘grammars.’
However, in contrast to a converging target profile, I found increasingly different
ways in which FLT is used across the disciplines. To use my terminology, between these
applications, there is an augmented usage profile. My analysis suggests that in each of
those disciplines, a ‘new use’ is added to the tool in their respective application.
Specifically, there are the ‘theorizinguse’ in linguistics, the ‘engineeringuse’ in
computer science, and the ‘experimentaluse’ in cognitive biology. In particular, in
linguistics, the tool is developed to reveal the rules that can generate all natural languages
so as to theorize the knowledge of human language (see the top diagram in Fig. 7.1). In
computer science, the tool is further developed for the programmers to engineer the list of
instructions such that the computer will behave according to some design needs (e.g.,
particular kinds of output) (see the middle diagram in Fig. 7.1). Finally, in cognitive
biology, the tool is modified to probe a subject’s ‘internal program’ through experiment
(see the bottom diagram in Fig. 7.1).
On the positive side, a common target profile with an expanded usage profile in a
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tool offers a ‘common ground’ for the users to integrate knowledge generated from
multiple disciplines. Such a common ground also allows them to bridge different,
sometimes competing methodologies into one cohesive, interdisciplinary research
program. For instance, Chomsky is known for not only the classification scheme that
now bears his name, but also his criticism of animal model organisms used in the study of
human language (Chomsky 1956a; Osgood 1975). Fitch and Hauser’s ingenious, novel
application of the Chomsky hierarchy enables a ‘conceptual crossover.’ It brings
nonhuman animals as model organisms back to the study of human language, together
with formal models of language constructed by Chomsky.

Fig. 7.1 Three Diagrams of the ‘Flow of Information’
These three diagrams illustrate different uses of formal language theory across linguistics,
computer science, and cognitive Biology
On the negative side, by applying the tool in neurolinguistics, one crucial change
in subject matter is left unaccounted for — the subject matter changed from being about
information processing regardless of implementation to being about linguistic processing
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actually implemented in the brain. The lack of a counteractor to this change of subject
has caused resistance from some neurolinguists. There were also backlashes from the
comparative experimental psychologists who believed that the tool could be used to
detect recursion — something that goes beyond the intended use by Fitch and Hauser
(2004).
A primary finding of this dissertation is that tool migration is epistemically risky,
and yet the source of the epistemic risks does not necessarily come from changes to the
tool. As these two illustrative case studies show, having a consistent target profile is
neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent errors that are associated with tool migration.

7.2

Future Directions

7.2.1

Are Some Types of Tool Migration Safer Than Others?

In this dissertation, what I have not been able to address is whether there can be any
general connections between the types of tool migration and the kinds of epistemic risks.
It is possible that tooltransformation may promote counteractors, which makes it a
‘safer’ type of tool migration. Conversely, it is likely that toolapplication may create a
‘false sense of security,’ which makes it a less safe type of tool migration. For when
there is a salient change in the tool’s target profile, one would expect the users in the new
disciplinary context to be more alert than when there isn’t such a salient change. To
illustrate this contrast, consider a mundane driving experience. Consider yourself driving
a car that is borrowed for a long road trip. When the car is of a different brand, different
year, and thus different interior from your own car, you might be more attentive to its
condition before and while driving it. In contrast, when the car you borrowed happens to
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be of the same brand, only, say, two years older than your car, and thus it has a very
similar interior to the one you have been driving for years, it would not be surprising if a
sense of familiarity desensitizes you from paying attention to this car’s idiosyncrasies.53
In a sense, driving the latter car makes the road trip more dangerous than driving the
former car. However, it requires further studies to identify (if there is any) connections
between particular types of tool migration and specific kind of epistemic risks.
7.2.2

A New Genre of Epistemic Risks

In addition to the discussion of model transfer, another line of literature in the philosophy
of science that I could make a connection with is the existing discussion of epistemic
risks. The concept of epistemic risks has been varyingly associated with other ideas, such
as uncertainty, probability, values, or responsibility (e.g., Sahlin 2012, Fallis 2007,
Parascandola 2010, Santoro, Marino, and Tamburrini 2008, Freedman 2014). In contrast,
a systematic account has been very recently proposed by Justin Biddle and Rebecca
Kukla (2017, also Biddle 2016). According to them, ‘epistemic risk’ refers to the risk of
being wrong in the context of falsely accepting or rejecting an element related to the
pursuit of knowledge. Such an element could be an hypothesis, a methodology, a
background assumption, a set of test subjects, a policy, or a definition. Along with this
line of discussion, epistemic risks associated with tool migration can be understood as the
risk of falsely accepting or rejecting a novel use of a previously established research tool.
Further case studies may then be able to contribute to this literature with examples of
such risks (e.g., mischaracterization, misinterpretation, misjudgment) and how to avoid

Julia Bursten (in personal conversation) provides this example to illustrate a ‘false
sense of security’.
166
53

them.
7.2.3

The Unity of Science 3.0?

On top of providing preventive measures, a study of tool migration has potential to shed
light on the longstanding philosophical question of how ‘unified’ science can be.
Philosophers of science once aimed to reveal a logical structure by which scientific
theories could be reduced to one another (e.g., Oppenheim and Putnam 1958), but this
pursuit of theory reduction has long been abandoned (Kitcher 1999). Superseding this
tradition was a gradual but steady shift of focus from questions concerning scientific
theories to those concerning scientific practice, e.g., what counts as evidence or what
counts as an explanation—a trend that persists to this day. As Humphreys (2016) argues,
the focus on scientific practice has led to both a ‘disunity’ view of science among
philosophers and the fragmentation of philosophy of science into various subdisciplines,
such as the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, and many more. According
to Humphreys, both consequences are understandable. For instance, a theory of scientific
evidence that works in astronomy may not work in chemistry. Likewise, a theory of
scientific explanation that accounts for explanations in biology may not necessarily
account for explanations in physics or economics. Naturally, philosophers of science
gravitate towards a specific science to avoid overgeneralization. Once such a division of
labor is established, it becomes harder for philosophers of a specific science to grasp
what may be the unifying features of science as a whole. In contrast, studying tool
migration provides a different perspective for looking at scientific practice. Instead of
focusing on one disciplinary context at a time. A study of tool migration compares and
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contrasts multiple scientific contexts, by examining how each of these disciplines handles
a particular research tool. Following versatile research tools may thereby allow a
common theme that underlies multiple scientific disciplines to emerge.
7.2.4

Integration of Disciplines and Tool Migration

Finally, the incident of ‘conceptual crossover’ in Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) novel
application of FLT could make an intriguing case study to contribute to the literature of
the study of ‘interdisciplinary.’ Under the umbrella term of ‘interdisciplinarity,’
academic interactions across disciplinary boundaries have been studied by scholars from
the humanities and social sciences (e.g., Apostel 1972; Boden 1999; Bruun, Hukkinen,
Huutoniemi, and Klein 2005; Krohn 2017; Graff 2015; Lattuca 2001; Miller 1982). A
major focus of this literature has been to construct typologies — especially that can be
used to effectively recognize patterns or characteristics of academic activities that
promote integration between disciplines or disciplinary knowledge. The philosophers of
science who have engaged in this topic have focused on the interdisciplinary dynamics
that prompt the creation versatile tools such as evolutionary game theory (GrüneYanoff
2011, 2016). In particular, GrüneYanoff (2011) argues that versatile tools may be seen
as products of successful ‘interdisciplinary exchange.’ One important question, which
arose from this literature of the development and application of versatile tools in science,
is whether interdisciplinary exchange leads to the integration of disciplines. That is, does
the process of producing a common research tool promote the cohesion of concepts and
the integration of practices (e.g., explanations, ontologies, methods, and data)?
GrüneYanoff (2016) has argued that an interdisciplinary exchange can be successful in
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producing a versatile tool without necessarily integrating the disciplines involved. While
GrüneYanoff does not rule out that some interdisciplinary exchange could succeed in
both, it remains a question: Which kind of dynamics may produce not only a versatile
research tool but also the integration of disciplines? The tooladaptation of FLT in
cognitive biology has the potential to shed light on this question.
7.2.5

Final Remark: A Case for the Study of Tool Migration

Making novel use of a borrowed tool can be conducive to scientific progress. Yet, as I
have argued, one needs to bear in mind that tool migration is not without risks. Potential
errors from using borrowed tools include mischaracterization (i.e., characterizing the
phenomenon in question with inappropriate assumptions), misinterpretation (i.e., using
illfitted background contexts to interpret the result of a calculation), and misjudgment
(i.e., incorrectly rejecting or accepting a novel use of a borrowed tool). Science offers
abundant examples of tool migration. A proper understanding of science would be
incomplete without a systematic study of tool migration. This dissertation offers a starter
kit, a conceptual framework with which one may identify, classify, and study any formal
tools in migration.
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